SB    31D 


REESE  LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


'Received 


,  190     . 


«  K  F.  •>  •} 

Accession  No.    ...OtJU'-)O    .   Class  No. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CAVALRY 


OF  THE 


Army  of  the  Potomac, 


INCLUDING 


That  of  the  Army  of  Virginia  (Pope's),  and 

also  the  History  of  the  Operations  of  the 

Federal  Cavalry  in  West  Virginia 

During  the  War. 


BY 


CHARLES    D.    RHODES, 

First  Lieutenant,  Sixth  Cavalry. 


KAI 

HUDSON-KlMBERLY  PUBLISHING  Co, 
1900, 


COPYRIGHT  1900. 

HUDSON-KlMBERLY   PUBLISHING   CO., 

KANSAS  CITY,  Mo. 


INTRODUCTION. 

The  preparation  of  the  following  pages,  especially 
that  portion  dealing  with  the  events  of  the  first  two 
years  of  the  war,  has  not  been  easy.  To  evolve  a  gen 
eral  history  from  those  of  individuals,  and  yet  not  deal 
with  any  one  regiment  to  the  prejudice  of  others;  to 
separate  the  operations  of  the  cavalry  from  those  of 
the  other  arms,  and  yet  preserve  that  degree  of  rela 
tionship  which  a  part  bears  to  the  whole;  to  touch 
upon  the  details  of  the  battle  and  the  march,  and  yet 
not  transgress 'the  prescribed  limits  of  this  little  his 
tory — all  these  have  been  difficulties  which  have  sev 
erally  and  collectively  taxed  the  writer's  resources  to 
the  utmost.  The  almost  total  absence  of  works  of  ref 
erence,  except  histories  of  individual  regiments  and 
the  official  records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  has 
in  itself  involved  a  vast  deal  of  labor.  It  is,  perhaps, 
not  too  much  to  say  that  a  history  of  the  cavalry  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  might  very  easily  have  filled 
three  times  as  many  pages  as  have  here  been  devoted 
to  it;  and  the  writer  has,  much  against  his  will,  been 
compelled  to  cut  out  matter  of  the  greatest  interest 
At  the  same  time,  while  he  has  borne  in  mind  that  this 

85533 


4  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

history  is  intended  to  be  a  faithful  chronicle  of  the 
life  of  the  Federal  cavalry,  he  has  tried  not  to  lost* 
sight  of  the  fact  that  a  mere  record  of  events  is  cer 
tain  to  be  monotonous  reading. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  CAVALRY 

OF  THE 

ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC. 

i. 

At  the  breaking  out  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion 
the  cavalry  force  at  the  disposal  of  the  United  States 
Government  consisted  of  the  First  and  Second  Regi 
ments  of  Dragoons,  one  regiment  of  Mounted  Rifles, 
and  the  First  and  Second  Regiments  of  Cavalry.  When 
President  Lincoln  issued  his  call  for  three-months 
volunteers,  another  regiment,  the  Sixth,  was  added  to 
the  five  others,  but,  for  the  time,  this  was  the  extent 
of  the  increase  in  the  cavalry.  Volunteer  infantry  and 
artillery  poured  into  Washington  from  all  parts  of  the 
North,  but  volunteer  cavalry  neither  came  nor  -wer>' 
encouraged  to  come.  Absurd  as  it  now  appears,  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  Federal  authorities  to  confine  the 
cavalry  to  the  six  regular  regiments.  The  North  confi 
dently  expected  to  crush  the  Rebellion  at  once.  Cav 
alry  was  an  expensive  arm,  and  experienced  officers 
knew  that  years  were  required  to  produce  an  efficient 


6  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

trooper.  Even  such  a  veteran  as  General  Scott  gave 
it  as  his  opinion  that,  owing  to  the  broken  and  wooded 
character  of  the  field  of  operations  and  the  improve 
ments  in  rifled  firearms,  the  role  of  the  cavalry  would 
be  unimportant  and  secondary.  McClellan's  report  of 
the  preliminary  operations  in  West  Virginia  says: 
"Cavalry  was  absolutely  refused,  but  the  governors  of 
the  States  complied  with  my  request  and  organized  a 
few  companies,  which  were  finally  mustered  into  the 
United  States  service  arid  proved  very  useful." 

Only  seven  companies  of  cavalry  took  part  in  (he 
battle  of  Bull  Kun,  but  the  firm  front  which  they  dis 
played  while  covering  the  precipitate  retreat  of  the 
Federal  army  probably  saved  a  large  proportion  of 
the  army  from  annihilation  by  Stuart's  cavalry,  and 
has  never  received  the  recognition  which  it  deserved. 

On  the  27th  of  July,  1861,  McClellan  assumed  coin 
mand  of  what  was  destined  to  be  called  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  and  the  regular  cavalry  regiments  were 
reorganized,  and  renumbered  consecutively  from  "one1' 
to  "six." 

With  the  organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  begins  the  real  history  of  its  cavalry,  but  for  two 
long  years — until  its  reorganization  under  Hooker — 
its  history  is  one  of  neglect,  disorganization,  and  mis 
use.  McClellan's  one  idea  of  the  shortcomings  of  the 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  1 

cavalry  was  that  it  was  not  large  enough.  Meanwhile 
it  furnished  guides,  orderlies,  and  grooms  for  staff 
officers,  and  was  so  divided  up  among  corps,  division, 
and  brigade  commanders  as  to  completely  subvert  its 
true  value,  bringing  sarcasm  and  ignominy  on  what 
should  have  been  one  of  the  most  powerful  factors  in 
the  overthrow  of  the  Rebellion. 

The  drill  regulations  of  the  cavalry  at  the  break 
ing  out  of  the  war — called  at  that  time  "tactics"- 
were  modified  from  those  of  the  French  dragoons,  and 
had  been  found  unsuited  to  the  needs  of  cavalry  oper 
ating  in  the  United  States.  General  Philip  St.  G. 
Cooke  had  accordingly  prepared  a  new  system,  which 
was  approved  by  the  War  Department  in  October, 
1861,  but  did  not  come  into  use  on  account  of  the  con 
ditions  which  obtained  at  the  time.  This,  without 
doubt,  proved  a  great  restriction  upon  the  usefulness 
of  the  arm. 

The  armament  of  the  volunteer  regiments,  which 
were  mustered  in  with  some  show  of  interest  after  the 
disaster  at  Bull  Run,  were  along  the  same  lines  as 
that  of  the  regular  regiments  of  that  day,  and  was  in 
charge  of  General  Stoneman.  Though  suffering  from 
a  deficiency  in  cavalry  arms  and  equipments,  every 
cavalry  soldier  was  armed  with  a  saber  and  revolver 
as  soon  as  circumstances  permitted,  and  at  least  two 
squadrons  in  every  regiment  were  armed  with  carbines. 


8  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

One  volunteer  regiment,  the  Sixth  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry  (Rush's  Lancers),  was  armed  with  the  lance, 
in  addition  to  the  pistol,  twelve  carbines  being  after 
wards  added  to  the  equipment  of  each  company,  for 
picket  and  scouting  duties.  The  lances  were  carried 
from  December,  1861,  until  May,  1863,  when  they  were 
discarded  for  the  carbine,  as  being  ill-adapted  for  use 
in  the  wooded  country  through  which  the  command 
operated. 

The  carbines  issued  were  of  various  patterns,  gen 
erally  the  Sharpe's,  until  the  advent  of  the  Spencer  in 
1863.  The  revolver  was  the  Colt's.  The  saddle  was 
the  McClellan,  and,  with  the  remaining  horse  equip 
ments,  had  been  adopted  through  recommendations 
made  by  General  McClellan  after  his  official  Euro 
pean  tour  in  1860.  The  saddle,  however,  was  covered 
with  rawhide  instead  of  leather,  and  became  very  un 
comfortable  when  split. 

The  original  regulations  governing  the  mustering 
in  of  volunteer  regiments  required  the  cavalry  to  fur 
nish  their  own  horses  as  well  as  horse  equipments;* 
but  this  was  later  modified,  and  the  Government  fur 
nished  them,  as  they  had  done  to  the  regular  regi 
ments.  But  the  horses  furnished  were  in  most  cases 


*See  Appendix  1. 


Army  of  the  Potomac. 

very  poor  animals,  due  to  fraud  on  the  part  of  Gov 
ernment  contractors,  and  the  overtaxed  resources  of 
the  Quartermaster's  Department. 

On  the  15th  of  October,  1861,  the  organization  of 
the  cavalry  consisted  of  a  small  brigade  under  Gen 
eral  Stoneman,  and  some  eleven  or  twelve  other  regi 
ments,  attached  to  divisions  of  infantry.*  Its  strength, 
November  12th,  aggregated  8,125,  of  which  but  4,753 
are  reported  as  "present  for  duty,  equipped."  It  was 
constantly  drilled  during  the  fall  and  winter,  with 
enough  scouting  and  outpost  duty  in  the  Virginia  hills 
to  give  the  cavalry  regiments  a  foretaste  of  actual 
service.  And  just  preceding  the  Peninsular  cam 
paign,  General  Stoneman  with  a  brigade  made  a  re 
connaissance  along  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad 
as  far  as  Cedar  Run. 

In  March,  1862,  the  Peninsular  Army  was  trans 
ported  southward,  and  the  siege  of  Yorktown  was 
begun.  The  cavalry  reserve,  which  was  under  that 
veteran  cavalryman,  General  P.  St.  G.  Cooke,  was 
organized  as  two  brigades  under  Generals  Emery  and 
Blake,  and  consisted  of  six  regiments.f  The  rest  of 


*See  Appendix  2. 

tEmory's  Brigade:  Fifth  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Sixth  U.  S.  Cav 
alry,  Sixth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  Blake's  Brigade:  First  U. 
S.  Cavalry,  Eighth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Barker's  squadron 
Illinois  Cavalry. 


10  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

the  cavalry  was  divided  up  among  the  army  corps 
and  the  various  headquarters.  Every  available  hour 
spared  from  outpost  duty  was  still  utilized  for  drill, 
and  when  the  enemy  abandoned  his  lines  at  Yorktown, 
the  cavalry  was  called  upon  to  pursue. 

General  Cooke  encountered  the  enemy  in  force  at 
Fort  Magruder,  but  as  he  failed  to  be  supported  by 
Hooker's  Division  through  causes  which  have  become 
historic,  he  was  obliged  to  fall  back.  But  not  be 
fore  the  First  U.  S.  Cavalry  had  made  two  brilliant 
charges,  capturing  a  regimental  standard.  Major 
Williams'  four  squadrons  of  the  Sixth  U.  S.  Cavalry, 
which  was  cut  off  by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy,  saved 
itself  by  promptly  wheeling  about  by  fours  and  charg 
ing  the  pursuers. 

Had  there  been  a  larger  force  of  Federal  cavalry, 
or  had  it  been  properly  supported  by  the  infantry  di 
visions,  it  is  probable  that  the  battle  of  Williamsburg, 
which  followed,  would  never  have  been  fought.  Long- 
street  had  not  intended  to  fight  here,  but  finding  hLs 
rear  guard  successful  and  posted  in  a  strong  position, 
and  a  large  portion  of  his  force  involved,  he  gave 
battle. 

The  cavalry  took  little  part  in  this  battle.  Wil 
liamsburg  was  abandoned  by  the  enemy  on  the  6th, 
and  Colonel  Averell,  with  portions  of  the  Third  Penn- 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  li 

sylvania  and  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry,  pressed  on  in 
pursuit  as  far  as  New  Kent,  recovering  five  pieces  of 
artillery  and  capturing  twenty-one  prisoners. 

"From  this  time  on,"  as  a  distinguished  cavalry  offi 
cer  has  said,  "affairs  with  the  cavalry,  through  no  fault 
of  its  own,  went  from  bad  to  worse.  Detachments 
from  its  strength  were  constantly  increased,  and  it  was 
hampered  by  instructions  which  crippled  it  for  all  use 
ful  action."  But  in  spite  of  the  disadvantages  under 
which  it  labored,  it  displayed  the  same  brave  devotion 
to  duty  which  was  afterwards  to  be  put  to  such  good 
account  during  the  last  two  years  of  the  war. 

During  the  next  few  days,  the  cavalry  was  almost 
constantly  engaged  in  reconnaissance  duty,  and  al 
though  there  were  numerous  minor  skirmishes,  noth 
ing  of  importance  occurred  until  the  taking  of  Han 
over  Court  House  (May  27-29),  when  the  Fifth  and 
Sixth  United  States  Cavalry,  supported  by  the  Sev 
enteenth  New  York  Infantry,  cut  off  and  captured  the 
greater  part  of  an  entire  regiment — the  Twenty-eighth 
North  Carolina  Infantry — continuing  the  pursuit  two 
and  one-half  miles  beyond  the  town. 

In  pursuance  of  the  general  plan  of  cutting  the 
enemy's  communications  with  northern  Virginia,  cav 
alry  brigades  under  General  Emory  and  Colonel  War 
ren  destroyed  the  bridges  over  the  South  Anna  and 


12  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Pamunkey  rivers,  and  engaged  in  many  creditable 
skirmishes  with  the  enemy.  Some  of  the  volunteer 
cavalry,  during  these  operations,  were  under  fire  for 
the  first  time. 

The  cavalry's  part  in  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks  (May 
29th)  was  insignificant.  Nothing  else  could  be  ex 
pected,  considering  its  disunited  condition  and  anom 
alous  status;  so  that  when,  two  weeks  later  (June 
13th),  Stuart,  with  about  1,200  cavalry,  passed  com 
pletely  around  the  Federal  army  and  fell  on  the  weak 
right  flank  of  the  cavalry,  there  could  be  but  one  re 
sult.  The  cavalry  was  blamed  for  not  having  given 
notice  of  Stuart's  approach;  and  when  General  Cooke, 
with  a  small  cavalry  force,  was  tacked  on  to  an  infan 
try  division  and  told  to  catch  Stuart,  his  failure  to 
strike  his  swift-moving  adversary  was  criticised  in 
these  words:  ul  have  seen  no  energy  or  spirit  in  the 
pursuit  by  General  Cooke  of  the  enemy,  nor  has  he 
exhibited  the  characteristics  of  a  skillful  and  active 
guardian  of  our  flanks."* 

Time  has  showrn  that  General  Cooke  received  posi 
tive  orders  from  the  commanding  general  of  the  left 
wing  to  regulate  his  pursuit  by  the  march  of  the  infan 
try  column,  and  on  no  account  to  precede  it.  "The 
officer  of  to-day,  even  though  he  has  had  no  experience 


*Report  of  General  Pitz  John  Porter. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  13 

in  war,  with  the  record  of  cavalry  marches  before  him, 
can  imagine  the  effect  of  such  an  order  on  a  dashing, 
chivalrous,  enthusiastic  cavalry  officer,  chafing  under 
the  restraints  that  had  already  been  placed  upon  him 
by  a  soldier  who  had  learned  from  the  books  that  a 
forced  march  for  cavalry  for  one  day  was  twenty-five 
miles."* 

In  the  passage  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  over 
the  Chickahominy,  General  Porter,  with  the  Fifth 
Army  Corps,  was  charged  with  covering  the  move 
ment  and  keeping  the  enemy  in  check.  All  the  cav 
alry  wras  placed  under  his  orders,  and  the  battle  of 
Games'  Mill,  which  followed  (June  27th),  is  remarka 
ble  for  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  cavalry  under 
General  Cooke.f 

The  line  of  battle  formed  the  arc  of  a  circle,  almost 
parallel  to  the  Chickahominy,  and  Cooke's  division, 
consisting  of  two  small  brigades,  was  placed  behind 
the  breaks  of  a  plateau,  in  rear  of  the  extreme  left  of 
the  line.  During  the  day  the  Confederate  army,  rein 
forced  by  the  army  of  Stonewall  Jackson  from  north 
ern  Virginia,  made  four  desperate  assaults  on  the 
Union  lines,  arid  every  available  infantryman  was 


*General    Merritt,    in   'Journal    U.    8.    Cavalry   Association, 
June,  1895. 

fSee  Appendix  3,. 


14  History  of  the  Cavalry^ 

brought  into  action.  In  rear  of  the  left  of  the  line 
there  was  not  a  single  reserve,  save  the  cavalry  and 
considerable  artillery.  The  day  was  fast  drawing  to 
a  close,  when  the  Confederates  made  a  final  effort  to 
force  the  left  flank  and  cut  it  off  from  the  bridge  over 
the  Chickahominy.  The  center  and  left  of  the  line 
gave  way  under  overwhelming  numbers,  many  of  the 
regiments  being  completely  demoralized.  The  reserve 
artillery,  left  without  support,  had  begun  to  limber 
up,  when,  by  order  of  General  Cooke,  they  were  or 
dered  to  maintain  their  position,  and  were  assured 
that  the  cavalry  would  support  them.  The  artillery 
willingly  complied  and  opened  a  heavy  fire  on  the 
advancing  infantry  linen.  When  almost  too  close  for 
an  effective  charge,  General  Cooke  ordered  Captain 
Whiting,  commanding  the  Fifth  U.  S.  Cavalry,  to 
charge  with  his  regiment.  Numbering  but  220  sabers, 
the  little  force  moved  out  under  a  heavy  fire,  and  a 
portion  of  the  line  struck  the  enemy  intact,  and  were 
only  stopped  by  the  woods  at  the  bottom  of  the  slope. 
The  casualties  in  the  charge  were  58,  with  24  horses 
killed,  a  sacrifice  that  was  well  worth  the  results  at 
tained.  Under  cover  of  the  charge  the  artillery  was 
safely  withdrawn,  its  bold  stand  having  delayed  the 
enemy's  advance  long  enough  for  the  re-forming  of  the 
best  disciplined  infantry  regiments. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  15 

Had  this  determined  stand  not  been  made,  the  seiz 
ure  of  the  Chickahominy  bridge  and  the  capture  of  at 
least  a  portion  of  Porter's  command  would  undoubt 
edly  have  followed.  And  yet  General  Porter  reported 
that  the  cavalry  caused  the  loss  of  the  action.  The- 
Comte  de  Paris,  in  a  letter  to  General  Cooke,  February 
2,  1877,  has  said:  "The  sacrifice  of  some  of  the  brav 
est  of  the  cavalry  certainly  saved  a  part  of  the  artil 
lery,  as  did,  on  a  larger  scale,  the  Austrian  cavalry  on 
the  evening  of  Sadowa.  The  main  fact  is  that  with 
your  cavalry  you  did  all  that  cavalry  could  do  to  stop 
the  rout."* 

Not  a  more  glorious  act  occurred  during  the  entire 
war  than  this  misrepresented  charge  of  the  Fifth  U. 
S.  Cavalry,  as  a  sacrifice  for  the  withdrawal  of  the 
artillery.  The  survivors  should  have  been  decorated, 
and,  had  they  belonged  to  a  French  or  German  army, 
they  would  undoubtedly  have  been  thus  rewarded. 

About  June  24th  General  Stoneman  was  placed  in 
command  of  all  the  cavalry  on  the  right  of  the  army 
(about  2,000  in  all),  and  was  charged  with  picketing 
the  country  towards  Hanover  Court  House.  During 
the  Seven  Days'  battles  he  was  guarding  the  region 
from  the  Meadow  Bridge  to  the  Pamunkey,  with  the 


*"Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War/'  Vol.   II.,   page 
344. 


16  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Seventeenth  New  York  Infantry  and  Eighteenth  Mas 
sachtfsetts  in  support.  The  maneuvering  of  the  enemy 
was  such  as  to  cut  off  Stoneman's  command  from  Por 
ter's  corps,  and,  after  falling  back  on  White  House, 
where  he  destroyed  immense  quantities  of  stores  to 
prevent  their  falling  into  the  enemy's  hands,  he  re 
treated  to  Yorktown,  arriving  there  the  29th  instant. 
These  cavalry  regiments  attached  to  the  army  corps 
during  this  movement  performed  arduous  and  pains 
taking  duties. 

By  an  order  published  July  8,  1862,  part  of  the 
volunteer  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
organized  by  General  Stoneman  into  two  brigades, 
commanded  by  Colonels  Averell  and  Gregg.*  To 
Averell  was  assigned  the  task  of  thoroughly  patrol 
ling  the  country  in  front  of  the  right  wing  and  flank, 
and  to  Colonel  Gregg  was  given  similar  duties  on  the 
left  flank.  Diminutive  as  this  force  was  for  the  many 
duties  it  was  called  upon  to  perform,  it  performed 


*First  Brigade  (Averell's):  Third  Pennsylvania,  First 
New  York,  Fourth  Pennsylvania,  Cavalry. 

Second  Brigade  (1,  Gregg's;  2,  Pleasanton's) :  Eighth  Illi 
nois,  Eighth  Pennsylvania,  Sixth  New  York. 

To  Sumner's  corps,  Barker's  squadron. 

To  Heintzelman's  corps,  Delaney's  squadron,  Fifth  Penn 
sylvania  Cavalry. 

To  Keyes'  corps,  one  squadron,  Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry. 

To  Porter's  corps,  one  squadron,  First  New  York  Cavalry. 

To  Franklin's  corps,  one  squadron,  First  New  York 
Cavalry. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  17" 

them  well.  But  again  was  the  cavalry  called  upon  to 
furnish  guides  scouts,  orderlies,  and  escorts,  until  the 
regiments  dwindle  down  to  mere  nothings.  In  fact, 
as  General  Merritt  has  said,  "After  Games'  Mill,  the 
cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  no  history 
of  which  it  had  reason  to  be  proud,  until  the  reorgan 
ization  of  the  army,  with  Hooker  in  command." 


II. 


On  the  26th  of  June  General  John  Pope  had  been 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  Virginia, 
composed  of  the  commands  of  Generals  Banks,  Fre 
mont,  and  McDowell.  Fremont  had  succeeded  Rose- 
crans  in  command  of  the  Mountain  Department, 
March  29th,  but  under  his  administration  and  those  of 
his  predecessors,  the  Federal  cavalry  in  West  Virginia 
had  performed  no  conspicuous  deeds.  The  country 
was  ill-suited  for  maneuvering  large  bodies  of  cav 
alry;  but  for  scouting  and  reconnoitering  small  bodies 
could  be  made  very  useful,  as  shown  by  the  value  to 
McClellan  of  the  hybrid  commands  known  as  McMul- 
len's  Rangers,  the  Ringgold  Cavalry,  and  Burdsall's 
Cavalry.  In  fact,  partisan  warfare  was  a  distinct  fea 
ture  of  the  operations  in  West  Virginia  throughout 
the  war. 

—2- 


18  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

A  year  after  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Moun 
tain  Department,  which  included  West  Virginia,  con 
tained  thirty-six  companies  of  cavalry,  aggregating 
2,741  men;  but  they  were  poorly  equipped  and  mount 
ed — many  of  them  dismounted.  And  these,  with  the 
insufficient  infantry  and  artillery  forces,  guarded  a 
frontier  350  miles  long,  300  miles  of  railroad,  and  200 
miles  of  water  communication. 

In  his  report  of  the  battle  of  Kernstown  (March 
23,  1862) — one  of  the  bright  spots  in  the  successive 
misfortunes  of  the  Union  forces  in  the  Shenandoah 
Valley — General  Shields  says:  "My  cavalry  is  very 
ineffective.  If  I  had  one  regiment  of  excellent  cavalry, 
armed  with  carbines,  I  could  have  doubled  the  enemy's 
loss." 

The  cavalry  which  Fremont  brought  to  the  Army 
of  Virginia  were  partly  dismounted,  and  the  horses  of 
those  who  were  mounted  were  in  a  great  measure  so 
broken  down  and  starved  as  to  be  well-nigh  useless. 
The  mounted  forces  of  Banks  and  McDowell  were  in 
much  the  same  miserable  condition.  The  consolidated 
morning  report  of  July  31,  1862,  shows  that  out  of 
8,738  cavalry  in  the  three  corps,  3,000  are  deducted  as 
"unfit  for  service."  Such  a  proportion  is  a  comment 
ary  on  the  condition  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of 
Virginia  at  this  time. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  19 

And  yet  this  little  force  did  excellent  service;  part 
ly,  perhaps,  through  the  efficiency  of  those  who  com 
manded  it,  but  principally  on  account  of  its  wise  use 
by  the  commanding  general. 

Pope's  general  instructions  directed  him  to  cover 
Washington,  and  pending  the  transfer  of  McClelland 
troops  from  Harrison's  Landing  to  Aquia  Creek,  Va., 
he  was  charged  with  resisting  at  all  hazard  any  pos 
sible  advance  of  the  enemy. 

Accordingly  General  King,  at  Fredericksburg,  was 
directed  to  send  out  detachments  of  his  cavalry  to 
operate  on  the  line  of  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad 
and  destroy  communications  between  Richmond  and 
the  Shenandoah.  The  cavalry  expeditions  sent  out 
were  highly  successful. 

At  the  same  time  Banks  was  directed  to  push  all 
his  cavalry  towards  Gordonsville,  and  its  execution 
was  entrusted  to  General  John  I.  Hatch,  an  officer  of 
the  regular  cavalry.  But  this  officer,  instead  of  push 
ing  forward  with  all  haste,  burdened  himself  with 
infantry,  artillery,  and  wagon  trains,  so  that  when 
Pope  supposed  the  bridges  and  railroad  destroyed 
in  the  vicinity  of  Charlottesville  and  Gordonsville, 
Hatch's  command  had  just  reached  Madison  Court 
House.  This  movement  illustrates  the  common  idea 
of  the  use  of  cavalry  at  this  period.  Hatch's  delay 


20  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

allowed  Jackson's  advance  to  occupy  Gordonsvillo. 
and  the  movements  contemplated  became  impractica 
ble.  Hatch  was  relieved  from  command,  and  was  suc 
ceeded  by  Buford,  as  chief  of  cavalry  of  Banks'  corps. 

On  August  7th  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  Vir 
ginia  was  distributed  as  follows:  Buford's  brigade,  at 
Madison  Court  House,  picketing  the  Rapidan  from 
Barnett's  Ford  to  the  Blue  Kidge;  Bayard's  brigade 
at  Rapidan  Station,  picketing  from  Barnett's  to  Rac 
coon  Fords.  (Buford  and  Bayard  were  young  officers 
of  the  regular  cavalry.)  Pickets  were  also  established 
from  Raccoon  Ford  to  the  forks  of  the  Rappahannock. 
The  whole  disposition  of  the  cavalry  was  admirably 
arranged  as  a  screening  force,  and  on  August  7th  and 
8th  performed  valuable  service  in  retarding  Jackson's 
advance  and  keeping  Pope  informed  of  the  enemy's 
movements. 

At  the  battle  of  Cedar  Mountain,*  which  occurred 
the  following  day,  the  cavalry  fell  slowly  back  as 
the  enemy  advanced,  and  rendered  effective  service 
throughout  the  day,  a  squadron  of  the  First  Pennsyl 
vania  Cavalry  making  a  most  gallant  charge  against 
a  body  of  the  enemy  which  was  about  to  charge  the 
Union  batteries.  The  squadron  lost  an  aggregate  of 
93  men  out  of  the  164  who  participated  in  the  charge. 


*See  Appendix  4. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  21 

As  Jackson  fell  back  across  the  Rapidan,  the  cav 
alry  kept  touch  with  him,  and  reoccupied  their  old 
picket  line,  stretching  from  Kaccoon  Ford  to  the  base 
of  the  Blue  Ridge.  Reconnaissances,  too,  were  pushed 
forward,  and  a  cavalry  command  sent  out  on  August 
16th  captured  General  Stuart's  adjutant-general  with 
important  dispatches,  the  tenor  of  which  strongly  in 
fluenced  Pope  in  his  decision  to  fall  back  across  the 
Rappahannock,  which  he  did  August  17th  and  18th. 

At  this  time  the  cavalry  was  greatly  fatigued. 
Pope  says:  "Our  cavalry  numbered  on  paper  about 
4,000  men,  but  their  horses  were  completely  broken 
down,  and  there  were  not  500  men  capable  of  doing  as 
much  service  as  should  be  expected  from  cavalry." 
That  the  cavalry  would  play  an  unimportant  part  in 
the  subsequent  movements  leading  up  to  and  culminat 
ing  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run  would  be  expected  from 
their  miserable  condition.  With  broken-down  horses 
it  was  impossible  to  cover  the  front  of  the  army,  or 
to  make  reconnaissances.  Speaking  of  the  condition 
of  the  cavalry  on  the  morning  of  the  battle  of  Bull 
Run,  Pope  says:  "The  artillery  and  cavalry  horses 
had  been  in  harness  and  saddled  continually  for  ten 
days,  and  had  had  no  forage  for  two  days  previous." 
But  the  services  of  the  cavalry  under  their  two  effi 
cient  brigade  commanders  could  not  receive  greater 
—3- 


22  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

praise  than  when  General  Pope  says:  "Generals  Bay 
ard  and  Buford  commanded  the  cavalry  belonging  to 
the  Army  of  Virginia.  Their  duties  were  peculiarly 
arduous  and  hazardous,  and  it  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  throughout  the  operations,  from  the  first  to  the 
last  day  of  the  campaign,  scarcely  a  day  passed  that 
these  officers  did  not  render  service  which  entitles 
them  to  the  gratitude  of  the  Government."* 

Thus  did  the  cavalry  acquit  itself.  It  had  not  al 
ways  been  used  wisely,  nor  was  it  kept  supplied  with 
remounts  and  forage  as  it  should  have  been.  Effi 
ciency,  which  comes  only  with  experience,  was  gradu 
ally  gaining  ground  in  spite  of  many  obstacles.  The 
true  worth  of  cavalry,  and  consequently  its  true  em 
ployment,  was  beginning  to  be  better  comprehended. 
An  order  issued  by  General  Pope,  soon  after  the  bat 
tle  of  Cedar  Mountain,  directing  the  cavalry  detach 
ments  at  brigade  and  division  headquarters  to  report 
for  duty  to  their  chiefs  of  cavalry,  and  greatly  reduc 
ing  the  number  of  orderlies,  marks  a  decided  change 
in  the  condition  of  the  cavalry;  but  the  time  was  still 
far  distant  when  it  was  to  be  given  a  status  in  keep 
ing  with  its  importance,  and  when  it  was  able  to  vin 
dicate  itself  in  the  eyes  of  those  who  "never  saw  a 
dead  cavalrvman." 


*See  Appendix  5. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  23 


III. 


On  the  5th  day  of  September,  1862,  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of  Virginia  were  consoli 
dated,  and  General  McClellan  assumed  command  of 
both  armies. 

Contrary  to  public  expectation,  General  Lee  in 
vaded  Maryland  instead  of  attacking  Washington,  and 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  while  shielding  the  national 
capital,  endeavored  to  keep  touch  with  the  army  of 
invasion.  Had  McClellan  had  at  his  disposal  at  this 
time  an  adequate  cavalry  force,  his  task  would  have 
been  made  infinitely  more  simple. 

But  the  cavalry,  especially  that  portion  which  had 
passed  through  Pope's  campaign,  was  in  deplorable 
condition  for  aggressive  action.  Pleasanton's  cavalry 
division,  weakened  though  it  was  by  its  experience  on 
the  Peninsula,  was  best  able  to  take  the  field,  and 
early  in  September  was  reconnoitering  the  fords  of 
the  Potomac.  On  the  9th  it  occupied  Barnesville,  and 
captured  the  battle-flag  of  the  Twelfth  Virginia  Cav 
alry.  On  the  13th  the  right  wing  and  center  of  the 
Federal  army  having  reached  Frederick,  the  cavalry 
cleared  the  passage  over  the  Catoctin  Hills,  ancf  early 
on  the  morning  of  the  14th  found  the  enemy  occupying 
advantageous  positions  at  South  Mountain,  on  either 


24  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

side  of  the  gap  through  which  the  National  Road 
passed. 

The  enemy  was  routed  from  his  positions  by  the 
Federal  army,  but  the  cavalry  took  little  part  in  the 
battle.  Pleasanton  deployed  a  portion  of  his  cavalry 
dismounted  during  the  day,  causing  the  enemy  to  mass 
a  considerable  force  on  the  right  of  the  Confederate 
position. 

Lee's  army  withdrew  so  as  to  cover  the  Shepherds- 
town  Ford  of  the  Potomac,  and  the  cavalry,  followed 
by  three  army  corps,  pursued  by  way  of  Boonesbor- 
ough.  At  the  latter  place  the  cavalry  caught  up  with 
the  enemy's  rear  guard,  and,  charging  repeatedly, 
drove  the  enemy  two  miles  beyond  the  town.  The 
enemy  left  30  dead  and  50  wounded  upon  the  field, 
besides  2  pieces  of  artillery  and  250  prisoners  cap 
tured;  while  the  loss  to  the  Union  cavalry  was  but  1 
killed  and  15  wounded. 

On  the  17th,  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Antietam,  the 
cavalry  moved  to  Antietam  Bridge,  which  was  found 
to  be  under  a  cross-fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  Cav 
alry  skirmishers  were  thrown  forward,  and,  aided  by 
the  horse  batteries  of  the  division,  the  enemy's  batter 
ies  were  driven  from  their  positions.  The  main  battle 
was  between  the  infantry  and  artillery  of  both  armies, 
and  resulted  in  the  withdrawal  of  Lee's  army  into 
Virginia. 


Army  of  the  Po 


On  the  18th  the  cavalry  was  feeling  the  enemy  and 
collecting  stragglers;  on  the  19th,  pushing  the  enemy's 
rear  guard  at  the  fords  of  the  Potomac;  and  thereaf 
ter,  for  some  time,  it  was  so  disposed  as  to  cover 
the  principal  fords,  making  frequent  reconnaissances 
into  Virginia  to  develop  the  enemy's  position  and 
movements. 

For  these  duties  the  strength  of  the  cavalry  was 
found  to  be  inadequate.  Overwork  and  disease  had 
broken  down  the  horses  to  such  an  extent  that  when 
on  October  llth  General  Stuart  made  a  raid  into  Penn 
sylvania  with  2.000  men,  McOlellan  could  mount  but 
800  men  to  follow  him.* 

To  meet  this  raid,  Averell — then  on  the  upper  Po 
tomac — moved  down  the  north  side  of  the  river,  while 
Pleasanton,  taking  the  Cavestown  —  Mechanicstown 
road,  was  disposed  to  cut  off  the  raiding  force  should 
it  cross  by  any  of  the  fords  below  the  main  army. 
Upon  arriving  at  Mechanicstown,  Pleasanton  learned 
that  the  enemy  was  but  an  hour  ahead  of  him — re 
treating  towards  the  mouth  of  the  Monocacy;  and,  al 
though  his  own  force  numbered  about  one-fourth  that 
of  the  enemy,  he  pursued  vigorously,!  and  attacked 


*Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XIX.,  Part  I.,  page  71. 

For  strength,  "present  and  absent,"  see  Appendix  7. 

fPleasanton   marched   seventy-eight  miles   in   twenty-four 
hours. 

—4— 


26  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Stuart's  rear  guard  with  such  energy  that  the  latter 
was  prevented  from  crossing  the  Monocacy  Ford,  and 
was  forced  to  move  to  White's  Ford,  three  miles  below. 
Had  the  latter  ford  been  occupied  by  troops  as  was 
originally  ordered,  it  is  quite  probable  that  Stuart 
would  have  been  captured  or  badly  crippled.  A  larger 
cavalry  force,  or  even  a  supply  of  serviceable  horses 
for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  might  have  prevented 
this  raid,  which  had  the  effect  of  drawing  a  consider 
able  force  from  Lee's  tired  army,  produced  great  con 
sternation  among  the  people  of  the  North,  and  led  to 
the  loss  of  much  property. 

On  September  10th  General  Buford  had  been  an 
nounced  as  chief-of-cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  but  the  office  was  simply  a  staff  position,  and  was 
attended  with  very  little,  if  any,  independence  of  ac 
tion.  So  far  as  the  cavalry  was  concerned,  the  chief- 
of-cavalry  was  the  executive  officer  of  the  command 
ing  general. 

On  October  1st  General  Bayard  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  all  the  cavalry  about  Washington, 
south  of  the  Potomac;  and  on  the  21st  General  Pleas- 
anton  was  given  a  cavalry  brigade,  consisting  of  the 
Sixth  U.  S.  Cavalry,  the  Eighth  Pennsylvania,  the 
Eighth  Illinois,  the  Third  Indiana,  and  the  Eighth 
New  York  Cavalry  regiments. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  27 

On  the  26th  Pleasanton  crossed  the  Potomac  at 
Berlin,  and  during  the  next  few  days  was  employed, 
as  was  also  the  brigade  of  Bayard,  in  gaining  infor 
mation  of  the  enemy's  movements,  resulting  in  skir 
mishes  at  Snicker's  Gap,  Upperville,  Aldie,  Mount- 
ville,  Philomont,  and  Manassas  Gap.  On  November 
5th  his  brigade  fought  an  action  at  Barbee's  Cross- 
Roads,  with  Stuart's  command  of  about  3,000  cavalry, 
accompanied  by  four  pieces  of  artillery.  Gregg,  with 
the  Eighth  Pennsylvania  and  the  Sixth  United  States, 
turned  the  enemy's  right;  Davis,  with  the  Eighth  New 
York,  attacked  the  left;  and  Farnsworth,  with  the 
Eighth  Illinois,  moved  against  the  center.  During  the 
engagement,  Davis  was  met  by  a  much  superior  force, 
about  to  charge  him.  He  quickly  overcame  the  dis 
proportion  in  numbers  by  dismounting  several  of  his 
companies  behind  a  stone  wall,  and  their  galling  front 
and  flank  fire  soon  threw  the  enemy  into  confusion. 
This  accomplished,  Davis,  with  the  remainder  of  the 
regiment,  mounted,  charged,  routed  the  enemy,  and 
drove  him  from  the  field.  The  Confederates  left  thirty- 
seven  dead  upon  the  field,  while  the  Union  loss  was 
but  five  killed  and  eight  wounded.  This  maneuver  of 
fighting  dismounted  behind  obstacles  with  a  portion 
of  a  command,  and  charging  the  enemy  in  the  flank 
with  the  remainder  mounted,  became  a  very  common 
and  effective  method  of  fighting  throughout  the  war. 


28  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

On  November  7th  General  McClellan  was  super 
seded  as  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  by 
General  Burnside,  and  the  army  was  organized  into 
three  grand  divisions — the  right,  center,  and  left,  com 
manded  by  Sumner,  Hooker,  and  Franklin.  An  order 
of  the  21st  instant  assigned  the  cavalry  divisions  of 
Pleasanton,  Bayard,  and  Averell  to  the  three  grand 
divisions  respectively. 

Burnside  moved  his  army  down  the  north  side  of 
the  Rappahannock  on  November  15th,  and  reached 
Falmouth  on  the  20th.  Although  the  river  was  ford- 
able  a  few  miles  above  the  town,  and  Lee's  army  had 
not  yet  reached  Falmouth  at  this  date,  Burnside  did 
not  cross  the  river  until  the  llth  of  December.  The 
passage  of  the  river  was  effected  without  much  oppo 
sition,  but  in  the  subsequent  attempts  to  turn  the  ene 
my's  position  on  the  heights  in  rear  of  Fredericksburg, 
the  Federal  army  was  obliged  to  fall  back.  Both 
armies  remained  in  position  until  the  night  of  Decem 
ber  loth,  when  General  Burnside  withdrew  his  forces 
to  the  north  bank  of  the  Rappahannock. 

During  the  advance  along  the  north  bank  of  the 
river,  begun  on  November  15th,  the  cavalry  was  in 
rear,  employed  in  covering  the  fords,  and  this  duty 
gave  rise  to  much  skirmishing.  On  November  16th  at 
the  United  States  Ford,  and  on  the  28th  at  Hartwood 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  291 

Church,  Bayard's  and  Averell's  cavalry  divisions  were 
engaged ;  and  on  the  28th  to  30th  of  the  month  the 
brigade  attached  to  the  reserve  grand  division,  whose 
headquarters  were  near  Fairfax,  advanced  to  Snickers- 
ville  and  Berryville  and  routed  the  enemy's  cavalry 
(White's),  capturing  their  colors  and  many  prisoners. 

But  the  cavalry  took  very  little  part  in  the  grander 
movements  of  the  army.  When  Sumner's  grand  divis 
ion  crossed  the  river  on  December  12th,  Pleasanton's 
cavalry  division  was  massed  in  rear  of  the  ridge  com 
manding  the  approaches  to  the  upper  bridges.  And 
when  Franklin  crossed  below  the  city,  he  was  pre 
ceded  by  Bayard's  cavalry  division,  which  reconnoi- 
tered  the  country  southward.*  This*  was  the  extent  of 
'the  cavalry  operations,  the  exhausting  and  unceasing 
picket  duty  monopolizing  almost  the  entire  time  and 
attention  of  officers  and  men. 

After  the  Union  army  fell  back  across  the  Kappa- 
hannock,  the  two  armies  confronted  each  other,  each 
endeavoring  to  recuperate  from  the  terrible  struggle 

*General  Bayard  was  killed  on  the  15th  by  a  piece  of  shell, 
while  near  General  Franklin's  headquarters.  He  was  suc 
ceeded  by  Colonel  D.  McM.  Gregg,  Eighth  Pennsylvania  Cav 
alry;  and  Colonel  Thomas  C.  Devin  succeeded  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Second  Brigade  of  Pleasanton's  division.  Both 
these  officers  were  destined  to  become  celebrated  in  the  sub 
sequent  operations  of  the  cavalry. 

For  the  organization  of  the  cavalry  at  Fredericksburg,  see 
Appendix  8. 


30  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

at  Fredericksburg,  and  each  hesitating  to  take  the  ini 
tiative.  There  were  dissensions  in  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  and  differences  of  opinion.  Burnside  was  for 
a  general  advance,  but  was  opposed  in  this  by  his 
grand  division  commanders.  And  the  commanding 
general's  views  so  far  took  shape  that  a  cavalry  expe 
dition,  proposed  and  organized  by  General  Averell, 
was  put  on  foot  (December  28th),  only  to  be  recalled 
at  the  last  moment  by  orders  from  the  President,  insti 
gated  by  general  officers,  who  differed  with  General 
Burnside  as  to  the  wisdom  of  aggressive  action  at  this 
time. 

Averell  proposed  to  take  a  thousand  picked  men, 
selected  from  nine  regiments,  with  four  pieces  of  artil 
lery,  proceed  by  Kelly's  Ford  on  the  Rappahannock' 
and  Kaccoon  Ford  on  the  Rapidan  to  the  James  River, 
and  by  crossing  on  the  bridge  at  Carterville,  to  pro 
ceed  to  Suffolk,  or  join  the  Federal  forces  in  North 
Carolina,  under  General  Foster.  The  expedition  was 
expected  to  destroy  the  railroads,  bridges,  and  tele 
graph  lines  between  the  Federal  army  and  Richmond, 
and  was  to  depend  upon  the  country  for  sustenance. 
In  many  respects  it  did  not  differ  in  conception  from 
the  Stoneman  raid  of  six  months  later. 


Army  of  the  Potomac. 


IV. 


On  January  26th,  General  Burnside  was  relieved 
from  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  wa& 
succeeded  by  General  Hooker.  A  few  days  later  (Feb 
ruary  6,  1863)  the  organization  by  grand  divisions  was 
abolished,  and  that  by  army  corps  substituted,  with 
General  Stoneman  to  command  all  the  cavalry. 

This  consolidation  of  the  cavalry  was  by  far  the 
most  important  step  that  had  yet  been  taken  to  in 
crease  its  efficiency,  and  enable  it  to  act  in  its  true 
role. 

The  cavalry  corps  was  organized  in  three  divisions, 
commanded  by  Generals  Pleasanton,  Averell,  and 
Gregg,  with  the  Keserve  Brigade  in  command  of  Gen 
eral  Buford.  On  February  10,  1863,  the  corps  had  an 
aggregate  of  13,452  officers  and  men  present  for  duty 
— the  present  and  absent  numbering  17,166.  These 
figures  give  some  idea  of  the  large  number  of  absent 
ees.  The  regular  regiments,  especially,  were  depleted 
in  numbers.  Regular  officers  were  constantly  as 
signed  to  duty  writh  volunteer  commands,  as  well  as 
to  many  staff  positions;  and  in  the  matter  of  recruit 
ing  the  Government  could  not  successfully  compete 
with  the  States.  At  times  the  strength  of  the  regular 
regiments  did  not  average  more  than  250  men  present 


History  of  the  Cavalry, 

for  duty.  A  squadron — the  tactical  unit  of  organiza 
tion — contained  anywhere  from  sixty  to  one  hundred 
men,  and  was  only  brought  up  to  the  required  strength 
by  the  addition  of  extra  companies. 

During  the  months  of  January  and  February  the 
cavalry  was  kept  constantly  employed,  reconnoitering 
the  enemy's  position,  watching  the  fords  of  the  Rappa 
hannock,  and  engaged  in  almost  constant  skirmish 
ing.*  Much  of  this  was  done  in  severe  winter  weather, 
while  the  infantry  was  being  made  comfortable  in 
winter  quarters. 

The  enemy's  cavalry  was  very  bold  and  aggressive. 
On  February  24th  General  Fitzhugh  Lee,  with  400  of 
his  cavalry,  crossed  the  river  at  Kelly's  Ford,  drove 
back  the  Federal  pickets  at  Hartwood  Church,  and 
brought  on  a  skirmish  with  Averell's  cavalry.  Under 
the  impression  that  the  enemy  were  in  force,  General 
Stoneman  immediately  put  the  divisions  of  Pleasan- 
ton  and  Averell  in  motion,  followed  by  the  Reserve 
Brigade;  but  after  encamping  for  a  night  at  Morris- 
ville,  the  enemy  eluded  their  pursuers  by  recrossing 
the  Rappahannock. 

On  March  17th,  however,  an  engagement  was 
fought  at  Kelly's  Ford,  which  made  the  Confederate 


*At    Grove    Church,    Fairfax,    Middleburg,    Rappahannock 
Bridge,  Somerville. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  33 

cavalry  more  wary,  and  did  much  towards  making  the 
Union  cavalry  more  aggressive. 

General  Averell  received  orders  to  cross  the  river 
with  3,000  cavalry  and  6  pieces  of  artillery,  and 
attack  and  destroy  the  forces  of  General  Fitzhugh 
Lee,  supposed  to  be  near  Culpeper  Court  House. 

The  Union  general  started  from  Morrisville  with 
about  2,100  men  all  told,  and  arriving  at  Kelly's  Ford, 
found  the  crossing  obstructed  with  abatis,  and  de 
fended  by  about  80  sharpshooters,  covered  by  rifle- 
pits  and  houses  on  the  opposite  bank.  After  several 
attempts,  the  crossing  was  gallantly  effected  by  Lieu 
tenant  Brown  with  20  men  of  the  First  Khode  Island 
Cavalry,  who  took  25  prisoners.  The  crossing  could 
easily  have  been  forced  by  the  use  of  artillery,  but  it 
was  not  desired  to  give  notice  of  the  movement  to  the 
enemy. 

Westward  from  the  ford,  the  ground  was  compara 
tively  clear  for  half  a  mile,  followed  by  woods;  and 
beyond  the  latter  was  an  open  field.  The  cavalry  col 
umn  reached  the  first  line  of  woods  without  opposi 
tion,  when  the  enemy  was  discovered  advancing  in 
line.  The  Fourth  New  York  was  directed  to  form  line 
to  the  right  of  the  road,  the  Fourth  Pennsylvania  to 
the  left,  with  a  section  of  artillery  between  the  two. 
Jn  front  of  these  troops  was  a  broad,  deep  ditch,  cov- 


34  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

ered  by  a  heavy  stone  wall;  and  from  behind  this 
obstacle  the  carbines  of  the  cavalry  and  guns  of  the 
artillery  delivered  a  brisk  fire.  Farther  to  the  right 
the  Third  Pennsylvania  and  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania 
had  come  into  position;  while  to  the  left  the  Fir^t 
Rhode  Island  and  Sixth  Ohio  had  also  formed  line.  As 
the  enemy  advanced  under  the  galling  fire  of  the  dis 
mounted  men,  Colonel  Duffie'.  commanding  the  first 
brigade,  led  the  regiments  on  the  left  of  the  line  in  a 
most  successful  charge.  This  charge  was  closely  fol 
lowed  by  that  of  Colonel  Mclntosh,  who  struck  the 
left  flank  of  another  of  the  enemy's  columns  just  ar 
riving  on  the  field,  and  the  entire  body  of  Confederate 
cavalry  was  driven  back  in  great  confusion. 

The  Federal  line  being  re-formed,  it  again  advanced 
three-quarters  of  a  mile,  driving  the  enemy  through  a 
second  line  of  woods.  Beyond  these  woods,  and  dis 
tant  about  half  a  mile,  the  Confederates  made  another 
stand,  and  attempted  to  advance  under  cover  of  a 
heavy  artillery  fire,  but  were  again  repulsed  and 
driven  from  the  field.  As  it  was  then  quite  late  in 
the  day,  and  the  horses  of  the  Federal  cavalry  were 
much  exhausted,  the  division  was  withdrawn,  and  re- 
crossed  Kelly's  Ford  without  opposition.  The  official 
return  of  casualties  was,  for  the  Union  forces,  78;  and 
for  the  Confederates,  133, 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  35 

This  engagement  has  been  described  with  some 
degree  of  detail,  because  of  its  importance  as  being 
the  first  time  the  Federal  cavalry  was  made  to  feel  its 
superiority,  or  at  least  equality,  with  the  splendid 
cavalry  of  Stuart.*  It  was  another  step  in  the  increas 
ing  feeling  of  confidence  in  themselves  and  in  their 
leaders,  which  was  to  manifest  itself  in  a  still  greater 
degree  at  the  subsequent  battle  of  Brandy  Station. 

But  the  interminable  picket  duty  of  the  cavalry 
still  went  on,f  as  though  none  but  mounted  troops 
were  capable  of  performing  such  service. 

During  this  period,  too,  the  Federal  cavalry  in 
West  Virginia  were  kept  more  than  usually  busy,  due 
to  the  expedition  of  the  Confederate  General  Imboden 
into  that  State  (April  20th  to  May  14th),  and  also  the 
raid  of  General  W.  E.  Jones  on  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Railroad  (April  21st  to  May  21st),  leading  to  skir- 
mishes  at  Beverly,  Janelew,  and  Summerville,  W.  Va. 


*Generals  Stuart's  and  Fitzhugh  Lee's  official  reports  of 
this  engagement  dwell  on  the  fact  that  the  Union  forces  were 
afraid  to  meet  their  opponents  in  the  open,  and  that  the 
mounted  troops  continually  fell  back,  when  hard  pressed,  to 
the  protection  of  their  artillery  and  dismounted  skirmishers. 

tThe  skirmishes  of  the  cavalry  while  upon  this  duty  were 
of  daily  occurrence,  some  of  them  very  severe — Bealeton  Sta 
tion,  Herndon,  Occoquon,  Little  River  Turnpike,  Broad  Run. 
Middleburg,  Burlington.  Purgitsville,  Rappahannock  Bridge. 
Kelly's,  Welford's,  and  Beverly  fords.  (Skirmish  of  April 
14-15.) 


36  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

In  addition  to  these  attempts  to  frustrate  the  more 
important  raids  of  Confederate  troops  in  the  State, 
the  Union  cavalry  in  West  Virginia  had  particularly 
arduous  service  during  the  entire  year,  in  attempts  to 
break  up  the  depredations  of  the  guerrilla  bands  of 
Mosby  and  Gilmore.  During  the  winter  of  1862-63 
movements  of  troops  were  especially  onerous  on  ac 
count  of  the  severity  of  the  winter  weather  in  the 
mountains,  and  the  extent  of  the  territory  to  be 
guarded. 

During  the  spring  of  1863,  as  well  as  during  the 
succeeding  summer,  the  cavalry  in  West  Virginia 
fought  a  number  of  minor  skirmishes,  which,  though 
often  bravely  contested,  reflected  no  great  credit  on 
the  cavalry  arm.  As  General  Halleck  states  in  his  ro- 
port  (November  15,  1863):  "The  force  [in  West  Vir 
ginia],  being  too  small  to  attempt  any  campaign  by 
itself,  has  acted  merely  on  the  defensive  in  repelling 
raids  and  breaking  up  guerrilla  bands." 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  cavalry  of  General 
Milroy,  operating  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley  at  this 
time.  Though  kept  continually  busy,  reconnoitering, 
patrolling,  and  picketing  this  part  of  Virginia,  its 
operations  were  of  a  minor  character.* 


*The   cavalry   fought   skirmishes   at   Buck's,   Front   Royal, 
and  Berry's  fords. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  37 

On  April  27,  1863,  was  .inaugurated  the  Chancel- 
lorsville  campaign,  General  Hooker  crossing  the  Rap 
pahannock  and  Rapidan  above  their  junction.  At  th  ' 
same  time  the  major  portion  of  the  cavalry  corps 
under  Stoneman  crossed  the  upper  Rappahannock  for 
a  raid  on  the  enemy's  communications  with  Richmond. 

Stoneman's  instructions  from  Hooker  were  framed 
with  the  idea  in  view  that  the  coming  encounter  be 
tween  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  would  be  gained  by  the  Federal 
army. 

"You  will  march,"  says  the  order,  "with  all  your 
available  force,  except  one  brigade,  for  the  purpose  of 
turning  the  enemy's  position  on  his  left,  and  of  throw 
ing  your  command  between  him  and  Richmond,  and 
isolating  him  from  his  supplies,  checking  his  retreat, 
and  inflicting  on  him  every  possible  injury  which  will 
tend  to  his  discomfiture  and  defeat.  You 

may  rely  upon  the  General  [Hooker]  being  in  conn  -c- 
tion  with  you  before  your  supplies  are  exhausted.'' 

Leaving  Devin's  brigade  of  Pleasanton's  division 
for  duty  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Stoneman 
crossed  the  Rappahannock  on  April  29th,  by  way  of 
the  railroad  bridge  and  Kelly's  Ford.  Three  days' 
rations  and  three  days'  allowance  of  short  forage  were 
taken  on  the  troopers'  horses;  while  three  days'  sub- 


38  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

sistence  and  two  days'  short  forage  were  taken  upon 
pack-mules.  With  the  exception  of  the  artillery,  not 
a  wheel  of  any  description  accompanied  the  command. 

After  crossing  the  river,  General  Stonemau  turned 
over  to  Averell's  command — which  consisted  of  one 
division,  one  brigade,  and  six  pieces  of  artillery — the 
task  of  defeating  any  force  of  the  enemy  likely  to  im 
pede  the  operations  of  the  raiding  force.  But  Averell 
had  not  gone  far  when  he  was  recalled  by  an  order 
from  General  Hooker,  leaving  Stoneman  with  one  d:- 
vision,  one  brigade,  and  six  pieces  of  artillery,  aggre 
gating  4,329  men. 

The  Rapidan  was  crossed  at  Morton's  and  Raccoon 
Fords  on  the  30th,  and  thereafter,  until  May  8th,  the 
command  subsisted  entirely  on  the  country  through 
which  it  passed.  After  taking  possession  of  Lou 
isa  Court  House,  Stonemnn  passed  on  and  destroyed 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad  from  Gordonsville,  for 
eighteen  miles  eastward,  together  with  all  railroad 
bridges,  trains',  d6p6ts,  provisions,  and  telegraph  lines. 
Passing  on,  a  large  portion  of  the  Aquia  &  Richmond 
Railroad  was  destroyed,  all  the  bridges  across  th  • 
South  Anna,  and  several  across  the  North  Anna. 

On  May  3d  Colonel  Judson  Kilpatrick,  command 
ing  one  of  the  brigades,  was  sent  with  his  own  regi 
ment  (Harris'  Light)  io  destroy  the  railroad  bridge 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  39 

over  the  Chickahominy.  But,  being  unable  to  rejoin 
Stoneman,  Kilpatrick  took  refuge  within  the  Union 
lines  on  the  Peninsula,  having  burned  the  bridge  over 
the  Chickahominy,  run  a  train  of  cars  into  the  river, 
destroyed  the  ferry  at  Hanovertown  in  time  to  check 
a  pursuing  force,  surprised  a  Confederate  force  at 
Aylett's,  burned  fifty-six  wagons  and  a  depot  contain 
ing  60,000  bushels  of  corn,  and  destroyed  the  ferry  over 
the  Mattapony,  as  well  as  vast  quantities  of  clothing 
and  commissary  stores. 

As  to  Stoneman's  main  command,  the  six  days  hav 
ing  expired  during  which  General  Hooker  was  to  have 
opened  communication,  and  supplies  becoming  scarce, 
Stoneman  decided  to  make  the  best  of  his  way  to  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  which  he  reached  in  safety.  He 
then  learned  the  result  of  the  sanguinary  battle  of 
Chancellorsville.* 

As  a  moral  factor  and  an  engine  of  destruction,  the 
Stoneman  raid  was  a  great  success.  It  destroyed  mil 
lions  of  dollars'  worth  of  Confederate  property,  and, 
although  for  a  short  time  only,  cut  Lee's  communica 
tions.  Its  moral  effect,  judging  from  the  Confederate 
correspondence  since  published,  was  much  greater 
than  was  at  the  time  believed  to  be  the  case.  It,  more 
over,  taught  the  Union  cavalry  how  to  cut  loose  from 


*For  organization  of  cavalry,  see  Appendix  9. 


40  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

their  base  of  supplies,  and  gave  them  a  new  confidence 
in  their  mobility  never  before  experienced. 

But,  as  a  part  of  the  main  operations,  the  raid  was 
ill-timed.  Its  complete  success,  depending  as  it  did  on 
a  Federal  victory  at  Chancel  1  or sville,  was  frustrated 
through  no  fault  of  the  cavalry  or  its  commander.  The 
detaching  of  Stoneman's  command  deprived  Hooker 
of  cavalry  at  a  time  when  he  particularly  needed  a 
covering  force  to  conceal  the  movements  of  his  right, 
as  well  as  to  give  timely  information  of  the  Confeder 
ate  concentration  against  his  right  flank.  The  Comte 
de  Paris  has  said:  "The  absence  of  Stoneman's  fine 
cavalry  had  probably  been  the  cause  of  Hooker's  de 
feat,  as  he  had  deprived  himself  of  all  means  of  otain- 
ing  information  wrhen  about  to  enter  an  impenetrable 
forest.  Such  was  Jackson's  opinion,  expressed  a  few 
days  before  his  death.  *  *  *  From  the  moment  he 
[Hooker]  had  failed  to  compel  Lee  to  retreat,  the  role 
assigned  to  Stoneman  lost  almost  all  its  importance.'"5 

But  the  cavalry  brigade  left  with  the  Army  of  th •> 
Potomac  performed  most  valuable  service. 

On  May  2d  General  Lee,  having  concluded  that  a 
direct  attack  upon  the  Union  forces  would  prove  fu 
tile,  determined  to  turn  the  Federal  right  flank,  and  its 


"History  of  the  Civil   War,  Vol.   IV.,   page   115.      (Comte 
de  Paris.) 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  41 

execution  was  entrusted  to  .General  T.  J.  Jackson.  By 
a  flank  march  along  the  Furnace  and  Brock  road,  ef 
fectually  covered  by  the  heavy  woods  and  by  the  move 
ments  of  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry,  Jackson  succeeded  in 
placing  three  divisions  opposite  the  Union  right. 

On  the  afternoon  of  this  day  General  Pleasanton, 
with  three  small  cavalry  regiments,  the  Sixth  New 
York,  Eighth  Pennsylvania,  and  Seventeenth  Pennsyl 
vania,  was  ordered  to  assist  General  Sickles  in  pursu 
ing  the  enemy's  wagon  trains.  Finding  the  time  inop 
portune  for  a  cavalry  attack,  Pleasanton  took  position 
north  of  Scott's  Run,  on  the  left  of  the  Eleventh  Corps 
(Howard's). 

Jackson's  attack  on  this  corps  was  a  complete  sur 
prise,  and  resulted  in  a  demoralizing  and  panic- 
stricken  retreat  on  its  part.  As  this  was  taking  place, 
Pleasanton  was  notified,  and  the  Eighth  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry  was  dispatched  at  a  gallop  to  check  the  ene 
my's  attack  at  any  cost,  until  preparations  could  be 
made  to  receive  them.  When  this  regiment  reached 
the  scene  of  action,*  Howard  had  fallen  back,  and  the 
enemy's  skirmish  line  had  crossed  the  road  along 
which  the  cavalry  was  moving.  Led  by  Colonel  Huey, 
the  regiment  made  a  desperate  charge  in  column,  at 


*Huey's  report,  Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXV.,  Part  I.,  page 

784. 


42  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

right  angles  to  Jackson's  column,  losing  three  officers 
out  of  the  five  with  the  regiment,  and  about  thirty 
men,  but  checking  for  the  time  being  the  Confederate 
advance. 

Meanwhile  Pleasanton,  to  whom  every  moment's  de 
lay  was  invaluable,  had  been  straining  every  effort  to 
concentrate  artillery  to  meet  the  advancing  lines,  and 
before  the  enemy  came  in  sight,  had  succeeded  in  plac 
ing  twenty-three  pieces  of  artillery  in  position,  double- 
shotted  with  canister,  and  supported  by  two  small  cav 
alry  squadrons.  The  fugitives  from  the  Eleventh  Corps 
swarmed  from  the  woods,  and  swept  frantically  over 
the  fields,  the  exulting  enemy  at  their  heels.  But  as  the 
latter  drew  near,  the  Federal  artillery  opened  with  ter 
rible  effect.  The  Confederate  lines  were  thrown  back 
in  disorder  and  with  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  to 
the  Union  line,  aided  by  darkness,  the  enemy  withdrew. 

It  is  impossible  to  say  what  might  have  happened 
had  not  the  attack  of  Jackson's  victorious  divisions  been 
checked.  The  sacrifice  of  the  brave  cavalry  regiment 
well  repaid  the  results  gained,  and  illustrates  how  very 
effective  as  a  gainer  of  time  the  charge  in  flank  of  even 
a  small  body  of  cavalry  may  be,  when  prosecuted  with 
vigor.  It  was,  perhaps,  the  most  important  piece  of 
mounted  work  by  a  single  cavalry  regiment  during  the 
entire  war. 


Army  of  the  Potomac. 


VI. 

After  Chancellorsville  the  opposing  armies  rested 
for  a  time  on  opposite  sides  of  the  Rappahannock,  near 
Fredericksburg. 

During  the  entire  month  of  May  the  cavalry  was 
greatly  annoyed  by  Mosby's  men.  On  the  3d  Mosby 
and  others  surrounded  fifty  men  of  the  First  West  Vir 
ginia,  but  the  latter  were  rescued  by  a  brilliant  charge 
of  the  Fifth  New  York.  Towards  the  middle  of  the 
month  the  First  New  York  had  a  skirmish  with  a  por 
tion  of  Mosby's  command  at  Upperville  (May  12-14); 
and  again  on  the  30th  Mosby  attacked  the  train  of  the 
Eighth  Michigan  near  Catlett's  Station,  burning  it  and 
engaging  in  a  spirited  cavalry  fight  with  the  First  Ver 
mont,  Fifth  New  York,  and  a  detachment  of  the  Sev 
enth  Michigan.  Partly  as  an  offset  to  these  raids,  the 
Eighth  Illinois  Cavalry  was  sent  on  a  raiding  expe 
dition  (May  20-26)  into  King  George,  Westmoreland, 
Richmond,  Northumberland,  and  Lancaster  counties, 
destroying  property  estimated  at  one  million  dollars. 

Early  in  June  Stuart's  cavalry  were  holding  the 
fords  of  the  upper  Rappahannock,  the  main  body  being 
near  Culpeper  Court  House  and  Brandy  Station.  It 
retained  its  division  organization,  being  composed  of 
five  brigades,  aggregating  May  31st,  9,536  men. 


44  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

To  the  right  rear  of  the  Array  of  the  Potomac  was 
the  Federal  cavalry,  massed  at  Wnrrentou  Junction 
uDder  General  Pleasanton,  who  had  May  22d  assumed 
command.  It  was  still  organized  as  a  corps  of  three 
divisions,  numbering  in  all  7,981  men,  and  was  charged 
with  outpost  duty  from  the  neighborhood  of  Falmouth 
to  Warrenton,  with  occasional  expeditions  into  the 
country  above  the  upper  Rapidan. 

In  Lee's  plan  of  invasion  of  the  Northern  States,  his 
first  objective  was  Culpeper  Court  House.  Hooker 
guessed  Lee's  intentions,  and  Pleasanton  was  ordered 
to  make  a  reconnaissance  in  force,  having  for  its  object 
to  discover  the  strength,  position,  and  possible  inten 
tions  of  any  body  of  Confederate  troops  on  the  Fred- 
ericksburg-Culpeper  road.  But  the  corps  was  hamp 
ered  by  the  addition  of  two  infantry  brigades — accord 
ing  to  the  still  prevailing  idea  as  to  the  employment  of 
cavalry. 

On  June  9th  one  division  of  the  cavalry  corps 
(Buford's),  accompanied  by  Ames'  infantry  brigade, 
was  to  cross  the  Rapphannock  at  Beverly  Ford,  and 
moved  by  way  of  St.  James'  Church  to  Brandy  Station. 
The  second  column,  Gregg's  and  Duffi^'s  divisions,  with 
Russell's  infantry  brigade,  was  to  cross  at  Kelly's 
Ford,  and,  separating,  Gregg  was  to  proceed  past  Mount 
Dumpling  to  Brandy  Station,  while  Duflfid  was  to  take 
the  left-hand  road  to  Stevensburg. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  45 

By  a  strange  coincidence,  it  was  Stuart's  intention 
on  this  same  day  to  cross  the  river  at  Beverly  Ford  and 
the  upper  fords,  and  divert  the  attention  of  the  Union 
forces  from  Lee's  movements  northward — later  infor 
mation  showing  that  he  intended  to  invade  Maryland. 

The  orders  for  the  Federal  cavalry  divisions  directed 
them  to  cross  the  river  at  daylight  on  the  9th,  and  push 
rapidly  on  to  Brandy  Station.  Under  cover  of  a  heavy 
fog  and  the  noise  of  a  neighboring  mill-dam,  Buford's 
command  crossed  the  river  at  4  o'clock,  surprised  the 
enemy,*  and  would  have  captured  his  guns  had  it  not 
been  for  the  untimely  death  of  the  brave  Colonel  B.  F. 
Davis,  Eighth  New  York  Cavalry,  who  was  killed  while 
charging  the  enemy  at  the  head  of  his  brigade.  The 
enemy's  force  confronting  the  Federal  column  was  su 
perior  in  numbers,  but  in  spite  of  this  fact,  Pleasanton 
had  formed  line  of  battle  crossing  the  ford  in  less  than 
an  hour.  But  the  Confederates  were  in  such  force  that 
no  advance  was  made  until  Gregg's  guns  were  heard 
on  the  enemy's  left,  when  a  general  advance  was 
ordered. 

The  enemy  fell  back  rapidly,  and  General  Stuart's 
headquarters,  with  all  his  papers,  was  captured.  A  junc 
tion  was  soon  formed  with  Gregg,  and  with  heavy  losses 
to  both  sides  the  enemy  was  pushed  back  to  Fleetwood 


*This  attack  was  afterwards   known   to  the  Confederates 
as   "The   Surprise." 


46  tlistory  of  the  Cavalry,  - 

Kidge.  It  was  then  found  that  the  enemy's  infantry 
was  advancing  from  Brandy  Station  and  Culpeper.  The 
object  of  the  reconnaissance  having  been  partly  gained, 
through  the  development  of  the  Confederate  infantry 
from  the  direction  of  Culpeper,  and  the  information 
gained  from  the  papers  captured  in  the  Confederate 
camp,  orders  were  given  to  withdraw — Gregg  by  the 
way  of  the  ford  at  Kappahannock  Bridge,  and  Buford 
at  Beverly  Ford.  But  as  this  order  was  being  put  into 
execution,  the  Confederates  made  a  heavy  attack  on 
the  Union  right,  resulting  in  the  most  serious  fighting 
of  the  day.  The  mounted  charges,  rallies,  and  counter 
charges  by  the  cavalry  of  both  sides  made  this  pre- 
emininently  a  cavalry  fight  of  the  most  desperate 
character. 

At  4  o'clock  p.  m.,  a  superior  infantry  force  being 
about  to  advance,  Pleasauton  ordered  a  withdrawal, 
which  was  executed  in  good  order,  the  recrossing  of 
the  river  being  effected  about  7  o'clock  p.  m. 

The  contest  had  lasted  for  ten  hours,  and  the  casual 
ties,  amounting  to  866  for  the  Federal  troops  and  485 
for  the  Confederates,*  attest  the  desperate  character 
of  the  fighting.  Although  the  battle  illustrated  all 
kinds  of  cavalry  fighting,  mounted  and  dismounted,  it 
was  principally  mounted.  Stuart  had  the  advantage  in 


"Official  returns,  Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXVII.,  Parts  I. 
and  II.,  pages  170  and  719,  respectively. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  47 

position,  but  the  conditions  were  most  favorable  for 
cavalry  operations;  men  and  horses  were  in  prime  con 
dition  for  active  service;  the  ground  was  undulating, 
rising  slightly  from  the  river  towards  Brandy  Station; 
and  the  infantry  on  both  sides  served  principally  as 
a  reserve. 

Brandy  Station  rounded  up  %the  successful  experi 
ences  of  the  Federal  cavalry  at  Kelly's  Ford  in  March, 
and  with  the  raiding  column  of  Stonemau  in  April.  It 
was  the  first  great  cavalry  combat  of  the  war,  and  was 
really  the  turning-point  in  the  fortunes  of  the  Union 
cavalry.  The  Confederate  cavalry  had  hitherto  held 
their  opponents  in  contempt,  and  the  latter  had  had 
doubts  of  themselves. 

But  the  experience  of  June  9,  1868,  made  the  Union 
cavalry,  and  henceforth  no  one  could  doubt  its  effi 
ciency,  mounted  or  dismounted.  McClellan  has  said: 
"One  result  of  incalculable  importance  certainly  did 
follow  this  battle — it  made  the  Federal  cavalry.  Up 
to  this  time  confessedly  inferior  to  the  Southern  horse 
men,  they  gained  on  this  day  that  confidence  in  them 
selves  and  their  commanders  which  enabled  them  to 
contest  so  fiercely  the  subsequent  battle-fields  of  June, 
July,  and  October."* 


*McClellan's   "Campaign   of    Stuart's   Cavalry,"    page    294. 


48  History  of  the  Cavalry, 


VII. 


Lee's  second  objective  was  the  fords  of  the  upper 
Potomac,  and  these  he  proposed  to  reach  by  the  valley 
of  the  Shenandoah,  where,  concealed  from  observation 
by  the  mountain  ranges  on  his  right,  his  safety,  could 
be  secured  by  holding  the  mountain  passes  connecting 
the  valley  with  the  main  theatre  of  operations.  He 
entrusted  this  duty  to  Stuart's  cavalry,  supported  by 
Longstreet's  infantry  corps. 

By  June  15th  Stuart  had  pushed  forward  to  the  Bull 
Run  Mountains,  and  held  Thoroughfare  and  Aldie  gaps, 
traversed  respectively  by  the  main  road  from  Win 
chester  to  Alexandria,  and  the  Manassas  Gap  Railway. 
He  also  occupied  Rectortown,  and,  later  on,  Middle- 
burg,  from  which  points  he  could  reinforce  either  one 
of  the  two  passes,  as  occasion  required. 

On  June  13th  the  cavalry  corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  concentrated  at  Warrenton  Junction,  and 
from  the  14th  to  the  17th,  was  covering  the  movement 
of  the  main  army  northward. 

Lee's  movements  were,  however,  so  well  concealed 
that  on  the  17th  the  cavalry  corps  was  sent  to  obtain 
information.  This  was  one  of  the  very  things  that 
Stuart  had  been  instructed  to  prevent. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  49 

Pleasanton  proposed  to  move  to  Ashby's  Gap  in  the 
Blue  Ridge,  by  way  of  Aldie.  To  do  this,  he  moved  on 
Aldie  with  Buford's  and  Gregg's  divisions — Barnes' 
division  of  infantry  in  support — and  detached  Duffie' 
with  his  regiment,  the  First  Rhode  Island  Cavalry,  to 
march  to  Middleburg,  by  way  of  Thoroughfare  Gap. 
It  was  expected  that  Duffi£  would  rejoin  the  main  com 
mand,  after  it  had  passed  through  Aldie,  by  way  of 
Union,  Purcellville,  and  Nolan's  Ferry. 

Munford's  brigade  of  Stuart's  cavalry  was  at  Aldie, 
and  Gregg's  division  encountered  his  outposts  on  the 
17th  inst.  A  spirited  engagement  ensued,  in  which  the 
advantage  remained  writh  the  Federal  cavalry,  the  en 
emy  withdrawing  from  the  field  and  occupying  Mid 
dleburg  that  night.  The  casualties  were  quite  heavy 
on  both  sides,  aggregating  for  the  Federal  troops  305 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  and  for  the  Confederates 
119.  There  was  much  mounted  and  dismounted  fight 
ing  on  both  sides,  the  greater  number  of  casualties  on 
the  Federal  side  being  due  to  the  obstinate  resistance 
of  the  Confederate  sharpshooters,  posted  behind  stone 
walls.  Stuart,  in  his  report  of  the  engagement,  pro 
nounced  Aldie  "one  of  the  most  sanguinary  battles  of 
the  war." 

Meanwhile  Dum6  had  proceeded  through  Thorough 
fare  Gap,  where  he  encountered  the  enemy's  outposts. 
As  his  orders  directed  him  to  proceed  to  Middleburg, 


50  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

he  kept  on,  and  was  ultimately  surrounded  by  Cham- 
bliss'  and  Robertson's  Confederate  brigades.  Duffle", 
with  four  officers  and  twenty-seven  men  only,  suc 
ceeded  in  escaping. 

On  the  19th  Pleasanton  advanced  against  the  Con 
federates  at  Middleburg.  Three  brigades  under  Gregg- 
moved  on  the  town,  while  one  brigade  was  sent  to  out 
flank  the  enemy's  position.  The  fighting  was  of  the 
most  desperate  character,  the  Federal  forces,  as  Pleas 
anton  stated  in  a  letter  to  Hooker,  "really  fighting 
infantry  behind  stone  walls."  The  enemy's  right  flank 
was  finally  outflanked  by  dismounted  skirmishers  and 
fell  back  to  a  stronger  position,  half  a  mile  to  the  rear. 

The  same  evening  Stuart  was  reinforced  by  Jones' 
brigade  from  Union;  and  on  the  20th,  by  Hampton's 
brigade,  which  relieved  Chambliss  on  the  Upperville 
road. 

On  the  21st  Stuart's  line  of  five  brigades  extended 
from  Middleburg  to  Union,  confronted  by  six  brigades 
of  Federal  cavalry,  supported  by  a  division  of  infantry. 
Gregg's  division  moved  against  the  enemy's  right,  while 
Buford's  advanced  toward  Union  to  turn  the  Confed 
erate  left.  As  so  often  happened,  Gregg's  movement, 
though  intended  as  a  feint  only,  developed  into  the 
principal  fight  of  the  day.  Protected  by  the  heights, 
the  enemy  stubbornly  resisted  Gregg's  advance,  but 
were  steadily  driven  back  to  Upperville,  where  the  first 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  51 

division  (Buford's),  which  had  closed  in  on  the  second 
division  on  its  left,  cooperated  with  it  in  the  attack  on 
the  town.  Here  the  enemy  had  massed  his  cavalry, 
with  his  artillery  in  position  at  Ashby's  Gap;  but  after 
repeated  charges  and  counter-charges,  was  driven  from 
the  town,  and  his  steady  withdrawal  was  finally 
changed  to  a  headlong  retreat  towards  Ashby's  Gap.* 

That  night  a  portion  of  Longstreet's  infantry  corps 
occupied  the  gap;  and  Stuart's  command,  as  that  gen 
eral  says  in  his  report,  was  "ordered  farther  back  for 
rest  and  refreshment,  of  which  it  was  sorely  in  need." 
And  on  June  22d,  having  accomplished  the  objects  of 
the  expedition,  Pleasanton  fell  back  to  Aldie,  and  a 
few  days  later  joined  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

In  these  operations  the  cavalry  corps  had  admirably 
performed  the  duties  of  screening  the  movements  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  of  reconnoitering  the 
enemy's  movements.  Some  of  Buford's  scouts  on  the 
heights  of  the  Blue  Ridge  had  actually  seen  a  Confed 
erate  infantry  camp,  two  miles  in  length,  in  the  val 
ley  of  the  Shenandoah.  At  the  same  time,  Lee  was 
uncertain  of  the  movements  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac.  The  success  of  the  engagements  at  Aldie,  Mid- 
dleburg,  and  Upperville  brought  increasing  confidence 
to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  Federal  cavalry. 


*Casualties   at   Upperville:      Union,    209.      Upperville    and. 
Middleburg  (consolidated):     Confederate,  510. 


52  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Within  five  days  it  had  driven  the  Confederate  cav- 
airy  through  a  country  capable  of  a  most  stubborn  de 
fense,  as  far  as  the  base  of  the  Blue  Eidge;  had  proved 
its  ability  to  cope,  mounted  or  dismounted,  with  its 
formidable  antagonists;  and  had  been  able  to  furnish 
information  of  a  most  important  character  to  the  com- 
mander-in-chief. 

During  this  time  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had, 
under  cover  of  the  cavalry,  moved  from  Fredericksburg 
northward,  covering  Washington  and  Baltimore,  and 
on  June  25th  and  26th  had  crossed  the  Potomac  at 
Edwards'  Ferry.  Upon  reaching  Frederick,  General 
Hooker  was,  at  his  own  request,  relieved  from  com 
mand  of  the  army,  and  General  Meade  was  appointed 
in  his  stead. 

When  Pleasanton,  on  June  22d,  withdrew  from  con 
tact  with  the  enemy  he  employed  the  few  days  in  which 
his  corps  was  on  outpost  duty  in  refitting.  His  horses 
needed  shoeing  badly,  and  his  command  required  both 
rations  and  forage.  On  June  27th  the  divisions  of 
Buford  and  Gregg  crossed  the  Potomac  in  rear  of  Ilie 
infantry,  and  on  the  following  day  a  new  cavalry  divi 
sion,  composed  of  the  cavalry  hitherto  guarding  Wash 
ington  under  General  Stahel,  was  assigned  to  the  cav 
alry  corps  as  the  Third  Division.  General  Judson  Kil- 
patrick  was  assigned  to  command  it,  with  Generals 
Farnsworth  (an  officer  promoted  from  the  Eighth  Illi- 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  53 

nois  Volunteer   Cavalry)   and   Ouster   as    his   brigade 
commanders.* 

VIII. 

On  June  24th  Stuart's  cavalry  started  on  a  raid 
which  was  destined  to  have  a  most  important  effect 
upon  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  about  to  follow.  Its 
purpose  was  to  cut  the  communications  of  the  Federal 
army,  destroy  the  immense  wagon  trains  in  rear  of  that 
army,  and  create  a  moral  effect  by  threatening  the 
national  capital. 

General  Lee's  letter  to  Stuart,  dated  June  22d,  gives 
him  these  general  instructions:  "If  you  find  that  he 
[the  enemy]  is  moving  northward,  and  that  two  bri 
gades  can  guard  the  Blue  Ridge  and  take  care  of  your 
rear,  you  can  move  with  the  other  three  into  Maryland, 
and  take  position  on  General  Ewell's  right." 

And  again,  in  a  letter  written  to  Stuart  the  follow 
ing  day,  Lee  says:  "You  will,  however,  be  able  to  judge 
whether  you  can  pass  around  their  army  without 
hindrance,  doing  them  all  the  damage  you  can,  and 
cross  the  river  east  of  the  mountains.  In  either  case, 
after  crossing  the  river,  you  must  move  on  and  feel  the 
right  of  Ewell's  troops." 

*For  the  organization  of  the  cavalry  at  Gettysburg,  July 
1st  to  3d,  nee  Appendix  10  and  11. 


54  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

It  seems,  from  these  letters  and  confirmatory  state 
ments  in  letters  to  General  Longstreet,  that  Lee  author 
ized,  if  he  did  not  actually  suggest,  Stuart's  raid  about 
the  Federal  army.  But,  while  giving  Stuart  great  dis 
cretionary  power,  he  qualified  this  power  by  several  im 
portant  conditions.  That  Stuart  met  with  hindrances 
which  prevented  his  keeping  in  touch  with  Ew£ll's 
right,  and  even  caused  his  absence  from  part  of  the 
battle  of  Gettysburg,  is  a  matter  of  history. 

Taking  the  brigades  of  Fitzhugh  Lee,  Hampton,  and 
Chambliss,  Stuart  moved  on  June  25th  to  Haymarket, 
via  Glassoock's  Gap,  where  he  was  delayed  twenty-four 
hours  by  encountering  Hancock's  corps  of  infantry.  On 
the  27th  he  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Bowser's  Ford,  and 
on  the  following  day  captured  a  Federal  wagon  train 
eight  miles  long. 

On  this  same  day  the  cavalry  corps  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  disposed  so  that  Gregg  was  on  the 
right,  Buford  on  the  left,  and  Kilpatrick  in  advance. 
In  consequence  of  Stuart's  depredations,  Kilpatrick'g 
division  was  on  June  28th  detached,  and  ordered  to 
move  eastward  to  intercept  Stuart,  reported  to  be  head 
ing  for  Littlestown.  By  June  30th  Kilpatrick's  com 
mand  was  badly  scattered,  the  First  and  Second  Michi 
gan  and  Pennington's  battery  being  at  Abbotstown, 
north  of  Hanover,  and  Farnsworth's  brigade  was  at 
Littlestown,  southwest  of  Hanover.  The  Fifth  am} 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  55 

Sixth  Michigan  readied  Littlestown  at  daylight,  after 
an  all-night  march,  and  during  the  morning  Farnsworth 
started  towards  Hanover.  The  troops  at  Abbottstown 
were  also  ordered  there. 

As  Farnsworth  passed  through  Hanover,  his  rear 
guard  was  attacked  by  the  leading  regiment  of  Stuart's 
column  (Chambliss'  brigade),  which  boldly  charged  and 
threw  the  Federal  column  into  great  confusion,  cap 
turing  the  pack-trains.  Under  Farnsworth's  skillful 
direction,  however,  the  Fifth  New  York  Cavalry  was 
faced  about,  and  by  a  counter-charge  repulsed  the 
attack.  Meanwhile  the  Sixth  Michigan,  which  had  been 
left  for  awhile  at  Littlestown,  was  hurried  up,  and  was 
attacked  en  route  by  Fitzhugh  Lee's  brigade.  About 
noon  the  entire  division  was  united  at  Hanover,  and 
until  dark  kept  up  a  vigorous  skirmishing  with  the 
enemy,  now  holding  the  hills  southwest  of  the  town. 

Stuart's  dispositions,  in  guarding  the  long  line  of 
wagons  he  had  captured,  were  such  as  to  prevent  his 
rapid  deployment.  Otherwise  he  might  have  overcome 
the  rear  of  Kilpatrick's  column  before  it  could  have 
been  reinforced.  As  it  was,  Stuart's  elongated  column 
gave  a  fine  opportunity  for  a  successful  attack  by  the 
Federal  commander,  which  he  failed  to  take  complete 
advantage  of,  principally  because  he  was  unable  to 
concentrate  his  scattered  units.  But  Kilpatrick's  final 


56  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

stand  had  the  eft'ect  of  still  further  delaying  Stuart's 
efforts  to  join  Lee. 

This  encounter,  coupled  with  his  efforts  to  save  the 
wagon  train  which  embarrassed  his  movements, and  the 
fact  that  he  believed  Lee  to  be  near  the  Susquehanna, 
forced  Stuart  to  make  a  detour  to  the  east,  passing 
through  Jefferson  and  Dover,  and  endeavoring  to  carry 
out  his  original  instructions  as  to  keeping  in  touch  with 
Ewell's  right.  Swinging  northward  to  Carlisle  on  July 
1st,  Stuart  learned,  to  his  dismay,  that  the  Confederate 
army  was  at  Gettysburg,  and  that,  in  spite  of  the  ex 
hausted  condition  of  his  command,  he  must  push  south 
ward  with  all  haste,  in  order  to  be  present  at  the  ex 
pected  encounter  of  the  two  great  armies.  He  therefore 
moved  rapidly  towards  Gettysburg,  while  Kilpatrick, 
who  had  meanwhile  been  acting  on  interior  lines, 
marched  to  Berlin,  by  way  of  Abbottstown,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  throwing  himself  across  Stuart's  path,  but  the 
Confederate  commander  succeeded  in  eluding  him. 

While  Kilpatrick  had  been  following  Stuart,  the 
First  Cavalry  Division  (Buford's)  had  marched  to  Mid 
dletown,  covering  the  left  of  the  army,  and  watching 
the  enemy  in  the  direction  of  Hagerstown.  While  in 
camp  at  Middletown,  Buford  improved  the  opportunity 
to  shoe  his  horses  and  refit.  The  second  division 
(Gregg's)  was  stationed  at  different  points  from  Fred 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  57 

erick  City  to  Ridgeville  on  the  Baltimore  pike,  cover 
ing  the  right  of  the  army. 

On  June  29th  the  first  division  moved  so  as  to  cover 
and  protect  the  left  flank  of  the  line  of  march,  the  Re 
serve  Brigade,  under  Merritt,  marching  through  Me- 
chanicstown  to  Emmittsburg,  protecting  the  division 
trains,  while  the  First  and  Second  Brigades,  passing 
through  Boonesborough,  Cavetown,  and  Monterey,  en 
camped  at  Fairfield.  The  Second  Cavalry  Division  on 
that  day  moved  to  Westminster  on  the  right  flank  of 
the  army,  patrolling  the  country  between  York  and 
Carlisle. 

On  June  30th  Buford's  first  and  second  brigades 
moved  towards  Gettysburg,  meeting  en  route  two  Con 
federate  infantry  regiments,  with  artillery,  and  became 
involved  in  a  skirmish.  But  not  wishing  to  use  his 
artillery,  lest  he  cause  a  premature  concentration  of  the 
enemy's  forces,  and  thus  disarrange  General  Meade's 
plans,  Buford  turned  aside,  and,  passing  through  Em 
mittsburg,  reached  Gettysburg  during  the  afternoon. 
His  arrival  was  most  timely.  The  enemy's  advance  was 
just  entering  the  town,  and  Buford  was  able  to  drive 
it  back  in  the  direction  of  Cashtown  before  it  gained 
a  foothold. 

During  the  night  of  June  30th  scouting  parties  from 
Buf  ord's  division  patrolled  the  country  in  all  directions. 

^No  information  of  value  could  be  obtained  from  the  in- 
—7— 


58  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

habitants,  and  it  was  only  through  the  untiring  exer 
tions  of  these  patrols  that  the  cavalry  commander 
learned  by  daylight  of  July  1st  that  Hill's  corps  of  the 
Confederate  army  had  reached  Cashtown,  and  that  his 
pickets,  composed  of  infantry  and  artillery,  were  within 
sight  of  the  Federal  pickets.  Buford  accordingly  made 
every  effort  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  Reynolds' 
corps,  encamped  five  miles  south  of  him,  could  arrive 
on  the  ground.  His  trained  eye  had  been  struck  at 
once  with  the  strategic  importance  of  Gettysburg. 
From  the  town  at  least  ten  roads  radiated  in  different 
directions,  and  the  commanding  ground  above  the  town 
offered  extraordinary  advantages  to  the  army  which 
should  first  gain  possession.  It  seems  apparent  that 
neither  General  Lee  nor  General  Meade  were  at  the 
time  aware  of  the  strategic  importance  of  the  place.* 
To  Buford  belongs  the  credit  of  the  selection  of  Gettys- 


*Meade's  dispatch  to  Reynolds,  11:30  a.  m.,  June  30th: 
"P.  8. — If,  after  occupying  your  present  position,  it  is  your 
judgment  that  you  would  be  in  better  position  at  Emmitts- 
burg  than  where  you  are,  you  can  fall  back  without  waiting 
for  the  enemy  or  further  orders.  Your  present  position  was 
given  more  with  a  view  to  an  advance  on  Gettysburg  than  a 
defensive  point" 

Then  again,  Reynolds'  dispatch  to  Butterfield,  June  30th: 
"I  think  if  the  enemy  advances  in  force  from  Gettysburg,  and 
we' are  to  fight  a  defensive  battle  in  this  vicinity,  that  the  posi 
tion  to  be  occupied  is  just  north  of  the  town  of  Emmittsburg. 
covering  the  plank  road  to  Taneytown." 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  59 

burg  as  a  field  of  battle,*  and  the  cool  equanimity  with 
which  he  disposed  his  two  insignificant  brigades,  when 
he  positively  knew  that  the  whole  of  General  A.  P. 
HilFs  force  was  advancing  against  him,  must  excite  the 
admiration  of  soldiers  the  world  over. 


IX. 

Buford  had  placed  Gamble's  brigade,  to  which  was 
attached  Calefs  battery  of  the  Second  U.  S.  Artillery, 
on  the  left,  connecting  with  Devin's  brigade  across  the 
Chambersburg  road,  about  one  mile  in  front  of  the  sem 
inary.  One  section  of  Calefs  battery  was  placed  on 
each  side  of  the  Cashtown  road,  covering  the  ap 
proaches,  and  the  third  section  was  on  the  right  of  the 
left  regiment.  Devin's  brigade  was  on  the  left  of  the 
First  Brigade,  its  right  resting  on  the  Mummasburg 
road. 

Between  8  and  9  o'clock  in  the  morning  Heth's  divi 
sion  of  the  Confederate  army  advanced  along  the  Cash- 
town  road,  and  Buford  sent  a  squadron  from  each  bri 
gade,  part  of  which  was  dismounted,  to  deploy  as  skir- 


*  Buford  stated  to  his  brigade  commander,  Devin,  "that 
the  battle  would  be  fought  at  that  point"  (Gettysburg).  And 
again,  "The  enemy  must  know  the  importance  of  this  posi 
tion,  and  will  strain  every  nerve  to  secure  it,  and  if  we  are 
able  to  hold  it,  we  would  do  well."  (Bates'  "Battle  of  Get 
tysburg.") 


60  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

mishers  and  support  the  pickets.  Gradually  the  whole 
of  the  cavalry,  dismounted,  became  involved,  and  as 
Buf ord  has  said :  "The  line  of  battle  moved  off  proudly 
to  meet  the  enemy."  In  a  short  time,  the  enemy's  fire 
becoming  unbearable  through  ever-increasing  num 
bers,  the  line  of  battle  was  moved  back  about  200  yards. 
Here  again  the  dismounted  cavalry  fought  desperately, 
and  Calef's  battery  did  tremendous  execution  in  the 
face  of  an  overwhelming  fire.  Indeed,  at  one  time 
twelve  of  the  enemy's  guns  were  concentrated  on  this 
battery.  For  over  two  hours  the  enemy  was  held  in 
check  by  this  little  force  of  less  than  -3,000  effective 
men,  when  the  arrival  of  the  First  Corps,  under  Gen 
eral  Keynolds,  served  to  relieve  the  cavalry  from  its 
perilous  position.  During  the  greater  part  of  the  re 
mainder  of  the  day,  however,  the  cavalry  continued  to 
fight  side  by  side  with  the  infantry;  and  portions  of 
the  Eighth  New  York,  Third  Indiana,  and  Twelfth  Illi 
nois  regiments,  posted  behind  a  low  stone  wall  within 
short  carbine  range  of  the  enemy,  did  tremendous  exe 
cution  and  by  their  fire  prevented  the  turning  of  the 
left  flank  of  General  Doubleday's  command.*  Part  of 
the  Third  Indiana  Cavalry  found  horse-holders,  bor 
rowed  muskets,  and  fought  with  the  Wisconsin  reg 
iment  that  wras  sent  to  relieve  them. 


*General  Gamble's  report  says:  "The  stand  which  we  made 
against  the  enemy  prevented  our  left  from  being  turned, 
and  saved  a  division  of  our  infantry." 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  61 

The  First  Cavalry  Division  bivouacked  that  night 
on  the  field  of  battle,  with  its  pickets  extending  almost 
to  Fairfield.  Early  next  morning,  while  reconnoiter- 
ing  the  enemy's  right,  it  became  engaged  with  Confed 
erate  sharpshooters,  but  succeeded  in  holding  its  posi 
tion  until  relieved  by  the  Third  Corps.  Then,  at  the 
risk  of  leaving  the  Federal  army's  left  flank  unpro 
tected  by  cavalry,  it  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  West 
minster  to  assist  in  guarding  the  supply  trains  at  that 
point. 

Meanwhile  the  Second  Cavalry  Division  under  Gregg 
had  been  moving  along  the  right  flank  of  the  Federal 
army.  On  June  29th  it  covered  the  country  between 
York  and  Carlisle  with  patrols.  On  the  30th,  due  to  the 
enemy's  concentration  at  Gettysburg,  it  left  one  bri 
gade  (Huey's)  to  cover  the  d6pot  at  Westminster,  and 
with  the  two  other  brigades  moved  to  a  position  on 
the  extreme  right  flank  of  the  Federal  line  of  battle, 
with  orders  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  turning  the 
flank  or  gaining  the  rear. 

The  position  of  this  division  at  the  intersection  of 
the  Gettysburg  and  Hanover  turnpike  with  the  road  in 
rear  of  the  Federal  line  of  battle  was  taken  about  noon 
July  2d.  A  line  of  pickets  was  established  to  the  front, 
connecting  with  the  right  of  the  infantry  line.  Towards 
evening  an  attempt  was  made  to  dislodge  some  of  the 
enemy's  sharpshooters  posted  in  front  of  the  division, 

—8- 


62  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

resulting  in  the  enemy's  sending  a  regiment  of  infantry 
(Second  Virginia)  to  meet  the  dismounted  cavalry.  The 
key  to  the  position  was  a  well-built  stone  wall  running 
along  the  top  of  the  ridge,  to  the  right  of  the  Hanover 
road.  Each  side  raced  for  the  wall  at  full  speed,  but  the 
fire  from  Bank's  battery,  Third  Pennsylvania  Artillery, 
delayed  the  enemy  long  enough  for  the  dismounted  cav 
alry  to  reach  the  wall  first  and  pour  a  withering  fire 
from  their  breech-loading  carbines  into  the  Confed 
erate  infantry  line,  not  more  than  twenty  feet  distant. 
The  result  was  decisive. 

The  following  day,  July  3d,  this  cavalry  division, 
which  had  for  a  time  been  withdrawn  from  its  position 
of  the  previous  day,  was  again  ordered  to  the  right  of 
the  line,  with  orders  to  make  a  demonstration  against 
the  enemy.  The  First  and  Third  Brigades  were  again 
posted  on  the  right  of  the  infantry,  this  time  about 
three-fourths  of  a  mile  nearer  the  Baltimore  and  Get 
tysburg  turnpike,  for  the  reason  that  Ouster's  brigade 
of  the  Third  Cavalry  Division  had  been  detached  from 
that  division  and  was  occupying  the  ground  held  the 
day  before  by  the  Second  Cavalry  Division.  Dis 
mounted  skirmishers  from  the  Sixteenth  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry  were  deployed  through  the  woods  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Gettysburg. 

About  noon  a  dispatch  reached  General  Gregg,  say 
ing  that  a  large  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  were 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  63 

observed  from  Cemetery  Hill,  and  were  moving  against 
the  right  of  the  line.  In  consequence  of  this  informa 
tion,  Ouster's  brigade,  which  had  been  ordered  back  to 
Kilpatrick's  command  on  the  left  of  the  line,  was  held 
bj  General  Gregg  until  after  the  enemy's  attack. 

This  Confederate  column,  moving  to  the  attack,  was 
Stuart's  cavalry,  which,  belated  by  obstacles  already 
mentioned,  was  advancing  in  front  of  Swell's  corps. 
Stuart  took  position  upon  a  ridge  which  controlled  a 
wide  area  of  cultivated  fields.  His  plan;  as  stated  in 
his  official  report,  was  to  employ  the  Federal  troops  in 
front  with  sharpshooters,  while  a  cavalry  force  was 
moved  against  their  flank.  He  says:  •'!  moved  this 
command  [Jenkins'  cavalry  brigade]  and  W.  H.  F. 
Lee's  secretly  through  the  woods  to  a  position,  and 
hoped  to  effect  a  surprise  upon  the  enemy's  rear." 
Taken  in  combination  with  Pickett's  famous  charge, 
Stuart's  dispositions  were  such  that  he  hoped  to  seize 
the  opportune  moment  to  profit  by  it. 

To  meet  this  attack  the  First  New  Jersey  was  posted 
as  mounted  skirmishers  to  the  right  and  front  in  a 
wood;  the  Third  Pennsylvania  was  deployed  as  dis 
mounted  skirmishers  to  the  left  and  front  in  open  fields 
and  the  First  Maryland  Cavalry  was  placed  on  the  Han 
over  turnpike,  in  position  to  protect  the  right  of  the 
line. 


64  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

In  a  short  time  the  skirmishing  became  very  brisk, 
and  the  artillery  fire  on  both  sides  very  heavy — the 
Federal  artillery  under  Kandall  and  Pennington,  de 
livering  an  extremely  accurate  fire.  To  counteract  the 
advance  of  the  Federal  skirmish  line,  about  to  cut  off 
a  portion  of  his  sharpshooters,  Stuart  caused  a  reg 
iment  of  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  brigade  to  charge.  This  was 
met  by  the  Seventh  Michigan,  but  without  apparent 
advantage,  both  regiments  discharging  their  carbines 
across  a  stone-and-rail  fence,  face  to  face.  The  First 
Michigan  Cavalry,  aided  by  firing  from  Chester's  bat 
tery,  made  a  charge  which,  followed  by  a  desperate 
hand-to-hand  fight,  drove  the  Confederate  line  back  in 
confusion.  Then  followed  counter-charges  by  the  Con 
federates,  until  a  large  part  of  both  commands  were  in 
volved  in  the  melee,  and  while  withdrawing  past  a  wood 
towards  his  left  the  enemy  was  charged  in  flank  by  the 
First  New  Jersey  Cavalry.  In  this  terrible  cavalry 
combat,  every  possible  weapon  wras  utilized.  In  a  dash 
for  a  Confederate  battle-flag  Captain  NewJiall  was  re 
ceived  by  its  bearer  upon  the  point  of  the  spear-head, 
which  hurled  Newhall  to  the  ground.  And  after  the 
battle  men  were  found  interlocked  in  each  other's  arms, 
with  fingers  so  firmly  imbedded  in  the  flesh  as  to  re 
quire  force  to  remove  them.*  The  Confederate  brigades 


""'Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Vol.  III.,  p.  405. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  65 

crumbled  away,  retiring  behind  their  artillery,  and  after 
dark  withdrew  to  the  York  road.  The  Federal  casual 
ties  had  amounted  to  254,  and  the  Confederate  to  181.* 
This  grand  cavalry  combat,f  on  the  right  of  the  Fed 
eral  line  of  battle,  has,  like  Buford's  glorious  stand  in 
the  first  day's  fight,  never  received  the  recognition 
which  its  importance  deserved.  Had  Stuart's  plan  of 
striking  the  rear  of  the  Union  army  simultaneously 
with  the  desperate  charge  of  Pickett  on  Cemetery 
Eidge  succeeded,  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Gettys 
burg  would  certainly  have  been  different. 

The  occasion  for  Stuart's  attack  was  most  oppor 
tune.  The  tide  of  battle  between  the  long  lines  of  in 
fantry  had  been  wavering,  first  one  way  and  then  the 
other.  Had  Stuart,  with  his  veteran  cavalry,  gained 
the  rear  of  the  line  of  battle,  the  panic  which  would 
have  undoubtedly  followed  would  have  been  more  than 
sufficient  to  win  the  day  for  the  Confederate  cause. 

X. 

On  the  Federal  left  another  great  cavalry  battle  was 
taking  place.  After  Kilpatrick's  encounter  with  Stu 
art's  cavalry  at  Hanover,  June  30th.  it  will  be  remem- 


*Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XXVII.,  Part  I.,  p.  958;  Part 
II.,  p.  714.  "Gregg's  Fight  at  Gettysburg."  ("Battles  and 
Leaders  of  the  Civil  War.") 


Known  as  Rummel's  Farm. 


66  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

bered  that  the  Third  Cavalry  Division  marched  on  the 
following  day  to  Berlin  via  Abbottstown,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  intercepting  Stuart.  Not  finding  him  there,  a 
detachment  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Alexander  fol 
lowed  Stuart  to  Rossville.  On  July  2d,  the  second  day 
of  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  Kilpatrick  received  orders 
to  march  as  quickly  as  possible  to  the  battle-field.  Here 
he  received  further  orders  to  move  over  the  Gettysburg- 
Abbottstowrn  road,  and  see  that  the  enemy  did  not  turn 
the  Federal  left  flank.  While  nearing  Hunterstown,  Kil 
patrick  was  attacked  by  a  heavy  cavalry  force  in  posi 
tion,  which  proved  to  be  Hampton's  and  Lee's  brigades. 
Custer,  whose  brigade  was  leading,  at  once  covered  the 
road  with  a  line  of  mounted  skirmishers,  while  dismount 
ed  skirmishers  were  throwTn  out  on  each  side  behind  the 
fences  which  flanked  the  road.  The  leading  squadron 
of  the  Sixth  Michigan  Cavalry  charged  down  the  road, 
and  two  squadrons  were  dismounted  and  deployed  along 
a  ridge  to  the  right.  Pennington's  battery  took  posi 
tion  to  their  rear.  This  gallant  charge  of  the  leading 
squadron  was  futile  against  the  superior  force  which  it 
encountered,  but  it  gained  time.  A  counter-charge, 
which  the  enemy  attempted,  was  repelled  by  the  dis 
mounted  skirmishers  with  their  Spencer  repeating 
carbines. 

The  position  was  held  until  near  midnight,  when 
Kilpatrick  received  orders  to  march  to  Two  Taverns. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  67 

Beaching  there  early  in  the  morning  of  July  3d,  the 
tired  troopers  wer.e  allowed  a  short  bivouac.  But  hardly 
had  the  men  of  Custer's  brigade  stretched  themselves 
on  the  ground,  when  orders  arrived,  detaching  them. 
and  directing  the  brigade  to  take  position  on  the  Union 
right,*  where,  as  has  been  seen,  they  rendered  such  sig 
nal  aid  to  the  Second  Cavalry  Division. 

The  Union  left  had  been  deprived  of  protection  by 
the  detaching  of  Buford's  division  to  Westminster  on 
July  2d;  so  that  at  8  o'clock  the  morning  of  July  3d 
Kilpatrick  received  orders  from  General  Pleasanton  to 
move  to  the  left  of  the  line  with  his  whole  command 
and  the  Reserve  Brigade,  meanwhile  ordered  up  from 
Emmittsburg.  The  purpose  was  to  attack  the  enemy's 
right  and  rear,  at  the  same  time  preventing,  if  possible, 
the  turning  of  the  Federal  left. 

The  result  of  the  Confederate  operations  of  the  day 
before  had  induced  them  to  believe  that  another  attack 
on  the  Federal  right  would  succeed.  The  column  of 
attack  was  to  consist  of  Pickett's,  Heth's,  and  a  part 
of  Fender's  divisions,  Pickett  being  on  the  right. 


*Kilpatrick's  report  characterizes  this  detaching  of  Ous 
ter's  brigade  as  "a  mistake."  Gregg's  report:  "I  learned  that 
the  Second  Brigade  of  the  Third  Division  was  occupying  my 
position  of  the  day  before,"  which  seems  to  indicate  that  Gregg 
was  not  responsible  for  the  detaching  of  Custer.  Pleasan- 
ton's  report,  too,  gives  no  clue  as  to  who  detached  this  bri 
gade.  At  all  events,  the  detaching  of  Custer,  whether  due  to 
mistake  or  to  wise  forethought,  was  of  the  greatest  assistance- 
in  preventing  Stuart's  attempted  turning  movement. 


38  History  of  the  Cavalri/. 

General  Farnsworth  reached  his  position  to  the  left 
and  front  of  the  "Bound  Tops"  about  1  o'clock  p.  ni. 
and  became  engaged  with  his  skirmishers,  the  Confed 
erate  division  immediately  opposed  to  him  being  Hood's 
division  under  General  Law.  About  this  time  (1  o'clock) 
began  the  grand  cannonade  from  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  pieces  of  artillery,  which  was  to  precede  the 
assault  of  the  Confederate  infantry  column.  The  arrival 
of  Farnsworth's  brigade  had  the  effect  of  constantly 
threatening  Law's  right,  and  greatly  embarrassed  that 
general's  movements.* 

Meanwhile,  the  Beserve  Brigade  under  Merritt,  hav 
ing  marched  from  Emmittsburg,  did  not  reach  its  posi 
tion  on  Farnsworth's  left  until  about  3  o'clock.  Then, 
advancing  along  the  Gettysburg  road,  Merritt's  dis 
mounted  skirmishers  caused  Law  to  detach  a  large 
force  from  his  main  line  in  order  to  protect  his  flank 
and  rear.  This  so  weakened  the  Confederate  line  in 
Farnsworth's  front  that  Kilpatrick  ordered  Farns 
worth  to  charge  the  center  of  Law's  line.  The  ground 

*Gfeneral  Law  regarded  the  appearance  of  the  cavalry  as 
exceedingly  dangerous  to  his  flank.  He  pays  ("Battles  and 
Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  Century  Company):  "While  the 
artillery  duel  was  in  progress,  and  before  our  infantry  had 
moved  to  the  attack,  a  new  danger  threatened  us  on  the  right. 
This  was  the  appearance  of  Kilpatrick's  division  of  cavalry, 
which  moved  up  on  that  flank,  and  commenced  massing  in  the 
body  of  the  timber  which  extended  from  the  base  of  Round 
Top  westward  towards  Kern's  house  on  the  Emmittsburg 
road." 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  69 

was  most  unfavorable  for  a  charge,  being  broken,  un 
even,  and  covered  with  stone.  It  was,  moreover,  inter 
sected  by  fences  and  stone  walls,  some  of  the  latter 
being  so  high  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  passing 
them  without  dismounting  and  throwing  them  down. 
Posted  behind  these  fences  and  walls  were  veteran 
infantry. 

After  making  a  dignified  protest  against  what  he 
considered  a  most  reckless  sacrifice  of  life,  Farnsworth 
placed  himself  at  the  head  of  his  brigade,  and  rode,  as 
became  a  brave  soldier  and  gallant  cavalryman,  boldly 
to  his  death.*  When  his  body  was  afterwards  recov 
ered,  it  was  found  to  have  received  five  mortal  wounds. 

The  charge  was  most  desperate.  The  First  West 
Virginia  and  Eighteenth  Pennsylvania  moved  through 


*Captain  H.  C.  Parsons,  First  Vermont  Cavalry,  says  in 
"Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War":  "I  was  near  Kilpat- 
rick  when  he  impetuously  gave  the  order  to  Farnsworth  to 
make  the  last  charge.  Farnsworth  spoke  with  emotion:  'Gen 
eral,  do  you  mean  it?  Shall  I  throw  my  handful  of  men  over 
rough  ground,  through  timber,  against  a  brigade  of  infantry? 
The  First  Vermont  has  already  been  fought  half  to  pieces; 
these  are  too  good  men  to  kill!'  Kilpatrick  said:  'Do  you  re 
fuse  to  obey  my  orders?  If  you  are  afraid  to  lead  this  charge. 
I  will  lead  it.'  Farnsworth  rose  in  his  stirrups,  looking  mag 
nificent  in  his  passion,  and  cried,  'Take  that  back!'  Kil 
patrick  returned  his  defiance,  but  soon  repenting,  said:  'I 
did  not  mean  it;  forget  it.'  For  a  moment  there  was  silence, 
when  Farnsworth  spoke  calmly:  'General,  if  you  order  the 
charge,  I  will  lead  it,  but  you  must  take  the  responsibility.' 
T  did  not  hear  the  low  conversation  that  followed,  but  as 
Farnsworth  turned  away,  he  said:  'I  will  obey  your  order,' 
Kilpatrick  sajd  earnestly:  M  take  the  responsibility.'" 


70  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

the  woods  first,  closely  followed  by  the  First  Vermont 
and  Fifth  New  York,  and  drove  the  enemy  before  them 
until  the  heavy  stone  walls  and  fences  were  reached. 
Here  the  formation  was  broken;  but  two  regiments 
cleared  the  obstacles,  charged  a  second  line  of  infantry, 
and  were  again  stopped  by  another  stone  wall,  covering 
a  third  line  of  infantry.  One  of  the  supporting  cavalry 
regiments,  after  passing  the  first  wall,  encountered  a 
large  body  of  the  enemy  which  had  been  sent  from  the 
enemy's  left  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  first  charging 
column.  The  contest  became  hand-to-hand,  and  the 
cavalry  used  their  sabers  to  such  advantage  as  to  dis 
able  a  great  many  of  their  opponents  and  cause  others 
to  surrender.  Being  exposed  to  the  enemy's  artillery 
and  sharpshooters,  this  regiment  was  at  length  obliged 
to  fall  back.  If  even  a  portion  of  the  Federal  infantry 
posted  on  Kilpatrick's  right  had  advanced  on  Law's 
attenuated  line  at  the  time  Farnsworth's  men  had 
gained  the  enemy's  rear,  the  Confederate  division  must 
have  given  way.  But  no  cooperation  took  place.  As 
it  was,  one  of  the  regiments  in  the  first  charging  line — 
the  First  West  Virginia — after  passing  the  two  stone 
fences  already  referred  to,  was  entirely  surrounded, 
but  succeeded  in  cutting  its  way  back  with  a  loss  of 
but  five  killed  and  four  wounded,  bringing  with  it  a 
number  of  prisoners. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  71 

All  things  considered  it  seems  wonderful  that  these 
four  regiments  did  not  suffer  a  greater  percentage  of 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing.*  It  can  perhaps,  best  be 
accounted  for  by  the  moral  effect  of  the  charge,  and 
the  fine  horsemanship  with  which  the  fearless  troop 
ers  leaped  the  obstacles  and  sabered  the  infantrymen 
in  their  positions.  Of  this,  the  Confederate  General 
Law  has  said:  "It  was  impossible  to  use  our  artillery 
to  any  advantage,  owing  to  the  close  quarters  of  the 
attacking  cavalry  with  our  own  men,  the  leading 
squadrons  forcing  their  horses  up  to  the  very  muzzles 
of  the  rifles  of  our  infantry." 


XI. 

The  Federal  victory  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  owes 
much  to  the  cavalry.  Buford  at  Oak  Hill,  Gregg  on  the 
Federal  right,  and  Kilpatrick  on  the  left,  performed 
deeds  which  have  never  been  excelled  by  the  cavalry 
of  any  nation.  As  Gettysburg  was  the  turning-point 
in  the  fortunes  of  the  Union  Army,  it  also  marked  an 
epoch  in  the  development  of  cavalry,  trained  in  meth 
ods  which  were  evolved  from  no  foreign  text-books,  but 


*Therewere300meninFamsworth's  charge,  and  65  casual 
ties.  (Captain  Parsons,  in  "Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil 
War.")  • 


UNIVERSITY 


72  History  of  Ihc  Cavalry, 

from  stern  experience  on  the  battle-fields  of  the  great 
Civil  War. 

By  the  morning  of  the  4th  of  July  General  Lee's 
lines  were  evacuated,  his  army  was  in  full  retreat,  and 
the  Federal  cavalry  and  the  Sixth  Army  Corps  were  in 
hot  pursuit,  striving  to  gain  his  rear,  cut  his  lines  of 
communication,  and  harass  and  annoy  him  in  every 
manner  possible. 

The  First  Cavalry  Division  moved  from  Westmin 
ster  to  Frederick,  where  it  was  joined  by  the  Keserve 
Brigade  under  Merritt  on  July  5th.  On  the  following 
day  it  moved  towards  William  sport  to  destroy  the  en 
emy's  trains,  reported  to  be  crossing  the  Potomac  into 
Virginia.  Upon  nearing  the  town  the  Confederate  pick 
ets  were  driven  in  until  the  enemy's  line  of  battle  be 
came  too  strong  for  further  progress.  In  an  attack  on 
Gamble's  brigade  on  the  Federal  left  the  enemy  was 
severely  punished,  but  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's 
trains  in  the  face  of  the  strong  force  guarding  them 
proved  too  difficult  a  task  for  the  division,  with  the 
exception  of  a  small  train  of  grain  with  about  forty 
mules. 

Meanwhile  Kilpatrick's  division  had  inarched  on 
July  4th  from  Gettysburg  to  Emmittsburg,  where  it 
was  joined  by  TTuey's  brigade  of  Gregg's  division,  and 
from  1  hence  it  moved  towards  Monterey,  with  the  in 
tention  of  destroying  the  enemy's  wagon  trains  near 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  73 

Ilagerstown.  After  a  series  of  combats  with  Stuart's 
cavalry,  the  Third  Division  reached  Smithburg  on 
July  5th,  having  entirely  destroyed  a  large  wagon 
train  of  Ewell's,  and  having  captured  1,360  prisoners, 
1  battle-flag,  and  a  lai  ge  number  of  horses  and  mules. 

On  July  Gth,  while  "Ruford  was  attacking  Williams- 
port,  Kilpatrick  attacked  Stuart  at  Hagerstown, result 
ing  in  that  general's  surprise  and  retreat  towards  Grei  n 
castle.  Kilpatrick  then  endeavored  to  cooperate  with 
Buford  at  Williamsport,  but  failed  to  gain  any  material 
advantage.  The  enemy,  however,  was  forced  to  burn 
a  large  train  northwest  of  Hagerstown. 

From  the  7th  until  the  14th  of  July,  Kilpatrick's 
division  was  constantly  engaged  with  the  enemy  on 
the  right  of  the  Federal  army,  as  was  Buford's  division 
on  the  left,  and  ITuey's  brigade  of  Gregg's  division  in 
the  center. 

Meanwhile  Gregg  had  followed  the  enemy  by  way  of 
Cashtown,  where  a  number  of  piisoners  wer  >  captured. 
The  division  then  proceeded  by  way  of  Marion  and 
Ohambersburg  to  Booncsborough;  Mclntosh's  brigade 
being  placed  at  Emmittsburg  to  prevent  raids  of  the 
Confederate  cavalry  towards  the  Federal  rear. 

On  July  14th  Gregg,  with  Mclntosh's  and  Irvin 
Gregg's  brigades,  crossed  the  Potomac  at  Harper's 
Ferry,  and  being  reinforced  by  Huey's  brigade,  marched 
to  Shepherdstovvn  with  a  view  of  striking  the  enemy 


74  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

in  flank  and  rear.  On  the  16th,  Huey's  brigade  not  be 
ing  present,  Gregg  was  attacked  by  the  enemy  in  force. 
After  a  spirited  engagement,  lasting  all  day,  the  enemy 
withdrew. 

On  the  same  day  Buford's  and  Kilpatrick's  divisions 
followed  the  enemy  closely  to  Falling  Waters,  captur 
ing  many  prisoners,  three  battle-flags,  and  a  large  quan 
tity  of  stores. 

After  July  15th  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  through 
the  London  Valley  and  across  the  Rappahannock  River 
was  made  by  detachments,  and  the  Gettysburg  cam 
paign,  so  far  as  the  movements  of  the  cavalry  corps  werv 
concerned,  properly  closed  at  that  date. 

By  the  end  of  July  the  entire  cavalry  corps  was  con 
centrated  about  \Varrenton,  Warreuton  Junction,  and 
Fayetteville,  Virginia,  and  was  agahi  engaged  in  pick 
eting  the  Rappahannock.  The  casualties  of  the  corps 
from  June  28th  to  July  .'list  consisted  of  1,949  killed, 
wounded,  and  missing. 


XII. 


During  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  284,000  horses 
were  furnished  the  cavalry,  when  the  maximum  num 
ber  of  cavalrymen  in  the  field  at  any  time  during  this 
period  did  not  exceed  00,000. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  75 

The  enormous  number  of  casualties  among  the 
horses  was  due  to  many  causes,  among  which  were: 
ignorance  of  purchasing  officers  as  to  the  proper  ani 
mals  for  cavalry  service;  poor  horsemanship  on  the 
part  of  the  raw  cavalry  troopers,  mustered  in  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war;  the  control  of  the  cavalry  move 
ments  by  officers  of  other  arms,  ignorant  of  the  limit 
of  endurance  of  cavalry  horses;  the  hardships  insep 
arable  from  tlu1  duties  of  the  cavalry  upon  such  duties 
as  the  Stonemaii  raid,  the  campaign  of  the  Army  of 
Virginia,  and  the  campaign  of  Gettysburg;  and  last, 
but  not  least,  ignorance  and  gross  inefficiency  on  the 
part  of  many  officers  and  men  as  to  the  condition  of  the 
horses'  backs  and  feet,  care  as  to  food  and  cleanliness, 
and  the  proper  treatment  of  the  many  diseases  to  which 
horses  on  active  service  are  subject. 

Cavalry,  of  all  arms,  requires^  the  greatest  length  of 
time  to  acquire  efficiency,  and  if  the  reduction  of  the 
regular  establishment  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States 
is  ever  contemplated,  the  experience  of  the  Government 
during  these  first  two  years  of  the  War  of  the  Rebel 
lion  with  horses  alone  should  serve  as  a  warning. 

Given  men  possessing  unbounded  patriotism,  intel 
ligence,  and  physical  excellence,  as  were  the  volunteers 
at  the  beginning  of  this  war,  yet  these  qualities,  while 
quickly  combining  to  make  excellent  infantry  and  artil 
lery  soldiers,  required  many  times  the  length  of  time  to 


*76  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

make  good  cavalrymen.  Training  and  discipline,  backed 
by  the  unlimited  finances  of  a  great  government,  pre 
vailed  in  the  end;  but  the  lesson,  to  say  the  least,  was  a 
humiliating  and  costly  one,  which  should  never  be 
repeated. 

In  such  a  tremendous  machine  as  the  Quartermas 
ter's  Department  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  contain 
ing  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  many  officers  with  ab 
solutely  no  experience  as  quartermasters,  there  were 
necessarily  many  vexatious  delays  in  purchasing  and 
forwarding  supplies,  and  many  disappointments  in  the 
quality  of  supplies,  furnished  too  often  by  scheming 
contractors. 

The  tardiness,  too,  with  which  cavalry  remounts 
were  forwarded  to  the  regiments  was  a  frequent  sub 
ject  of  complaint.  In  October,  1862,  when  service  in 
the  Peninsular  campaign  and  that  of  the  Army  of  Vir 
ginia  had  brought  the  numbers  of  mounted  cavalry 
down  to  less  than  a  good-sized  regiment,  General  Me 
Clellan  wrote  to  Halleck:  "It  is  absolutely  necessary 
that  some  energetic  measures  be  taken  to  supply  the 
cavalry  of  this  army  with  remount  horses.  The  present 
rate  of  supply  is  1 ,050  per  week  for  the  entire  army  here 
and  in  front  of  Washington.  From  this  number  the 
artillery  draw  for  their  batteries." 

In  reply  to  this  I  ho  Quartermaster-General  stated 
that  since  the  battles  in  front  of  Washington  there 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  77 

had  been  issued  to  the  Army,  (o  replace  losses,  9,254 
horses,  adding:  "Is  there  an  instance  on  record  of  such 
a  drain  and  destruction  of  horses  in  a  country  not  a  des 
ert?"  A  little  later  McClellan  again  complained  that 
many  of  the  horses  furnished  "were  totally  unfitted  for 
the  service,  and  should  never  have  been  received."  Gen 
eral  Pope  had,  in  fact,  reported  that  "our  cavalry  num 
bered  on  paper  about  4,000  men,  but  their  horses  were 
completely  broken  down,  and  there  were  not  500  men, 
all  told,  capable  of  doing  much  service,  as  should  be 
expected  from  cavalry.  On  the  morning  of 

the  30th  [August  30,  1862],  *  *  *  the  artillery  and 
cavalry  horses  had  been  saddled  and  in  harness  for  ten 
days,  and  had  had  no  forage  for  two  days  previous." 
And  again  he  says:  "Our  cavalry  at  Centerville  was 
completely  broken  down,  no  horses  whatever  having 
reached  us  to  remount  it.  Generals  Buford  and  Bay 
ard,  commanding  the  whole  of  the  cavalry  force  of  the 
Army,  reported  to  me  that  there  were  not  five  horse* 
to  the  company  that  could  be  forced  into  a  trot." 

The  demand  for  horses  was  KO  great  that  in  many 
cases  they  were  sent  on  active  service  before  recover 
ing  sufficiently  from  the  fatigue  incident  to  a  long  rail 
way  journey.  One  case  was  reported  of  horses  left  on 
the  cars  fifty  hours  without  food  or  water,  and  then 


78  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

being    taken    out,    issued,    and    used    for    immediate 
service.* 

To  such  an  extent  had  overwork  and  disease  re 
duced  the  number  of  cavalry  horses  that  when  General 
Stuart  made  his  raid  into  Pennsylvania^  October  11. 
1862,  only  800  Federal  cavalry  could  be  mounted  to 
follow  him,  and  the  exhausting  pursuit  which  took 
place  broke  down  a  large  proportion  of  the  horses  that 
remained.  Under  date  of  October  21st,  McClellan  wrotv* 
to  Halleck:  "Exclusive  of  the  cavalry  force  now  en 
gaged  in  picketing  the  river,  I  have  not  at  present  over 
1,000  horses  for  service.  Without  more  cavalry  horses, 
our  communications  from  the  moment  we  march  would 
be  at  the  mercy  of  the  large  cavalry  force  of  the 
enemy." 

The  need  of  cavalry  was  so  urgent  and  the  numbeis 
of  dismounted  men  so  alarming  that  even  President  Lin 
coin  wrote  to  McClellan,  October  27,  1862:  "To  be  told, 
after  five  weeks'  total  inaction  of  the  Army,  during 
which  time  we  have  sent  to  the  Army  every  fresh  horse 
wre  possibly  could,  amounting  on  the  whole  to  7,918, 
that  the  cavalry  horses  were  too  much  fatigued  to 
move,  presents  a  cheerless,  almost  hopeless  prospect 
for  the  future." 


*General  Meigs'  report,  Rebellion  Records,  Vol.  XIX.,  Part 
I.,  page  19. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  79 

The  reorganization  of  the  cavalry  under  Hooker 
worked  a  great  improvement  in  the  care  and  condition 
of  horses,  as  it  tended  to  systematize  the  forwarding  of 
remounts,  and  by  a  centralization  of  authority  brought 
the  whole  cavalry  force  under  a  stricter  sense  of  respon 
sibility  for  casualties  among  the  hordes.  It  also  re 
duced  the  excessive  picket  duty,  which  m  my  corps  and 
division  commanders  had  deemed  the  chief  duty  of  cav 
alry.  But  little  by  little  officers  and  men  were  begin 
ning  to  realize  how  important  the  health  and  strength 
of  their  chargers  were  to  them,  and  by  actual  experience 
on  many  arduous  campaigns  they  were  gradually  learn 
ing  how  best  to  preserve  that  health  and  strength. 

But  the  Stoneman  raid  again  necessarily  reduced 
the  numbers  of  serviceable  horses.  Stoneman  reported 
that  while  the  horses  were  generally  in  fair  condition 
when  they  started,  they  were  much  exhausted  and 
weakened  by  the  march.  Many  were  rendered  tempo 
rarily  useless  from  infrequent  feeding,"  mud  fever," 
and  sore  backs,  while  at  least  a  thousand  were  aban 
doned.  Numbers  of  men  thus  dismounted  procured 
remounts  from  the  country,  mostly  broo'd-mares  and 
draught-horses,  which,  though  unsuitable  for  cavalry 
service,  served  for  temporary  use. 

This  raid,  followed  by  the  battle  of  Beverly  Ford, 
was  a  poor  preparation,  so  far  as  horse-flesh  was  con 
cerned,  for  the  Gettysburg  campaign  which  followed. 


80  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

In  immediate  readiness  for  action,  constantly  in  motion 
night  and  day,  saddled  for  long  periods,*  fed  and 
groomed  at  irregular  times,  often  unshod  in  a  country 
from  which  the  Confederate  cavalry  had  collected  every 
horse-shoe,  the  horses  of  the  Union  cavalry  fought  their 
battles  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign  at  a  disadvantage. 
Had  not  the  enemy's  cavalry  been  in  much  the  same 
condition,  this  would  have  been  a  serious  consideration. 
Aside,  too,  from  the  ordinary  diseases  to  which 
horses  are  subject,  the  Virginia  soil  seemed  to  be  par 
ticularly  productive  of  diseases  of  the  feet.  That 
known  as  "scratches"  disabled  thousands  of  horses  dur 
ing  the  Peninsular  campaign  and  that  of  Pope,  and  late 
in  186.3,  after  the  Bristoe  campaign,  General  Merritt  re 
ported:  "Since  arriving  in  camp  I  have  sent  to  the 
Quartermaster's  Department,  Washington  City,  accord 
ing  to  order,  471  disabled,  unserviceable  horses.  There 
are  at  least  100  more  in  the  command.  This  leaves  the 
entire  strength  for  duty  not  more  than  1,500.  The 
frightful  loss  among  horses  is  owing  to  a  disease  which 
resembles  tetter  (called  in  the  Army,  'foot-rot'),  from 
the  effects  of  which  the  finest  appearing  horses  in  the 
command  became  disabled  in  one  day's  march.  *  *  * 
The  disease  seems  to  have  been  contracted  in  the  quar 
termaster  corrals,  in  Washington." 


*From    Warrenton    Junction    to    Thoroughfare    Gap,    the 
-horses  were  not  unsaddled  for  two  days. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  81 

Such  was  the  enormous  expense  of  the  cavalry  arm 
of  the  service  during  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  thai 
in  July,  1863,  the  Cavalry  Bureau  was  established.  The 
order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  relative  to  its  establish 
ment  contained  the  following:  "The  enormous  expense 
attending  the  maintenance  of  the  cavalry  arm  points  to 
the  necessity  of  greater  care  and  more  judicious  man 
agement  on  the  part  of  cavalry  officers,  that  their  horses 
may  be  constantly  kept  up  to  the  standard  of  efficiency 
for  service.  Great  neglects  of  duty  in  this  connection 
are  to  be  attributed  to  officers  in  command  of  cavalry 
troops.  It  is  the  design  of  the  War  Department  to  cor 
rect  such  neglects  by  dismissing  from  service  officers 
whose  inefficiency  and  inattention  result  in  the  dete 
rioration  and  loss  of  the  public  animals  under  their 
charge." 

The.  Cavalry  Bureau  was  charged  with  the  organi 
zation  and  equipment  of  the  cavalry  forces.  It  further 
more  provided  that  the  mounts  and  remounts  be  pur 
chased  and  inspected  under  its  direction,  by  officers  of 
the  Quartermaster's  Department  and  cavalry  service, 
respectively. 

Depots  were  established  at  important  cities — one 
of  the  principal  depots  being  at  Giesboro  Point,  near 
Washington.  The  establishment  of  a  "dismounted 
camp,"  near  Washington,  where  cavalrymen  were  sent 
to  be  refitted,  worked  great  injury  to  the  cavalry  service, 
as  the  men  purposely  lost  their  equipments  and  neg 


82  History  of  the  Gavalrv. 

lected  their  horses  for  the  purpose  of  being  sent  to  the 
"dismounted  camp."  So  pernicious  had  been  the  effect 
of  this  camp  that  on  October  26th  General  Meade  rec 
ommended  that  all  horses,  arms,  and  equipments  for  tht> 
dismounted  men  be  sent  out  to  the  army  as  needed. 

The  first  chief  of  the  Cavalry  Bureau  was  General 
Stoneman,  followed  January  2,  1864,  by  General  Gar 
rard ;  he  in  turn  being  succeeded  in  the  26th  of  the  same 
month  by  General  J.  H.  Wilson.  On  the  14th  of  April, 
1864,  it  was  directed  that  the  Cavalry  Bureau  be  under 
charge  of  the  chief  of  army  staff;  the  duties  pertain 
ing  to  organization,  equipment,  and  inspection  of  cav 
alry  being  performed  by  a  cavalry  officer,  while  those 
of  the  purchase,  inspection,  subsistence,  and  transpor 
tation  of  horses  were  performed  by  an  officer  of  the 
Quartermaster's  Department. 

The  establishment  of  this  bureau  worked  a  decided 
improvement  in  the  supply  system  of  the  mounted  aim 
and  much  of  the  success  of  the  Federal  cavalry  is  to  be 
attributed  to  the  systematic  and  efficient  manner  in 
which  the  officers  of  the  bureau  performed  their  duties. 
That  it  was  difficult  for  even  the  Cavalry  Bureau  to 
keep  the  supply  of  remounts  up  to  the  number  required, 
is  shown  from  the  fact  that  General  Sheridan  states  in 
his  Memoirs  that  "only  1,900  horses  were  furnished  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  from  April  6  to  August  14,  1864— 
not  enough  to  meet  casualties — and  that  it  was  neces 
sary  for  him  to  send  his  dismounted  men  into  camp." 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  88 


The  months  of  August  and  September  were  marked 
by  several  important  reconnaissances  by  the  cavalry.* 

On  August  1st  General  Buford  advanced  from  Rap 
idan  Station  with  his  cavalry  division  and  drove  the 
enemy's,  cavalry  towards  Culpeper  Court  House.  The 
enemy's  infantry  caused  the  division  to  retire,  but  the 
reconnaissance  had  the  effect  of  causing  Lee  to  draw 
his  infantry  south  of  the  Rapidan.  Towards  the  end  of 
this  month  regiments  of  the  Second  Cavalry  Division 
engaged  the  enemy  at  Edwards'  Ferry,  Hartwood 
Church,  Barbee's  Cross-Roads,  and  Rixey's  Ford. 

Again,  on  September  1st,  General  Kilpatrick  with 
the  Third  Cavalry  Division  marched  to  Port  Conway  on 
the  lower  Rappahannock,  where  he  drove  a  force  of  the 
enemy's  cavalry  across  the  river  and,  with  his  artillery, 
destroyed  the  gunboats  Reliance  and  Satellite. 

Another  cavalry  fight  took  place  September  13th  to 
17th.  It  had  been  reported  that  the  enemy  was  mak 
ing  a  retrograde  movement,  and  General  Pleasanton 


*On  the  15th  of  August  the  Reserve  Brigade  was  ordered 
to  Giesboro  Point  to  refit.  On  August  12th  the  Second  Brigade, 
Second  Cavalry  Division,  was  broken  up;  "the  Second  New 
York  going  to  the  First  Brigade,  Third  Division;  the  Fourth 
New  York  to  the  Second  Brigade,  First  Division;  and  the 
First  Rhode  Island,  Sixth  Ohio,  and  Eighth  Pennsylvania  to  the 
two  remaining  brigades  of  the  Second  Cavalry  Division. 


84  History  of 'the  Cavalry, 

with  all  the  cavalry,  supported  by  the  Second  Army 
Corps  under  General  Warren,  crossed  the  river  at  a 
number  of  points,  driving  the  enemy's  cavalry  across 
the  Rapidan,  and  capturing  three  guns  and  a  number 
of  prisoners.  The  fords  of  the  Rapidan  were  found 
fortified  and  held  by  such  strong  bodies  of  the  enemy's 
infantry  as  to  prevent  the  cavalry  from  crossing. 

On  September  IGth  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
crossed  the  Rappahannock  and  took  position  near  Cul- 
peper  Court  House,  with  two  corps  advanced  to  the 
Rapidan.  The  fords  on  the  latter  river  were  found  to 
be  too  strongly  guarded  to  be  forced.  Just  as  a  flank 
movement  had  been  matured,  the  Eleventh  and 
Twelfth  Army  Corps  wrere  withdrawn  from  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  for  duty  in  the  Southwest. 

During  the  next  few  weeks  the  cavalry  was  active 
ly  engaged  in  reconnoitering  duty.  On  September  21st 
Buford  and  Kilpatrick  crossed  the  Rapidan,  their 
purpose  being  to  develop  the  enemy's  strength  and 
position  about  his  left  flank.  Stuart's  cavalry  was 
encountered  and  driven  back,  and  the  fact  that  two  of 
the  enemy's  infantry  corps  were  north  of  Gordonsville 
was  discovered. 

Information  having  been  received  that  the  enemy 
was  about  to  make  some  important  movement,  Gen 
eral  B 11  ford  was,  on  October  10th,  sent  across  the  Rap 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  85 

idan  with  the  First  Cavalry  Division,  to  uncover,  if 
possible,  the  upper  fords  of  the  river,  while  the  First 
and  Sixth  Army  Corps  would  attempt  to  force  the 
fords  in  their  front. 

On  this  same  day,  before  any  word  had  been  re 
ceived  from  Buford,  the  enemy  crossed  the  Robertson 
River,  and  advanced  in  heavy  force  from  the  direction 
of  Madison  Court  House,  driving  in  the  Federal  cav 
alry.  As  there  was  every  indication  that  this  force 
was  endeavoring  to  pass  the  flank  of  the  Union 
army,  General  Meade,  on  the  following  day  (October 
llth),  withdrew  his  army  to  the  north  bank  of  the 
Rappahannock. 

Meanwhile  Buford  had  forced  a  passage  over  the; 
Germanna  Ford,  although  without  a  pound  of  forage 
for  his  horses.  He  then  proceeded  along  the  river, 
capturing  the  enemy's  pickets  at  the  fords,  and  biv 
ouacking  that  night  at  Morton's  Ford.  As  the  First 
Division  train  had  in  the  meantime  been  ordered  to 
recross  the  river,  and  the  First  Army  Corps  had  re 
tired,  Buford  was  at  a  loss  to  know  just  what  to  do, 
especially  as  the  enemy  was  pressing  him  hard.  He 
finally  recrossed  the  Rapidan  at  Morton's  Ford  and  en 
gaged  a  body  of  the  enemy  that  had  crossed  at  the  Rat- 
coon  Ford.  Finally  learning  that  General  Pleasanton 
with  the  Third  Cavalry  Division  was  still  in  the  rear  of 


86  History  of  flic  Cavalry, 

the  Third  Army  Corps,  Buford  determined  to  hold  his 
position  until  the  arrival  of  that  division.  The  next 
day  the  First  Division,  with  Sedgwick's  corps,  made  a 
reconnaissance  in  force  to  Brandy  Station,  and  accom 
plished  its  purpose  of  discovering  the  enemy's  strength 
and  position. 

Meanwhile  the  Second  Cavalry  Division  had  pro 
ceeded  from  Culpeper  Court  House  on  the  llth  instant 
1o  Sulphur  Springs,  with  orders  to  feel  the  enemy  to 
wards  Sperryville  and  Little  Washington.  This  was 
successfully  accomplished,  but  the  division  was  com 
pelled  by  superior  numbers  to  recross  to  the  east  side 
of  the  river.  As  the  enemy  advanced,  the  cavalry  fell 
slowrly  back  to  Auburn,  covering  the  rear  of  the  Sec 
ond  Army  Corps. 

At  daylight  on  the  14th  instant  the  enemy  attacked 
Gregg's  division,  but  he  held  his  position  tenaciously, 
while  General  Warren  got  the  Second  Corps  across 
Cedar  Run.  After  this  stubborn  contest  the  cavalry 
fell  back  slowly,  and  after  dark  moved  to  B  rent  svi  lie 
to  assist  General  Buford  with  the  wagon  trains.  Dur 
ing  this  arduous  rear-guard  duty,  the  First  Maine  Cav 
alry,  which  had  been  cut  oft'  in  its  return  from  Sperry 
ville,  made  a  circuitous  march  of  ninety  miles,  and  re 
ported  in  safety  at  Bristoe  Station. 

The  Third  Cavalry  Division  was,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  enemy's  movement  across  the  Rapidan,  picket- 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  87 

ing  from  Griffinsburg  near  Hazel  Run,  through  Rus 
sell's  Ford  on  Robertson's  River  to  the  vicinity  of 
James  City. 

On  the  10th  of  October  the  enemy  moved  through 
Cregler's  Mills,  Russell's  Ford,  and  Creglersville,  and, 
although  its  advance  of  artillery  and  cavalry  pre 
sented  a  bold  front,  the  Third  Cavalry  Division  suc 
ceeded  in  holding  its  position  throughout  the  day.  At 
.'*>  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  following  day,  the  di 
vision  received  orders — in  keeping  with  the  general 
withdrawal  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — to  fall  back 
to  Culpeper  Court  House,  covering  the  rear  of  the 
Third  and  Fifth  Army  Corps.  As  the  enemy  ap 
proached  Culpeper,  Pennington's  battery  opened  upon 
them  from  the  hills  north  of  the  town,  and  the  entire 
cavalry  division  fell  back  on  Brandy  Station.  Here  it 
was  found  that  the  enemy  had  taken  up  a  position 
immediately  in  front  of  the  division,  and  was  also 
approaching  the  left  flank.  The  command  was  accord 
ingly  massed  in  column  of  squadrons.  General  Davies 
having  the  right  and  General  Custer  the  left.  A  charge 
of  a  large  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  met  and 
broken  by  a  counter-charge,  and  the  division  continu 
ing  to  advance  in  good  order,  the  enemy  broke  and 
fled  in  great  confusion.  Passing  on,  Kilpatrick  effected 
a  junction  with  Buford's  division,  and  crossed  the 


88  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Rappahannock  about  8  o'clock  in  the  evening.  On  the 
morning  of  the  12th,  the  division  moved  to  Fayetteville 
to  reinforce  General  Gregg,  and  from  there  moved 
through  Buckland  Mills,  encamping  on  the  13th  at 
Sudley  Springs. 

On  the  15th,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  remained  in 
position  at  Centerville,  with  skirmishing  at  Black 
burn's  Ford  and  at  Liberty  Mills;  and  on  the  17th  the 
enemy  made  a  further  attempt  to  turn  the  right  flank 
of  the  army,  retiring  again  on  the  18th. 

On  the  19th,  with  the  Third  Cavalry  Division  in 
advance,  the  army  moved  to  Gainesville.  On  the  20th 
the  Third  Division  moved  out  on  the  Warrenton  Pike, 
driving  the  enemy  from  Gainesville  and  across  Broad 
Run.  Davies'  brigade  advanced  from  Buckland  Mills 
to  New  Baltimore,  where  it  narrowly  escaped  being 
cut  off  by  a  column  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  in 
fantry,  advancing  from  the  direction  of  Auburn.  The 
Seventh  Michigan  was  sent  out  to  delay  the  enemy. 
Ouster's  brigade  formed  line  of  battle,  and  Davies' 
brigade  was  ordered  to  retire.  The  Michigan  regiment 
was  driven  in  on  Custer,  whoso  skirmish  line  "repulsed 
the  Confederate  cavalry,  but  under  stress  of  superior 
numbers  was  forced  to  retire. 

Davies'  brigade  was  at  this  time  slowly  retiring, 
and  Custer  crossed  Broad  Run  and  took  up  a  position. 


Army  of  tJie  Potomac.  89 

enabling  Davies  to  cross  safely  by  the  right  of  the 
town,  the  enemy  not  being  able  to  attack  him  with 
out  passing  within  range  of  Ouster's  artillery.  Ouster 
then  fell  back  upon  the  infantry  supports  at  Gaines 
ville,  and  Davies  extricated  himself  by  marching  to 
New  Market. 

On  the  20th  instant  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  again 
occupied  Warrenton,  the  eneniy  retiring  to  the  south 
bank  of  the  Rappahannock,  having  destroyed  the 
Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad  from  Bristoe  Station 
to  the  Rappahannock,  and  by  the  22d  both  armies 
were  again  recuperating  in  camp. 

In  the  arduous  work  of  the  cavalry  corps  as  ad 
vance  and  rear  guard  during  the  Bristoe  campaign, 
October  9th  to  22d,  it  suffered  a  total  of  1,251  casual 
ties,  wrhich  included  4  officers  killed  and  29  wounded.* 

But  the  period  of  rest  did  not  last  long.  General 
Meade  submitted  to  the  general-in-chief  a  plan  for 
the  seizure  of  the  heights  above  Fredericksburg,  thus 


*That  this  highly  efficient  work  of  the  cavalry  was  not 
duly  appreciated  is  shown  from  the  fact  that  in  congratula 
tory  General  Orders  No.  96,  of  October  15,  1863,  the  cavalry 
was  not  mentioned.  General  Gregg  accordingly  asked  for 
either  a  court  of  inquiry  upon  his  conduct  as  commander  of 
the  Second  Cavalry  Division,  or  that  he  be  relieved  at  once 
from  command.  In  replying,  General  Meade  disclaimed  any 
intention  of  disparaging  the  services  of  the  cavalry,  and  in 
General  Order  No.  97,  following,  bore  testimony  to  "the  activ 
ity,  zeal,  and  gallantry"  of  the  whole  cavalry  corps  during 
the  operations  from  the  Rapidan  to  Centervilje. 
—10- 


90  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

transferring  the  base  of  operations  to  the  Fredericks- 
burg  Railroad.  This  plan  not  being  approved,  it  was 
decided  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Kappahannock. 

Accordingly,  on  November  7th  General  Sedgwick 
advanced  to  Kappahannock  Station  with  the  Fifth  and 
Sixth  Army  Corps,  finding  the  enemy  strongly  in 
trenched  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river.  General 
French,  with  the  First,  Second,  and  Third  Army  Corps, 
marched  to  Kelly's  Ford. 

Sedgwick  attacked  and  carried  the  enemy's  works 
on  the  north  bank,  capturing  four  pieces  of  artillery 
and  1,600  prisoners;  and  the  Third  Corps  of  French's 
command  likewise  gallantly  forced  the  passage  of  the 
river  at  Kelly's  Ford. 

During  these  operations  the  First  Cavalry  Division 
under  Buford  moved  on  the  right  flank,  crossing  at  the 
upper  fords  and  forcing  the  passage  of  Hazel  River  at 
Rixeyville,  thus  cooperating  with  Sedgwick. 

Kilpatrick's  division  operated  similarly  on  the  left 
flank,  crossing  the  river  at  Ellis'  Ford,  and  cooperat 
ing  with  French's  left  infantry  column.  Gregg's  di 
vision  was  held  in  reserve,  guarding  the  trains  at 
Bealeton  and  Morrisville. 

The  cavalry  took  part  in  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy 
to  Brandy  Station,  and  as  far  as  Culpeper.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac  then  took  position  from  Kelly's  Ford 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  91 

through  Brandy  Station  to  Welford's  Ford;  and  the 
work  of  repairing  the  Orange  &  Alexandria  Railroad 
to  the  Rappahannock  was  begun  immediately.  By  the 
16th  of  November  the  railroad  and  a  bridge  over  the 
Rappahannock  was  completed;  and  by  the  19th  sidings 
and  a  dep6t  at  Brandy  Station,  where  supplies  for  the 
army  were  brought  forward  and  delivered. 

XIV. 

By  the  end  of  November  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
Avas  ready  for  another  advance  southward.  A  front 
attack  wras  deemed  impracticable,  as  the  position  of 
the  enemy  along  the  Rapidan  was  strongly  intrenched. 
Preparations  were  accordingly  made  for  an  advance 
on  the  enemy's  flank.  On  November  26th  the  Federal 
army  crossed  the  Rapidan  in  three  columns — at  Ja 
cobs',  Germanna,  and  Culpeper  fords.  The  Third 
Corps  (French's)  crossed  at  Jacobs'  Ford,  followed  by 
the  Sixth  Corps  (Sedgwick's);  the  Second  Corps  (War 
ren's)  crossed  at  Germanna  Ford;  and  the  Fifth  Corps 
(Sykes')  crossed  at  Culpeper  Ford,  followed  by  the 
First  Corps  (Newton's). 

Gregg's  division  was  ordered  to  operate  on  the  left 
flank  of  the  army,  Buford's*  on  the  right,  to  cover  the 


*In    November    General    Buford    was    permitted    to    go    to 
Washington  for  surgical  treatment,  and  during  the  Mine  Run 


92  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

movement,  and  Kilpatrick's  to  hold  the  fords  of  the 
Rapidan  until  further  orders.  Detachments  of  cav 
alry,  each  100  strong,  were  also  ordered  to  report  to 
Generals  French,  Sykes,  and  Warren,  commanding  th:> 
advanced  corps. 

Gregg's  division  crossed  the  Rappahannock  at  Ellis' 
Ford  on  the  24th  instant,  and  proceeded  to  Ely's  Ford 
on  the  llapidan.  The  advance  guard  crossed  and  took 
possession  of  the  heights,  but  later  the  entire  division 
was  withdrawn  to  Richardsville  and  Ellis'  Ford.  On 
the  26th  the  division  crossed  the  Kapidan,  and  oper 
ated  in  the  direction  of  the  head  waters  of  the  Po 
Kiver.  On  the  27th  it  passed  through  Parker's  Store, 
and  took  position  on  the  Orange  plank  road,  in  ad 
vance  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps.  At  New  Hope  Meet 
ing  House,  the  enemy's  skirmishers  were  encountered 
and  driven  back  with  loss  by  three  of  the  advance 
regiments  of  the  division.  The  cavalry  division's  cas 
ualties  this  day  were  106. 

On  the  30th  Devin's  brigade  of  this  division,  which 
had  been  protecting  the  wagon  trains   of  the  army, 


campaign  General  Wesley  Merritt  commanded  the  First  Cav 
alry  Division,  and  Colonel  Alfred  Gibbs  the  Reserve  Brigade 
General  Buford  had  been  wounded,  and  his  constant  work 
in  the  field  had  told  severely  upon  his  constitution.  In  Wash 
ington  he  gradually  grew  worse,  and  on  December  16,  1863 
— the  very  day  that  the  President  signed  his  commission  as 
major-general — he  died,  the  l>c<in  ideal  of  a  cavalry  officer, 
on  the  threshold  of  a  still  more  brilliant  career, 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  $& 

joined  Gregg's  division,  and  was  posted  at  the  Wilder 
ness.  The  First  Brigade  moved  to  Parker's  Store. 

Meanwhile  the  Third  Cavalry  Division,  under  Ous 
ter,  had,  on  the  26th  instant,  left  camp  near  Stevens- 
burg,  and  moved  to  the  Rapidan  River,  Davies'  bri 
gade  taking  position  near  Raccoon  Ford,  and  Town's 
brigade  at  Morton's  Ford.  The  First  West  Virginia 
Cavalry  was  sent  to  guard  the  fords  between  Ger- 
manna  and  Morton's;  and  the  Sixth  Michigan  to  Som- 
erville  Ford,  to  patrol  that  and  adjacent  fords.  Cus- 
ter's  instructions  required  him  to  make  demonstra 
tions  as  if  to  cross  from  Morton's  Ford  upwards,  the 
moment  he  heard  cannonading  below.  This  he  did,  as 
soon  as  he  heard  the  artillery,  and  succeeded  in  draw 
ing  the  fire  of  thirty  of  the  enemy's  guns  upon  his 
force,  accompanied  by  the  moving  forward  of  a  large 
body  of  the  enemy's  infantry.  The  demonstration  was 
highly  successful,  and  kept  two  entire  divisions  (Rode's 
and  Early's)  of  Ewell's  corps  standing  to  arms  all 
night.  But  in  the  morning  of  the  27th,  having  dis 
covered  the  intentions  of  the  Federal  army,  the  Con 
federate  infantry  and  artillery  between  Morton's  and 
Raccoon  fords  was  withdrawn. 

The  Second  Brigade  of  this  cavalry  division  ac 
cordingly  crossed  the  river,  and,  occupying  the  ene 
my's  intrenchments,  drove  their  cavalry  back  several 


94  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

miles.  During  the  remainder  of  the  day  and  the  fol 
lowing  day  skirmishing  occurred  with  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  and  during  the  next  five  days  the  command 
merely  watched  the  fords. 

The  campaign  was  a  failure,  so  far  as  flanking  the 
enemy's  position  was  concerned,  General  Meade  attrib 
uting  it  to  the  fact  that  the  Third  Corps  (French's), 
through  taking  the  wrong  road,  was  so  slow  moving 
out  to  Robertson's  Tavern  on  the  27th  inst.  that  the 
other  corps  became  engaged  before  the  Third  was 
within  supporting  distance.  The  enemy  was  so  strong 
ly  intrenched  that,  rather  than  risk  an  assault  on  their 
works,  it  was  decided  to  again  fall  back  behind  the 
Rapidan. 

This  was  accomplished  on  the  night  of  December 
1st,  the  army's  movements  being  covered  by  the  Sec 
ond  Cavalry  Division,  Devin's  brigade  of  the  First 
Division,  and  two  brigades  of  infantry  from  the  Third 
Army  Corps,  the  whole  under  the  command  of  General 
Gregg. 

Again  had  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  retired  with 
out  effecting  its  object.  Winter  was  at  hand,  and  the 
troops  went  into  winter  quarters.  Early  in  January 
the  Government  offered  a  furlough  and  agreed  to  pay 
a  bounty  to  soldiers  who  would  reenlist  for  threij 
years.  A  large  number  of  cavalrymen  did  so,  and 
were  sent  home  on  furlough. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  95 

The  cavalry  troops  in  winter  quarters  made  them 
selves  as  comfortable  as  their  surroundings  permitted, 
but  their  anticipated  rest  from  active  duty  hardly  ma 
terialized.  In  addition  to  the  fatiguing  picket  and 
outpost  duty,  there  were  continual  scouts,  reconnais 
sances,  and  several  raids,  to  keep  the  cavalry  busy, 
while  the  infantry  was  recuperating  for  the  spring 
campaign. 

And  here  it  may  be  proper  to  say  that  General 
Hooker's  original  plan  of  consolidating  the  cavalry 
and  giving  its  leader  independence  of  action  had  not 
been  completely  realized.  The  ever-present  outpost 
duty  still  continued,  and  this,  with  continual  detached 
service  on  minor  reconnaissances,  guarding  wagon 
trains,  could  not  but  result  in  a  lack  of  unity  in  the 
cavalry  corps. 

Late  in  December,  the  Second,  Eighth,  and  Six 
teenth  Pennsylvania  and  First  Maine  Cavalry  regi 
ments,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Charles  H. 
Smith,  marched  from  Bealeton  to  Luray,  Virginia,  sur 
prising  a  number  of  small  detachments  of  the  enemy 
and  capturing  a  number  of  prisoners.  At  Luray  they 
destroyed  a  large  amount  of  property  useful  to  the 
Confederate  Government,  and  returned  in  safety, 
having  marched  one  hundred  miles  without  a  single 
casualty. 


96  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Early  in  January,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  with  a  large  caval 
ry  command,  invaded  Hampshire  and  Hardy  counties, 
West  Virginia.  General  Kelly,  commanding  the  De 
partment  of  West  Virginia,  confronted  the  enemy 
with  all  his  available  force;  after  destroying  a  number 
of  wagons  and  securing  such  supplies  as  he  could  find. 
Lee's  command  withdrew,  having  suffered  severely 
from  the  intensely  cold  weather.  Later  in  the  month 
these  same  counties  were  subject  to  another  raid  by 
General  Early,  in  which  the  cavalry  forces  of  West 
Virginia,  the  First  New  York,  the  Fifteenth  New 
York,  the  Twenty-first  New  York,  Cole's  (Maryland) 
Cavalry,  and  detachments  of  the  Second  Maryland, 
Sixth  Michigan,  and  First  Connecticut  Cavalry  were 
engaged.  The  main  object  of  the  enemy,  the  capture 
of  the  garrison  at  Petersburg  and  the  destruction  of 
the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad,  was  successful;  but 
the  Confederate  General  Kosser  succeeded  in  captur 
ing  a  large  wagon  train.  The  hampering  of  the  cav 
alry  by  orders  from  the  infantry  officer  commanding 
the  infantry  supports  and  the  great  difficulty  of  suc 
cessfully  concentrating  troops  in  so  rough  a  country 
contributed  to  the  safe  withdrawal  of  the  enemy's 
forces. 

Although  a  number  of  minor  engagements  oc 
curred  during  the  month  of  January,  nothing  of  great 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  97 

importance  took  place  until  February  6th,  when  a 
demonstration  was  made  along  the  Rapidan,  partici 
pated  in  by  the  First  and  Second  Army  Corps  and  the 
First  and  Third  Cavalry  Divisions. 

While  the  infantry  was  engaging  the  enemy  at 
Morton's  and  Raccoon  fords,  the  First  Cavalry  Divis 
ion  (Merritt's)  crossed  the  Robertson  River  in  two 
columns,  at  Smoot's  and  Ayler's  fords;  and  the  Third 
Cavalry  Division  (Kilpatrick's)  crossed  at  Culpeper, 
Ely's,  and  Germanna  fords. 

On  the  7th  the  First  Cavalry  Division  moved  to 
Barnett's  Ford,  and  brisk  skirmishing  ensued.  The 
demonstration  on  this  ford  continued  until  about  1 
o'clock  p.  m.,  resulting  in  the  deployment  of  a  Confed 
erate  infantry  brigade.  The  Third  Cavalry  Division 
reconnoitered  in  all  directions,  after  crossing  the  Rap 
idan,  finding  the  enemy  in  much  the  same  position  as 
during  the  preceding  November. 

During  this  month  the  cavalry  was  greatly  an 
noyed  by  guerrillas,  a  large  number  of  small  detach 
ments  being  ambushed  and  either  shot  down  or  cap 
tured.  So  serious  did  these  losses  become  that  a  gen 
eral  order  was  issued,  threatening  with  court-martial 
officers  and  men  who  allowed  themselves  to  be  sur 
prised  and  captured  while  on  duty.  West  Virginia  and 
western  Virginia  suffered  greatly  from  these  irregular 
—12— 


98  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

marauding  forces,  and  on  February  llth  G-ilmore's 
guerrillas  threw  a  Baltimore  &  Ohio  express  train 
from  the  track  at  Kearneysville  and  robbed  the  passen 
gers.  And  on  February  20th,  in  an  attempt  to  capture 
the  noted  Major  Mosby  at  Upperville  and  Front  Royal, 
a  severe  skirmish  took  place  between  Mosby's  com 
mand  and  a  portion  of  the  cavalry  brigade  of  the  De 
partment  of  West  Virginia. 

On  the  28th  of  February  Ouster's  cavalry  division 
undertook  a  raid  into  Albemarle  County,  Virginia. 
The  command  marched  by  way  of  Madison  Court 
House  and  Standardsville  without  opposition  and  took 
the  road  to  Charlottesville,  where  Fitzhugh  Lee's 
force  was  in  camp.  The  division  approached  within 
three  miles  of  the  place,  when,  finding  the  enemy 
in  superior  numbers,  Custer  withdrew,  burning  the 
bridges  over  the  Rivanna  River  and  destroying  much 
property.  Near  Standardsville  his  force  having  been 
reduced  to  1,000  men  through  a  misunderstanding,  by 
which  a  portion  of  the  command  had  marched  beyond 
the  Rapidan,  he  was  charged  by  the  First  and  Fifth 
Virginia  Cavalry,  led  by  General  Stuart  in  person. 
The  charge  threw  the  advance  guard — one  squadron  of 
the  Fifth  United  States  Cavalry — back  upon  the  main 
body;  but  the  entire  regiment,  charging  forward,  drove 
the  enemy  back  in  great  disorder.  Custer  pursued 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  99 

with  his  whole  command  to  Bank's  Ford,  and  then, 
wheeling  about,  eluded  the  enemy,  who  had  concen 
trated  here,  by  moving  rapidly  to  the  ford  and  cross 
ing.  The  command  marched  150  miles,  captured  1 
battle-standard,  50  prisoners,  500  horses,  and  6  cais 
sons,  and  destroyed  an  immense  amount  of  property. 

This  raid  was  made  to  distract  attention  from  an 
other  raid  of  greater  proportions,  begun  the  same  day 
by  General  Kilpatrick,  and  having  as  its  object  the 
taking  of  the  city  of  Kichmond  and  the  liberation  of 
the  Union  prisoners  confined  there.  Incidentally,  the 
President's  proclamation  of  amnesty  was  to  be  distrib 
uted  throughout  the  hostile  territory. 

It  had  been  learned  that  Richmond  was,  about  this 
time,  comparatively  defenseless,  and  it  was  thought 
that,  by  a  rapid  and  secret  march,  the  city  might  be 
captured  and  the  prisoners  released  before  reinforce 
ments  from  either  Petersburg  or  Lee's  army  could 
reach  there. 

General  Kilpatrick  left  his  camp  at  Stevensburg  at 
7  o'clock  p.  m.,  February  28th,  with  3,595  picked  men 
and  Ransom's  horse  battery.  The  advance,  consisting 
of  460  men  under  Colonel  Ulric  Dahlgren,  crossed  at 
Ely's  Ford,  capturing  the  enemy's  picket.  Then,  leav 
ing  the  main  body,  it  proceeded  through  Spottsylvania 
Court  House  to  Frederick's  Hall,  where  it  captured  a 


100  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Confederate  general  court-martial,  consisting  of  13 
officers.  It  then  proceeded  through  dense  woods  and 
swamps  to  the  James  River,  which  it  reached  about  7 
a.  m.  on  March  2d.  having  destroyed  considerable  Con 
federate  property  en  route.  But  through  the  alleged 
treachery  of  a  guide  the  little  command  had  been  led 
out  of  its  course,  and  instead  of  being  near  Eichmond, 
the  latter  was  still  eighteen  miles  away.  However, 
Dahlgren  continued  his  march  and  even  passed  the 
outer  line  of  the  city's  works,  when  he  was  attacked 
from  both  sides  of  the  road  and  from  the  front.  A 
desperate  fight  followed.  Colonel  Dahlgren  with 
about  150  men  pushed  on,  hoping  to  get  through  the 
Confederate  lines  by  way  of  the  James  River;  but 
about  midnight  the  command  fell  into  an  ambuscade; 
Dahlgren  was  killed,  together  with  a  number  of  his 
men,  and  the  remainder  captured.  The  other  part  of 
Dahlgren's  force  under  Captain  Mitchell,  Second  New 
York  Cavalry,  succeeded  finally  in  joining  Kilpatrick 
at  Tunstall's  Station,  with  44  casualties. 

Meanwhile  Kilpatrick,  after  passing  through  Spott- 
sylvania  Court  House,  had  taken  a  southeasterly 
course,  crossed  the  South  Anna  at  Ground  Squirrel 
Bridge,  and  reached  the  outer  line  of  works  about 
Richmond  without  serious  opposition.  The  first  line 
of  defense  was  successfully  passed,  and  preparations 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  101 

were  made  to  assault  the  main  works;  but  nothing 
having  been  heard  from  Dahlgren's  party,  which  was 
to  have  made  a  simultaneous  attack  from  the  other 
side,  and  the  enemy  being  heavily  reinforced,  Kilpat- 
rick  deemed  it  prudent  to  retire. 

Kilpatrick's  attack  was  made  some  three  hours 
earlier  than  Dahlgren's,  owing  to  the  latter's  delay  in 
reaching  Richmond,  and  thus  the  Confederates  were 
prepared  to  meet  Dahlgren  when  he  finally  reached 
their  works. 

Kilpatrick  withdrew  across  the  Chickahominy  and 
succeeded  in  reaching  General  Butler's  lines  on  the 
Peninsula  March  3d. 

As  its  commander  afterwards  reported:  "The  ex 
pedition  failed  in  its  great  object,  but  through  no 
fault  of  the  officers  and  men  accompanying  it.  All 
did  their  duty  bravely,  promptly,  and  well,  for  which 
they  deserve  the  highest  praise.  Considerable  prop 
erty  was  destroyed,  and  several  thousand  of  the  Pres 
ident's  proclamations  scattered  through  the  country. 
If  Colonel  Dahlgren  had  not  failed  in  crossing  the 
river,  which  he  did  either  through  the  ignorance  or 
treachery  of  his  guide,  or  had  the  enemy  at  Bottom's 
Bridge  been  forced  to  remain  at  that  point  by  a 
threatened  attack  from  the  direction  of  Yorktown,  I 
should  have  entered  the  rebel  capital  and  released  our 
prisoners." 


102  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Confirmatory  of  this  opinion,  a  letter  written  by 
General  Wade  Hampton  to  General  Stuart,  March  6th, 
contained  the  following:  "My  observations  convinced 
me  that  the  enemy  could  have  taken  Richmond,  and  in 
all  probability  would  have  done  so  but  for  the  fact 
that  Colonel  Johnson  intercepted  a  dispatch  from 
Dahlgren  to  Kilpatriek,  asking  what  hour  the  latter 
had  fixed  for  an  attack  on  the  city,  so  that  both  at 
tacks  might  be  simultaneous." 

As  part  reprisal  for  the  killing  of  Dahlgren,  Gen 
eral  Butler  on  March  9th  sent  an  expedition  consist 
ing  of  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  about  700  of  Kilpat- 
rick's  cavalry  to  King  and  Queen  counties.  There 
they  drove  the  Fifth  and  Ninth  Virginia  Cavalry  from 
their  camp,  burned  the  latter  with  much  Confederate 
property,  and  took  a  number  of  prisoners. 


XV. 

During  the  winter  many  changes  important  to  the 
cavalry  as  well  as  to  the  entire  army  had  taken  place. 

On  the  12th  of  March  Lieutenant-General  Ulysses 
S.  Grant  had  been  assigned  to  command  the  armies  of 
the  United  States,  with  General  Halleck  as  chief-of- 
staff  in  Washington.  And  on  the  25th  of  the  same 
month  General  Pleasanton  was  relieved  from  com- 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  10B 

mand  of  the  cavalry  corps,  General  Gregg  taking  tem 
porary  command,  and  was  superseded  on  April  4th  by 
Major-General  Philip  H.  Sheridan. 

General  A.  T.  A.  Torbert  was  placed  in  command 
of  the  First  Cavalry  Division,  his  brigade  commanders 
being  Custer  and  Devin,  with  Merritt  in  command  of 
the  Eeserve  Brigade.  The  Second  Cavalry  Division 
remained  in  command  of  General  Gregg,  with  Davies 
and  Irvin  Gregg  as  brigade  commanders.  The  Third 
Cavalry  Division  was  assigned  to  General  James  H. 
Wilson,  with  Colonels  Bryan  and  Chapman  as  brigade 
commanders. 

Sheridan  found  the  horses  of  the  cavalry  corps 
much  run  down,  and  one  of  the  first  and  most  import 
ant  things  that  he  did  was  to  impress  upon  General 
Meade  the  wastefulness  of  rendering  unserviceable  so 
many  thousand  horses  by  unnecessary  picket  duty, 
"covering  a  distance  on  a  continuous  line  of  nearly 
sixty  miles,  with  hardly  a  mounted  Confederate  con 
fronting  it  at  any  point."  Sheridan  also  insisted  that 
the  cavalry  should  be  concentrated  to  fight  the  enemy's 
cavalry.  Meade  expressed  the  traditional  views  of 
army  commanders,  when,  in  reply,  he  failed  to  see  who 
would  protect  the  flanks  of  the  army,  the  fronts  of 
moving  infantry  columns,  and  the  wagon  trains,  if  the 
cavalrv  were  concentrated. 


104  History  of  ike  Cavalry, 

Although  Meade  promptly  relieved  the  cavalry 
from  much  of  the  arduous  picket  duty  it  was  perform 
ing,  he  gave  little  encouragement  at  the  time  to  Sher 
idan's  plans  for  an  independent  cavalry  corps — a  corps 
in  fact  as  well  as  in  name.  But  the  corps  commander 
bided  his  time,  confident  that  an  opportunity  would  at 
length  come  for  the  realization  of  his  views.  The 
opportunity  came  quickly  enough. 

On  May  4th  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  again  moved 
against  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  then  occupy 
ing  an  entrenched  position  south  of  the  Rapidan.  Gen 
eral  Grant  planned,  by  moving  by  the  left  flank,  to 
compel  Lee  to  come  out  from  his  entrenchments  along 
Mine  Run;  and  although  a  serious  consideration  was 
the  wooded  country  of  the  Wilderness,  through  which 
he  must  pass,  the  maneuver  had  the  advantages  of 
using  Brandy  Station  as  a  base  of  supplies,  and  at  the 
same  time  of  covering  Washington. 

Sheridan  had  in  the  neighborhood  of  10,000  cav 
alry.*  Gregg's  and  Wilson's  divisions  took  the  ad 
vance  by  way  of  Ely's  and  Germanna  fords,  preced 
ing  the  Second  and  Fifth  Army  Corps  respectively, 
while  Torbert's  division  remained  in  rear  to  cover  the 
trains  and  reserve  artillery. 


*Por  the  organization  of  the  cavalry  May  5th,  see  Appen 
dix  12. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  105 

On  the  5th  Wilson's  division  advanced  from  Par 
ker's  Store  to  Craig's  Meeting  House,  where  he  met  the 
enemy's  advance,  and,  although  at  first  successful,  he 
finally  withdrew,  for  lack  of  ammunition,  to  Todd's 
Tavern,  where  he  formed  a  junction  with  Gregg's  di 
vision.  The  combined  cavalry  then  drove  the  enemy 
back  to  Shady  Grove  Church,  and  Sheridan  so  dis 
posed  the  force  as  to  hold  the  Brock  road  beyond  the 
Furnaces  and  around  through  Todd's  Tavern  to  Piney 
Branch  Church. 

But  on  the  6th,  although  Custer  had  defeated  the 
enemy  at  the  Furnaces,  Meade  became  alarmed  for  the 
safety  of  his  left  flank,  and  ordered  Sheridan  to  with 
draw  the  advanced  cavalry  towards  Chancellorsville, 
abandoning  a  position  that  was  to  be  regained  later 
at  heavy  cost  to  both  infantry  and  cavalry. 

That  Sheridan  chafed  under  this  order  is  seen  from 
his  letter  to  General  Humphreys  of  May  5th:  "Why 
cannot  infantry/"  he  says,  "be  sent  to  guard  the  trains, 
and  let  me  take  the  offensive?" 

On  the  7th  the  army  advanced  with  a  view  to  tak 
ing  Spottsylvania  Court  House,  and  the  trains  were 
moved  towards  Piney  Branch  Church,  now,  unknown 
to  Meade,  held  by  the  enemy.  This  led  to  the  battle 
of  Todd's  Tavern  between  Hampton's  and  Fitzhugh 
l.ce's  commands  of  SluaH's  cavalry  (about  8,000  men) 


106  History  of  the  Cavalry. 

and  Gregg's  division,  assisted  by  two  brigades  of  Tor- 
bert's  division.*  Irvin  Gregg's  brigade  attacked  the 
enemy  on  the  Catharpen  road,  Merritt's  Reserve  Bri 
gade  on  the  Spottsylvania  road,  and  Davies'  brigade 
on  the  Piney  Branch  road,  uniting  with  Merritt's  left. 
After  severe  fighting,  in  which  the  enemy  showed  the 
greatest  resistance  in  Merritt's  front,  the  Confederates 
gave  way  and  were  pursued  almost  to  Spottsylvania 
Court  House. 

In  keeping  with  Grant's  purpose  of  threatening 
Lee's  communications  by  moving  the  army  to  Spottsyl- 
vania  Court  House,  Sheridan  directed  Gregg  and  Mer 
ritt  to  gain  possession  of  Snell's  Bridge,  early  on  the 
8th,  while  Wilson  was  ordered  to  take  possession  of 
Spottsylvania  Court  House,  and  actually  reached  and 
held  that  place  till  directed  to  fall  back  from  it.  Meade 
had  so  amended  Sheridan's  orders  as  to  direct  Gregg 
to  simply  hold  the  Corbin  Bridge,  and  Merritt  to  act 
as  advance  guard  for  the  advancing  column  of  infant 
ry.  Had  Sheridan's  order  not  been  thus  modified,  it 
is  quite  probable  that  the  cavalry  would  have  to  de 
layed  the  march  of  the  Confederates,  who  held  on  to 
Spottsylvania  Court  House,  till  the  Federal  infantry 
had  advanced  and  made  good  their  possession  of  that 


*Torbert  was  taken  ill  on  the  6th  instant,  and  the  com 
mand  of  his  division  devolved  on  General  Merritt  the  follow 
ing  day. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  107 

place.  As  it  was,  the  enemy  had  time  to  fortify  the 
latter  place,  and  the  bloody  battle  of  Spottsylvania 
Court  House  was  fought  while  the  work  of  the  cav 
alry  was  practically  ineffective. 

Sheridan's  unwillingness  to  use  his  cavalry  in  this 
disjointed  manner,  coupled  with  additional  distaste 
that  Merritt's  division  should  have  been  accused  of 
delaying  the  march  of  the  Fifth  Army  Corps,  led  to 
that  famous  interview  between  Meade  and  Sheridan, 
in  which  the  latter  told  his  senior  that  he  could  whip 
Stuart  if  allowed  to  do  so,  and  that  henceforth  Meade 
could  command  the  cavalry  corps  himself,  as  he  (Sher 
idan)  would  not  give  it  another  order. 

General  Grant  determined  that  Sheridan  should  be 
granted  his  opportunity  to  "whip  Stuart,"  and  that 
very  day  Meade  directed  that  the  cavalry  be  concen 
trated  immediately,  and  that  Sheridan  proceed  against 
the  enemy's  cavalry.  When  his  supplies  were  ex 
hausted,  he  was  to  proceed  to  Haxall's  Landing  on  the 
James  Kiver,  communicating  with  General  Butler. 

The  country  between  Spottsylvania  and  Kichmond 
had  been  stripped  of  supplies  of  all  kinds.  For  this  rea 
son,  and  in  order  to  obtain  greater  room  for  cavalry 
operations,  secure  from  interference  from  the  enemy's 
infantry,  Sheridan  decided  to  march  his  command 
south  of  the  North  Anna  before  offering  battle. 


108  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Mobilized  at  Aldrich's,  the  expedition  started  on  the 
morning  of  May  9th,  and  with  a  column  thirteen  miles 
long,  Sheridan  succeeded  in  passing  at  a  walk  around 
the  right  of  Lee's  army  without  discovery.  The  Ny,  Po, 
and  Ta  rivers  were  safely  passed,  and  the  North  Anna 
reached  on  the  same  day;  Stuart's  cavalry,  which  fol 
lowed,  being  repeatedly  held  in  check  by  Davies'  bri 
gade,  which  acted  as  rear  guard.  Ouster's  brigade 
pushed  on  to  Beaver  Dam  Station  to  cut  the  Virginia 
Central  Railroad. 

On  the  day  following,  the  10th,  Gregg's  and  Wil 
son's  divisions  crossed  the  North  Anna,  covered  while 
crossing  by  Merritt's  division,  which  had  crossed  the 
preceding  day.  The  cavalry  corps  then  proceeded 
leisurely  by  the  Negro-foot  Road  towards  Richmond, 
Stuart  meanwhile  urging  his  forces  forward,  in  an  en 
deavor  to  interpose  between  the  Federal  cavalry  and 
the  capital  of  the  Confederacy.  On  the  llth  instant 
Stuart  held  Yellow  Tavern  on  the  Brook  Turnpike. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  this  day  Davies  proceeded 
to  Ashland  and  cut  the  Fredericksburg  Railroad,  which 
so  deceived  Stuart  as  to  Sheridan's  future  movements 
that  he  divided  his  forces,  Gordon's  brigade  following 
the  Federal  troops  and  the  remainder  marching  to  Yel 
low  Tavern.  But  Merritt's  brigade,  having  entered  the 
place,  drove  (he  enemy  back  and  secured  possession  of 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  109 

the  turnpike.  The  other  Federal  divisions  being  brought 
up,  Ouster,  with  his  own  brigade,  supported  by  Chap 
man's  brigade  of  Wilson's  division,  made  a  mounted 
charge  on  the  enemy's  left,  capturing  two  guns  and 
breaking  their  line.  Then,  while  Gibbs  and  Devin 
forced  the  enemy's  center  and  right,  Gregg  charged  in 
rear  and  the  battle  was  won. 

This  engagement  gave  Sheridan  complete  control  of 
the  road  to  Richmond.  The  casualties  on  both  sides 
were  quite  severe,  but  the  Confederate  loss  included 
Generals  Stuart  and  James  B.  Gordon. 

Finding  the  road  planted  with  torpedoes,  and  there 
being  no  road  between  the  enemy's  works  and  the  Cliick- 
ahominy,  Sheridan  gave  up  the  attempt  and  crossed  to 
the  north  side  of  that  river  by  the  Meadow  Bridge. 
This  bridge  was  repaired,  under  severe  fire,  by  Mer- 
ritt's  brigade,  which  afterwards  pursued  the  enemy  to 
dairies'  Mill.  But  while  the  bridge  was  being  repaired, 
the  Confederates  advanced  from  their  intrenchments 
with  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  large  numbers  of  dis 
mounted  cavalry,  while  Gordon's  cavalry  threatened 
Sheridan  along  the  Brook  Road.  After  a  severe  con 
test,  the  enemy  was  repulsed  and  the  infantry  driven 
within  the  works. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  12th  the  Cavalry  Corps  en 
camped  at  Walnut  Grove  and  Games'  Mill;  on  the  13th 

at  Bottom's  Ridge;  on  the  14th  it  passed  through  White 
—13- 


110  History  of  ilie  Cavalrif, 

Oak  Swamp  and  encampad  between  Maxall's  Landing 
and  Shirley  on  the  James  River,  and  resting  there  until 
the  17th,  the  return  march  was  begun.  Proceeding  by 
way  of  Baltimore  Cross-Roads,  Sheridan  crossed  the 
Pamunkey  at  White  House,  repairing  the  partly  de 
stroyed  railroad  bridge;  and  then,  by  way  of  Aylett's, 
he  rejoined  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  near  Chesterfield 
on  the  24th  instant. 

The  raid  had  accomplished  important  results.  It 
had  materially  affected  Lee's  retrograde  movements; 
had  drawn  oft'  Stuart's  cavalry,  and  thus  increased  the 
ease  of  movement  of  the  immense  trains  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac;  had  brought  signal  defeat  to  the  Ton- 
federate  cavalry;  had  seriously  threatened  Richmond, 
and  might  have  taken  it;  had  cut  the  railroads  which 
connected  Lee  with  Richmond,  and  had  destroyed  im 
mense  quantities  of  stores  which,  with  the  strained  re 
sources  of  the  Confederacy  at  this  time,  must,  no  doubt, 
have  exerted  a  powerful  influence  on  the  result  of 
the  war. 

XVI. 

Spottsylvania's  battles  had  been  fought  when  Sheri 
dan  returned,  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  ma 
neuvering  to  cross  the  North  Anna. 

On  the  25th  instant  Wilson's  cavalry  division  was 
ordered  to  make  a  reconnaissance  across  this  river  as 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  Ill 

far  as  Little  Elver;  and  from  the  26th  to  the  30th  the 
division  was  engaged  in  this  duty,  at  the  same  time  cov 
ering  the  right  flank  of  the  army.  On  the  31st  Wilson 
crossed  the  south  side  of  the  Pamunkey,  defeating  a 
division  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  under  W.  H.  F.  Lee. 
Pushing  on  the  same  day,  in  accordance  with  an  order 
from  General  Meade,  Wilson  occupied  Hanover  Court 
House,  after  a  sharp  fight,  in  which  the  Confederate 
General  P.  M.  B.  Young  was  wounded;  and  on  the  fol 
lowing  day,  June  1st,  destroyed  the  bridges  over  the 
South  Anna.  Simultaneously  therewith  he  had  a  sharp 
engagement  with  the  Confederate  cavalry,  but  the  lat 
ter  being  reinforced  by  infantry,  and  Wilson  having 
accomplished  the  object  of  his  movement,  he  withdrew 
by  the  head  of  the  Totopotomy  to  Hawes'  Shop,  where 
he  again  came  within  supporting  distance  of  the  army. 
Meanwhile  Gregg's  and  Torbert's  divisions,  sup 
ported  by  Eussell's  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  were 
covering  the  crossing  of  the  army  over  the  Pamunkey. 
In  effecting  this  crossing,  Gregg  made  a  feint  of  cross 
ing  at  Littlepage's  and  Torbett  at  Taylor's  Ford.  Both 
then,  after  dark,  discreetly  retired,  and  successfully 
crossed  at  Hanovertown  Ford  on  the  27th,  Custer's  bri 
gade  in  the  lead.  Pushing  rapidly  on  to  Hanovertown, 
Torbert'is  division  encountered  Gordon's  brigade  of  Con 
federate  cavalry,  and  drove  it  in  confusion  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Hanover  Court  House.  Gregg's  division  moved 


112  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

up  to  this  line;  Russell's  division  of  infantry  encamped 
near  the  river  crossing,  in  support,  and  behind  the 
screen  thus  formed  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  crossed 
the  river  on  the  28th  instant  unimpeded. 

As  General  Grant  was  now  uncertain  of  Lee's  exact 
position,  Gregg  was  ordered  to  reconnoiter  towards 
Mechanicsville.  At  Hawes'  Shop  he  found  confronting 
him  Hampton's  and  Fitzlmgh  Lee's  cavalry  divisions,* 
supported  by  Butler's  cavalry  brigade,  and  he  attacked 
them  dismounted  at  once.  The  fight  which  followed 
was  very  severe,  and  continued  late  into  the  evening,  as 
the  position  contended  for  was  one  of  great  strategic  im 
portance  to  both  armies.  Ouster's  brigade,  which  had 
reinforced  Gregg,  was  finally  dismounted,  and  assault 
ing  through  an  opening  near  the  center  of  the  line,  tlie 
temporary  works  were  carried  by  the  entire  Union  line, 
and  the  position  was  won.  Although  the  battle  took 
place  immediately  in  front  of  the  Federal  infantry,  Gen 
eral  Meade  declined  to  put  the  latter  into  action,  and 
the  battle  was  won  by  the  cavalry  alone.  The  result 
gave  possession  of  the  cross-roads,  and  showed  Grant 
that  Lee's  army  was  retiring  by  the  right  flank. 

The  night  following  the  battle  Sheridan  withdrew 
the  two  cavalry  divisions  to  the  left  rear  of  the  army, 


*After  Stuart's  death,  the  Confederate  cavalry  was  reor 
ganized  in  three  divisions  under  Hampton,  Fitzhugh  Lee,  and 
W.  H.  P.  Lee,  due  to  reinforcement  by  Butler's  cavalry  bri 
gade  from  South  Carolina. 


Army  of  the  Potomac. 

and,  marching  to  Old  Church,  threw  out  pickets  to 
wards  Cold  Harbor,  the  possession  of  which  was  nec 
essary  to  secure  White  House  as  a  base.  The  enemy 
realized  this  too,  and  a  fierce  fight  ensued  at  Matade 
quin  Creek,  in  which  the  Confederate  force  was  finally 
driven  to  Cold  Harbor,  that  town  being  taken  the  fol 
lowing  day  (May  31st),  after  a  hard-fought  battle. 

The  cavalry  at  Cold  Harbor  was  now  so  isolated, 
being  nine  miles  from  the  nearest  infantry,  that  Sheri 
dan  was  making  preparations  to  withdraw,  when  he 
received  word  from  Meade  to  hold  the  town  at  all  haz 
ards.  Its  capture  by  the  cavalry  had  not  been  antici 
pated  by  Grant. 

Accordingly  Sheridan  made  every  preparation  dur 
ing  the  night  to  hold  the  town;  and  on  the  following- 
day,  behind  his  temporary  breastworks,  successfully 
met  and  repulsed  the  Confederate  infantry  under  Ker- 
shaw.  About  10  o'clock  a.  m.  the  cavalry  was  relieved 
by  the  Sixth  Army  Corps,  and  was  moved  to  a  position 
at  Bottom's  Bridge,  on  the  north  side  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  where  it  rested  in  camp  until  June  6th. 

Wilson  having  meanwhile  driven  the  enemy  out  of 
Hawes'  Shop  and  passed  so  far  around  Lee's  left  flank 
as  to  deceive  him  into  the  belief  that  he  was  threatened 
by  a  large  force,  after  taking  a  number  of  prisoners,  fell 
back  the  next  day  and  quietly  went  into  camp  at  New 
Caslle  Ferry. 


114  Hi  si  on/  of  fhe  C  avoir  j/, 

Grant's  unsuccessful  attack  upon  the  enemy's  strong 
position  at  Cold  Harbor  made  him  decide  to  again  move 
his  army  forward  by  the  left  flank.  To  draw  off  the 
enemy's  cavalry  during  this  da  igerous  maneuver,  Sheri 
dan  received  instructions  on  Juno  Oth  to  proceed  with 
two  cavalry  divisions  via  Charlottesville  to  break  up 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad,  and  afterwards  to  unite, 
if  possible,  with  the  army  advancing  through  West  Vir 
ginia  under  General  Hunter  towards  Lynchburg. 

Wilson's  division  was  directed  to  remain  with  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  receiving  its  instructions  direct 
from  army  headquarters.  Torbert's  and  Gregg's  divi 
sions  accordingly  started  on  the  7th  of  June,  taking 
with  them  three  days'  rations  in  haversacks  to  last  for 
live  days,  two  days'  forage  on  the  pommels  of  saddles, 
and  100  rounds  of  ammunition  to  each  man. 

The  line  of  march  carried  the  command  through  Ne\v 
Castle  and  Polecat  Station  along  the  r.orth  bank  of  the 
North  Anna,  through  Twyman's  Store,  and  across  the 
Anna  on  the  10th  instant,  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Tre- 
vilian  Station  on  the  llth. 

Here  Torbert's  division,  pressing  back  the  enemy's 
picket's,  found  the  enemy  in  force  about  three  miles 
from  Trevilian,  posted  behind  heavy  timber.  At  the 
same  time,  Custer  was  sent  by  a  wood  road  to  destroy 
Trevilian  Station.  In  doing  this  Custer  passed  between 
Fitzhugh  Lee's  and  Hampton's  divisions,  and  soon  had 


Army  of  the  Potomac. 

possession  of  the  station,  as  well  as  the  Confederate 
wagons,  caissons,  and  led  horses,  causing  Hampton  to 
detach  Rosser's  brigade. 

Assured  of  Ouster's  position,  Sheridan  dismounted 
Torbert's  tw7o  remaining  brigades,  and,  aided  by  one  of 
Gregg's  brigades  carried  the  enemy's  works,  driving 
Hampton's  division  pell-mell  back  on  Ouster,  and  even 
through  his  lines.  Gregg's  remaining  brigade  had  mean 
while  attacked  Fitzhugh  Lee  successfully,  and  pursued 
him  until  almost  dark  as  far  as  Louisa  Court  House. 
Hampton's  scattered  forces  retreated  towards  Gor- 
donsville,  and  were  joined  by  Fitzhugh  Lee's  command 
during  the  night. 

The  cavalry  corps  eiicauipid  that  night  at  Trevilian, 
and  here  Sheridan  received  information  which  showed 
that  General  Hunter  was  marching  away  from,  instead 
of  towards,  Charlottesville.  He  therefore  decided  to 
give  up  attempting  to  join  Hunter,  and  made  imme 
diate  preparations  to  return  to  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac.  The  wounded  arid  prisoners  greatly  impeded  his 
movements,  and  his  supply  of  ammunition  was  not  suffi 
ciently  large  for  more  than  one  general  engagement. 

On  the  morning  of  June  12th  Gregg's  division  pro 
ceeded  to  destroy  the  railroad  towards  Louisa  Court 
House,  while  Torbert  made  a  reconnaissance  towards 
Goidonsville.  The  latter  became  heavily  engaged  with 
Hampton's  and  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  at  Mallory's 


116  History  of  fJie  Cavalry, 

Cross-Roads,  about  two  miles  beyond  Treviliau,  the 
battle  continuing  until  dark. 

Although  the  fighting  in  this  series  of  engagements 
was  in  favor  of  Sheridan,  the  general  result  prevented 
a  return  by  way  of  Mallory's  Ford,  as  had  been  planned, 
and  Sheridan  decided  forthwith  to  return  by  the  same 
road  on  which  lit'  had  come.  But  for  reasons  which  are 
not  clear  he  marched  northeast,  reaching  Catharpen 
road,  in  the  Wilderness,  on  the  14th;  on  the  15th,  the 
Ta  Kiver;  on  the  16th,  it  passed  through  Bowling  Green 
to  the  Mattapony  Eiver;  on  the  17th,  it  reached  Walker- 
ton,  and  on  the  18th,  the  vicinity  of  King  and  Queen 
County.  On  the  19th  instant  the  wounded,  the  pris 
oners,  and  about  2,000  contrabands  were  sent  to  White 
House,  while  the  corps  marched  to  Dunkirk,  reaching 
White  House  on  the  HOth  of  June. 

At  the  latter  place  Sheridan  found  orders  directing 
him  to  break  up  the  supply  station  there  and  conduct 
the  900  wagons  to  Petersburg.  This  was  successfully 
accomplished,  but  not  without  several  severe  engage 
ments  with  the  Confederate  cavalry,  which  had  a^ain 
got  across  his  line  of  march.  Gregg's  division  had  a 
severe  engagement  at  St.  Mary's  Church,  particularly 
creditable  to  the  cavalry. 

In  combination  with  the  operations  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac,  the  Army  of  the  James,  under  General 
Butler,  had  meanwhile  moved  up  the  Peninsula;  and 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  117 

on  May  5th  General  Kautz,  with  a  cavalry  force  of 
nearly  8,000  men,*  had  been  detached  for  a  raid  against 
the  Petersburg  &  Weldon  Railroad.  Kautz  forced  the 
Blackwater,  burned  the  railroad  biidge  at  Stony  Creek 
below  Petersburg,  cut  the  Danville  Kailroad  at  three 
points,  cut  the  Petersburg  &  Lynchburg  Railroad  at 
three  points,  cut  the  Petersburg  &  Weldon  Railroad, 
and  destroyed  property  of  immense  value.  The  com 
mand  reached  City  Point  in  safety  on  May  17th,  having 
marched  from  thirty  to  forty  miles  a  day  for  six  days. 
On  June  9th  General  Kautz,  with  1,300  -  cavalry, 
took  active  part  in  the  movement  which  General  But 
ler  had  planned  for  the  capture  of  Petersburg,  then  de 
fended  by  a  force  of  about  1,200  militia.  It  was  ar 
ranged  that  Kautz  should  make  a  detour  to  the  left, 
attacking  the  city  from  the  Jerusalem  road,  while  the 
infantry  forces  under  General  Gillmore  should  coop 
erate  on  the  Jordan's  Point  and  City  Point  roads. 
Kautz's  cavalry — a  portion  mounted  and  the  remain 
der  dismounted — gallantly  charged  the  enemy's  en 
trenchments,  capturing  the  works  and  approaching 


*First  Brigade:  Third  New  York  Cavalry,  First  District  of 
Columbia  Cavalry.  Second  Brigade:  Fifth  Pennsylvania  Cav 
alry,  Eleventh  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  section  of  Eighth  New 
York  Artillery.  Total,  2,838  men  for  duty,  equipped. 


118  tlistory  of  the  Cavalry, 

very  near  the  city,  but,  owing  to  lack  of  support  from 
the  infantry,  the  cavalry  was  obliged  to  fall  back.* 

Wilson's  division,  augmented  to  5,500  men  by  the 
addition  of  the  cavalry  from  the  Army  of  the  James, 
had,  during  the  absence  of  the  other  divisions  of  the 
Cavalry  Corps  at  Trevilian  Station,  made  a  raid  (July 
22d)  south  of  Petersburg,  destroying  the  Petersburg  & 
Lynchburg  and  Richmond  &  Danville  railroads.  Upon 
reaching  the  left  of  the  army  on  his  return,  Wilson 
was  attacked  in  front  by  a  large  force  of  Confederate 
infantry  under  General  Mahone,  sent  down  from  Pe 
tersburg  on  the  Weldon  Railroad,  and  on  the  flank  by 
the  Confederate  cavalry,  which  had  dropped  Sheridan 
and  marched  rapidly  to  this  point.  The  impossibility 
of  breaking  the  infantry  line  which  confronted  it 
caused  the  division  to  fall  back  across  the  Nottoway 
and  Meherrin  rivers,  and  swing  east  across  the  Black- 
water,  losing  in  the  retreat  a  great  number  of  hcrscs 
through  heat  and  fatigue.  Wilson  had  previously  ex 
pressed  his  doubts  of  being  able  to  return  safely,  unless 
the  enemy's  cavalry  and  infantry  were  kept  engaged 
by  General  Sheridan  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
respectively.  But  the  destruction  of  the  railroads  on 
this  raid  was  considered  by  General  Grant  to  have 


fGeneral  Gillmore's  alleged  bad  management  of  this  attack 
led  to  charges  against  him  by  General  Butler,  and  his  subse 
quent  relief  from  command  at  his  own  request. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  119 

more  than  compensated  for  the  severe  losses  which  the 
cavalry  division  sustained.  Had  infantry  been  prompt 
ly  sent,  as  requested,  to  meet  Wilson  at  Ream's  Sta 
tion,  only  four  miles  from  Meade's  headquarters,  and 
open  the  door  for  his  return,  he  could  have  safely  with 
drawn  his  command  and  rejoined  the  army  without 
material  loss. 

From  the  2d  to  the  26th  of  July  Sheridan  was  at 
Lighthouse  Point  recuperating  his  hard-worked  com 
mand.  Here  1,500  horses  were  received  in  addition  to 
the  400  received  at  White  House.  That  the  Union  cav 
alry  had  learned  to  take  better  care  of  its  horse-flesh  is 
shown  from  the  fact  that  these  1,900  remounts  were 
all  that  the  Cavalry  Corps  received  from  the  Quarter 
master's  Department  of  the  Army  while  Sheridan 
had  personal  command — that  is,  from  April  6th  to 
August  1st. 

The  misfortunes  of  the  national  cavalry  during  this 
period  was  due  to  its  division  into  two  parts,  and  al 
though  it  had  been  roughly  handled,  it  was  soon  ready 
for  active  operations.  On  the  afternoon  of  July  26th  the 
First  and  Second  Cavalry  Divisions  moved  north  of  the 
James,  the  Second  Army  Corps  cooperating,  with  or 
ders  to  raid,  if  opportunity  offered,  the  Virginia  Cen 
tral  Railroad,  and  destroy  the  bridges  over  the  North 
and  South  Anna  rivers.  The  Appomattox  was  crossed 
at  Broadway  Landing;  and  at  Deep  Bottom,  Kautz's 


120  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

small  cavalry  division  joined  the  raiding  force,  the 
Second  Army  Corps  taking  the  advance. 

A  portion  of  Hancock's  corps  *oon  became  engaged, 
and  Sheridan  with  two  divisions  of  the  cavalry  accord 
ingly  moved  to  the  right  upon  the  strongly  fortified  New 
Market  and  Central  roads,  leading  to  Richmond.  In 
advance  of  Ruffin's  House  on  the  New  Market  road,  the 
First  and  Second  Cavalry  Divisions  formed  line  of  bat 
tle,  but  were  driven  back  over  the  high  ground  by  the 
Confederate  infantry  divisions  of  Kershaw,  Wilcox,  and 
Heath.  Reaching  the  eastern  extremity  of  a  ridge,  the 
cavalry  were  quickly  dismounted  and  directed  to  lie 
down  about  fifteen  yards  from  the  crest.  When  the 
enemy's  infantry  arrived,  such  a  galling  fire  was  deliv 
ered  from  the  cavalry's  repeating  carbines  that  the  Con 
federate  divisions  gave  way  in  disorder.  The  Federal 
cavalry  quickly  followed,  capturing  250  prisoners  and 
two  battle-flags.  This  adaptability  to  fight  mounted  or 
dismounted  had  now  become  a  marked  characteristic  of 
the  Union  cavalry. 

The  long  line  presented  by  the  cavalry  and  the  Sec 
ond  Army  Corps  deceived  General  Lee  into  the  belief 
that  Grant  had  transferred  a  large  part  of  his  force  to 
the  north  side  of  the  James.  Lee  accordingly  moved 
a  large  body  of  his  troops  from  Petersburg  to  the  vicin 
ity  of  New  Market.  This  was  one  of  the  very  objects 
which  Grant  wished  to  obtain  by  this  demonstration 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  121 

north  of  the  James,  as  the  explosion  of  the  mine  at 
Petersburg  was  nearing  consummation,  by  means  of 
which  he  hoped  to  gain  possession  of  the  city. 

Giving  up  all  idea  then  of  tlu>  original  objects  of  thi> 
expedition,  Hancock  and  Sheridan  bent  all  their  re 
sources  towards  keeping  up  the  deception  without  giv 
ing  battle.  This  was  accomplished  until  the  29th  in 
stant,  when  the  Second  Corps  was  withdrawn  to  take 
part  in  the  assault  on  Petersburg  tlie  following  day. 

This  withdrawal  of  the  infantry  left  the  cavalry 
corps  in  a  position  where  it  could  have  been  annihilated 
had  the  enemy  seen  fit  to  attack.  But  shortly  after 
daylight  on  the  30th  the  cavalry  safely  followed  the 
infantry,  and  moved  with  a  view  to  operating  on  the 
enemy's  left  flank,  should  the  mine  explosion  be  suc 
cessful.  The  failure,  however,  of  the  latter  caused  this 
movement  of  the  cavalry  to  be  at  once  arrested.  On 
August  1st,  two  days  after  the  mine  explosion,  Genera] 
Sheridan  was  relieved  from  personal  command  of  the 
Cavalry  Corps,  and  was  ordered  to  the  Shenandoah 
Valley. 

The  results  thus  far  accomplished  by  the  cavalry 
under  Sheridan  had  b'^en  most  distinguished.  With  the 
idea  ever  held  in  viewr  that  the  Cavalry  Corps  should 
be  organized  and  used  to  fight  the  enemy's  cavalry,  he 
had  succeeded  in  almost  annihilating  what  had  hereto 
fore  been  the  most  uniformly  successful  arm  of  the 


122  History  of  tJie  Cavalry, 

Confederate  Army.  Besides  accomplishing  the  destruc 
tion  of  millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  property,  the  Cav 
alry  Corps  had,  in  all  important  movements,  acted  as  a 
screen  to  the  main  army,  and  by  its  hostile  demonstra 
tions  had  time  after  time  forced  the  Confederate  com- 
mander-in-chief,  much  against  his  will,  to  detach  much- 
needed  troops  from  his  already  hard-pressed  army. 
Had  it  been  kept  united  in  its  more  important  opera 
tions  of  breaking  up  the  enemy's  communications,  it 
would  have  escaped  all  defeat  and  would  have  been 
much  more  successful. 


XVII. 

The  Federal  Government  had,  with  an  inconsidera 
ble  force,  been  able  to  hold  the  State  of  West  Virginia, 
subject  though  it  was  at  all  times  to  guerrilla  opera 
tions  and  to  bold  raids  of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  Aside 
from  the  moral  effect  of  keeping  the  State  within  the 
Union,  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  in  the  northern 
part,  main  line  between  the  East  and  West,  the  Vir 
ginia  Central  Railroad,  penetrating  the  Blue  Ridge  at 
Rockfish  Gap,  and  the  Virginia  &  Tennessee  Railroad, 
just  beyond  West  Virginia's  southern  boundary,  were 
all  of  immense  strategic  importance. 

But  although  the  State  had  by  extraordinary  exer 
tions  been  held,  the  operations  of  the  cavalry  had  been 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  123 

inconspicuous.  With  the  advent  of  Grant's  control  of 
the  Federal  armies,  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  West 
Virginia  came  into  more  prominence. 

In  the  spring  of  1864  the  Department  of  West  Vir 
ginia,  which  included  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  was  in 
command  of  General  Si  gel,  who,  under  orders  from 
Grant,  despatched  an  expedition  under  General  Crook 
to  cut  the  Virginia  &  Tennessee  Railroad  at  New 
River  Bridge  and  destroy  the  salt  works  at  Saltville. 
As  a  diversion,  Sigel  proposed  to  menace  the  Virginia 
Central  Railroad  at  Staunton. 

Crook  entrusted  the  destruction  of  the  works  at 
Saltville  to  General  Averell's  cavalry  division,  while 
he  himself  marched  against  New  River  Bridge.  It 
is  writh  the  cavalry  command  that  we  are  chiefly 
interested. 

Averell  was  at  Charleston,  W.  Va.,  with  2,479  offi 
cers  and  men*  when  Crook's  orders  reached  him. 
Marching  on  May  1st  over  pathless  mountains,  Aver 
ell  found  Saltville  too  strongly  guarded  to  be  taken 
without  infantry  and  artillery.  Approaching  Wythe 
ville  on  the  1.0th,  he  was  confronted  by  5,000  of  the 
enemy  under  Generals  Morgan  and  Jones,  whom  he 
successfully  attacked  and  held  at  bay  for  the  purpose 


*Averell's    brigade    commanders   were    General    Duffio    and 
Colonel  Schoonmaker. 


124  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

of  preventing  their  concentration  on  General  Crook's 
column.  Proceeding  to  New  Eiver,  Averell  crossed  at 
an  opportune  time,  the  river  rising  in  time  to  check 
Morgan's  pursuing  force.  At  Christianburg,  Averell 
look  two  3-inch  guns  and  destroyed  the  railroad  to  a 
point  four  miles  east  of  town.  On  the  15th  instant 
the  little  command  rejoined  General  Crook  at  Union, 
having  inarched  with  uncomplaining  fortitude  350 
miles  through  an  almost  impassable  region,  destitute 
of  supplies,  thirty  miles  of  the  journey  being  made  in 
single  file,  on  foot,  over  unfrequented  paths. 

While  this  campaign  of  the  Kanawha  was  taking 
place,  Sigel  had,  with  6,000  men,  of  which  1,000  were 
cavalry  under  General  Stahel  (an  officer  of  foreign 
birth),  begun  operations  in  the  Shenaudoali  Valley. 
He  reports:  "The  few  troops  I  have  here  [at  Winches 
ter]  are  excellent,  with  the  exception  of  the  cavalry." 

On  May  15th  he  met  the  Confederate  force  under 
Breckenridge,  at  New  Market,*  and  the  Federal  cav 
alry,  posted  on  the  left  of  the  line*,  were  routed  early 
in  the  action.  Although  the  remainder  of  the  Union 
troops  contested  the  ground  bravely,  they  finally  gave 
way.  Sigel  was  signally  defeated,  and  was  accordingly 

*Breckenridge  had  5,500  men,  his  800  cavalry  being  oonT- 
manded  by  Imboden.  The  corps  of  cadets  of  the  Virginia 
Military  Institute,  under  Colonel  Shipp,  took  part  in  tb's 
battle. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  125 

relieved  from  command  of  the  Department  of  West 
Virginia,  being  succeeded  on  May  21st  by  General 
Hunter. 

On  May  26th  Hunter  began  from  Cedar  Creek  the 
campaign  which  had  for  its  object  the  occupation  of 
Lynchburg.  His  two  cavalry  divisions  were  under  the 
command  of  Duffle"  (also  a  foreigner)  and  Averell. 

The  Federal  command  encountered  no  opposition 
until  it  reached  Harrisonburg,  where  Imboden  was 
found  occupying  a  strong  position.  The  Federal  cav 
alry  succeeded  in  capturing  a  large  supply  train  at  this 
point.  On  the  5th  of  June,  Wyncoop's  cavalry  brigade 
took  an  active  and  important  part  in  the  battle  of  Pied 
mont,  by  which  the  Confederate  General  Jones  was 
defeated;  on  the  6th  Hunter  occupied  Staunton,  and 
on  the  8th  he  was  reinforced  by  the  infantry  under 
Crook  and  the  cavalry  under  Averell. 

In  setting  out  from  Staunton,  Duffies  cavalry  di 
vision  was  ordered  to  demonstrate  against  the  enemy 
at  Waynesborough,  but  finding  the  Confederate  force 
very  strong,  he  crossed  the  Blue  Eidge  and  cut  the 
Charlottesville  &  Lynchburg  Railroad  at  Arlington 
Station.  Imboden  followed  him,  but  was  repulsed  with 
loss,  Duffie'  capturing  100  prisoners,  including  17  offi 
cers.  While  these  operations  were  highly  successful, 
Duffi#S  failure  to  return  to  the  main  command  caused 
—14- 


126  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Hunter  a  long  delay  at  Slauuton,  and  the  main  object 
ive,  Lynchburg,  was  reinforced  before  the  Federal 
troops  arrived. 

On  the  17th  Averell,  supported  by  Duffle",  came 
upon  the  enemy  at  Quaker  Church,  five  miles  from 
Lynchburg;,  and,  aided  by  Crook's  infantry,  charged 
their  intrenchments  and  carried  the  works.  But  find 
ing  Lynchburg  heavily  reinforced,  Hunter  decided  to 
withdraw  toward  his  base  by  way  of  Buford's  Pass. 
This  he  accomplished  successfully,  Early  following, 
and  repulsed  the  enemy  whenever  attacked.  He 
reached  Salem  on  the  21st  instant,  where  the  enemy 
abandoned  the  pursuit,  and  arrived,  half-starved  at 
Granley's  Bridge  on  the  27th. 

Hunter's  campaign  had  the  effect  of  drawing  off  a 
portion  of  Lee's  force  to  reinforce  Lynchburg,  and 
caused  a  great  loss  of  property  to  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment.  In  these  successes  the  cavalry  divisions  of 
Generals  Averell  and  Duffie'  took  a  prominent  part. 

But  Early  did  not  long  remain  idle.  After  forcing 
Hunter  into  the  Shenaudoah — a  maneuver  which  freed 
Lynchburg  and  left  the  lower  Shenandoah  open — he 
united  General  Breekenridge's  infantry  division  and 
the  cavalry  of  General  Robert  Ransom,  Jr.,  to  his  own 
corps  and  moved  down  the  valley.  Reaching  Winches 
ter  on  July  2d,  and  Martinsburg  two  days  later,  lie 


Army  of  Iho  Potomac.  127 

brushed  Sigel's  and  Wallace's  troops  aside,  crossed  the 
Potomac,  and  threatened  Washington.  This  move 
nient  so  alarmed  the  Federal  authorities  that  the 
Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Army  Corps  were  rapidly  trans 
ferred  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  Washington, 
resulting  in  Early's  retiring  through  Leesburg,  Win 
chester,  and  Strasburg.  During  this  retreat  Early 
was  continually  harassed  by  Duffies  cavalry  division, 
which  attacked  his  trains  and  engaged  in  several  se 
vere  skirmishes. 

On  the  24th  of  July,  Early  turned  at  Kernstown  on 
Crook's  command,  which  was  following  him,  and  han 
dled  it  so  severely  that  Crook  was  obliged  to  retire  to 
Harper's  Ferry.  In  this  battle  both  Duffies  and  Aver- 
ell's  cavalry  saw  severe  service,  but  that  their  effi 
ciency  was  not  what  it  should  have  been  is  shown  by 
Hunter's  letter  to  Halleck,  written  about  this  time: 
"The  cavalry  and  the  dismounted  men  in  the  late  fights 
behaved  in  the  most  disgraceful  manner,  their  officers 
in  many  instances  leading  them  off  and  starting  all 
kinds  of  lying  reports  tending  to  demoralize  the  whole 
command."  Although  applicable  to  the  dismounted 
men,  who  were  the  odds  and  ends  of  various  regiments 
about  Washington,  this  statement  was  unjust  to  the 
main  cavalry  force,  which,  with  few  exceptions,  fought 
gallantly, 


128  History  of  tho  Cavalry, 

The  way  was  again  open  for  Early,  and,  advancing 
into  Maryland,  he  detached  McCausland  to  Chambers- 
burg,  Penn.,  laid  that  town  in  ashes,  and  fell  back 
towards  Strasburg. 

XVIII. 

Early's  second  raid  caused  such  consternation  in 
the  North  that  Grant  determined  to  not  only  crush 
Early's  command,  but,  by  devastating  the  fertile  valley 
of  the  Shenandoah,  to  prevent  its  being  used  in  future 
as  a  base  of  supplies  for  the  Confederate  armies.  Gen 
eral  Sheridan  was  selected  to  carry  out  this  difficult 
task,  in  a  region  where  many  generals  had  already 
failed. 

When  Sheridan  assumed  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Shenandoah,  its  strength  comprised  the  Sixth 
Army  Corps,  one  division  of  the  Nineteenth  Army 
Corps,  two  divisions  of  infantry  from  West  Virginia, 
and  Torbert's  division  of  cavalry.  In  the  expectation 
that  Averell's  cavalry  division  would  soon  join  him, 
Sheridan  appointed  Torbert  chief-of-cavalry,  and  as 
signed  Merritt  to  the  command  of  Torbert's  old  division. 

Sheridan's  instructions  directed  him  to  mass  his 
troops  at  Harper's  Ferry,  and  follow  and  attack  the 
raiding  force  wherever  found.  And,  although  protect- 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  129 

ing  all  buildings,  to  take  and  destroy  all  forage  and 
stock  in  the  valley  which  might  invite  the  enemy's 
return. 

The  first  five  weeks  of  Sheridan's  Valley  campaign 
were  spent  in  maneuverings,  offensive  and  defensive, 
which,  though  enlivened  by  numerous  severe  cavalry 
skirmishes,  brought  on  no  general  action. 

The  Federal  Army  set  out  from  Harper's  Ferry  on 
August  10th,  and  between  that  date  and  the  13th 
moved  with  strategical  precision  to  Strasburg.  Here 
Sheridan  received  a  delayed  letter  from  Grant  to  Hal 
leek,  informing  him  that  Early  had  been  reinforced  by 
infantry  and  artillery  from  the  Confederate  Army  at 
Petersburg,  and  directing  Sheridan  to  act  on  the  de 
fensive.  The  latter  accordingly  retraced  his  forward 
movement  with  the  same  precision  which  had  marked 
his  advance,  and  left  in  his  wake  a  devastated  valley. 
By  August  18th  he  was  again  in  the  vicinity  of  Charles- 
town,  closely  followed  by  Early;  but  towards  the  end 
of  the  month  the  Confederate  general  fell  back  to 
wards  Brucetown  and  Bunker  Hill,  and  later  to  the 
vicinity  of  Stephenson's  Depot,  near  Winchester.  No 
engagement  of  importance  occurred,*  Sheridan  stand 


*On  September  13th  Mclntosh's  brigade  of  Wilson's  divis 
ion  (Second  Ohio,  Third  New  Jersey,  Fifth  New  York,  Sec 
ond  New  York,  and  First  Connecticut)  captured  the  Eighth 
South  Carolina  Infantry,  with  its  colonel  and  battle-flag,  at 
Abraham's  Creek. 
—15- 


130  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

ing  strictly  on  the  defensive,  as  his  orders  required,  in 
spite  of  great  political  pressure  employed  to  force 
him  into  aggressive  action.  But  the  time  was  well 
employed.  As  Sheridan  reports:  "The  cavalry  was 
employed  every  day  in  harassing  the  enemy,  its  oppo 
nents  being  principally  infantry.  In  these  skirmishes 
the  cavalry  was  becoming  educated  to  attack  infantry 
lines." 

September  16th  Sheridan  learned  through  spies  that 
Kershaw's  division  had  returned  to  the  Army  of  North 
ern  Virginia,  and  he  decided  that  the  time  for  active 
operations  had  at  length  come. 

His  original  plan  of  action  contemplated  throwing 
his  army  across  the  Valley  Pike  at  Xewtown,  south  of 
Winchester,  but  hearing  from  Averell  that  on  the  17th 
Early  had  attacked  him  at  Bunker  Hill  with  two  in 
fantry  divisions,  and  had  afterwards  proceeded  to 
wards  Martiiisburg,  he  determined  to  attack  the  two 
remaining  Confederate  divisions  at  Stephenson's  De 
pot,  and  then  turn,  in  time  to  meet  those  at  Bunker 
Hill  and  Martinsburg. 

But  Early,  suspecting  that  Sheridan  was  about  to 
move,  promptly  withdrew  these  divisions,  so  that  on 
the  18th  instant  Gordon's  division  was  at  Bunker  Hill, 
Kamseur's  two  miles  east  of  Winchester  across  the 
Berryville  Pike,  Wharton's  at  Stephenson's,  and  Rodes' 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  131 

division  near  there.  The  cavalry  of  Lomax,  Jackson, 
and  Johnson  was  to  the  right  of  Ramseur,  while  Fitz- 
hugh  Lee  covered  Stephenson's  Depot,  westward. 

On  September  19th  Sheridan's  army  was  up  and 
moving  at  3  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Wilson's  division 
crossed  the  Opequon  at  the  Berryville  crossing,  and, 
charging  up  the  canon  through  which  the  Berryville- 
Winchester  turnpike  runs,  captured  a  small  work  on 
the  open  ground  at  its  mouth  before  the  Confederates 
could  recover  from  their  astonishment.  All  efforts  to 
dislodge  Wilson  proved  fruitless,  and  he  held  it  until 
the  arrival  of  the  Sixth  Army  Corps.  This  corps  and 
the  Nineteenth,  which  were  following  Wilson,  were  so 
long  passing  the  defile  already  referred  to,  that  it  was 
late  in  the  forenoon  before  they  were  able  to  form  line 
of  battle;  and  in  the  meanwhile  Early  had  time  to 
bring  Bodes'  and  Gordon's  infantry  divisions  down 
from  Stephenson's,  and  from  the  high  ground  in  front 
was  able  to  enfilade  the  Union  troops  as  they  advanced. 
With  the  arrival  of  the  infantry,  Wilson  moved  to  the 
left  from  his  perilous  position  in  front  and  took  posi 
tion  along  the  south  bank  of  Abraham's  Creek,  cover 
ing  the  Union  left. 

Line  of  battle  formed,  the  Union  infantry  advanced 
—Getty's  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps  to  the  left,  and 
Rickett's  division  to  the  right  of  the  Berryville- Win- 


132  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

Chester  pike ;  Grover's  division  of  the  Nineteenth  Corps 
to  the  right  of  Rickett's,  with  Russell's  and  Dwight's 
divisions  in  reserve,  in  rear  of  their  respective  corps. 
The  advance  was  successfully  accomplished  on  the  left, 
but  retarded  on  the  right;  and  as  Getty  and  Rickett 
gained  ground  to  the  left,  a  serious  break  occurred  at 
the  center  of  the  line,  which  was  opportunely  filled  by 
Russell's  reserve  division. 

Meanwhile  Averell  had  advanced  from  Darksville 
southward;  Ouster  had  crossed  the  Opequon  at  Lock's 
Ford,  while  Lowell  and  Devin  had  crossed  at  Ridg- 
way's  Ford,  all  three  commands  pressing  forward  to 
wards  Stephenson's  Depot. 

To  confront  this  force,  the  Confederates  had  Pat- 
ton's  brigade  of  infantry  and  some  of  Fitzhugh  Lee's 
cavalry,  but  with  Averell's  division  on  the  west  of  the 
Valley  Pike,  and  Merritt's  on  the  east,  Torbert  easily 
drove  this  force  towards  Winchester.  The  ground  in 
front  of  the  Federal  cavalry  was  well  adapted  for  a 
charge,  and  while  Averell  pressed  rapidly  towards  the 
Confederate  rear,  Merritt's  division  charged  forward 
with  such  success  as  to  break  the  Confederate  left  and 
capture  a  battery  of  5  guns  and  1,200  prisoners. 

Almost  simultaneous  with  this,  Crook's  divisions, 
which  had  been  massed  at  the  Berryville  crossing  of 
the  Opequon,  were  hurled  against  the  Confederate  left, 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  133 

on  the  right  of  the  Nineteenth  Army  Corps.  This,  to 
gether  with  the  brilliant  success  of  Torbert's  cavalry 
along  the  Valley  Tike,  stampeded  the  whole  Confed 
erate  line,  which  fell  back  in  confusion  towards  Win 
chester  in  spite  of  the  repeated  efforts  of  its  command 
ers  to  rally  their  demoralized  units. 

Sheridan  had  hoped  to  retain  Crook's  divisions  in 
reserve,  until  an  opportunity  should  occur  to  use  them 
in  taking  possession  of  the  Valley  Pike,  southward, 
thus  cutting  off  the  enemy's  retreat.  Rut  under  the 
circumstances  it  had  seemed  best  to  place  Crook's  com 
mand  in  the  main  line  of  battle  to  the  right.  Accord 
ingly,  Wilson  was  directed  to  perform  alone,  as  well  as 
he  was  able,  what  had  been  intended  for  Crook's  entire 
command — to  prevent  the  retreat  of  the  Confederate 
army  along  the  Valley  Pike  towards  Strasburg. 

Wilson's  demonstrations  on  the1  extreme  Confeder 
ate  right  had,  earlier  in  the  battle,  caused  Early  to 
weaken  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  division  on  the  left  by 
detaching  Wickham's  brigade  for  the  purpose  of  secur 
ing  a  route  for  retreat;  but  this  brigade  was  later  sent 
back  to  the  Confederate  left  to  confront  Averell,  so 
that  Wilson  advanced  without  difficulty,  scattering 
Wickham's  brigade  and  continuing  his  advance  till 
after  night. 

-16-    ' 


134  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

When  the  Confederate  line  fell  back  panic-stricken, 
Sheridan  caused  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Army  Corps 
to  move  towards  the  left  to  assist  Wilson  in  taking 
possession  of  the  Valley  Pike.  But  Kamseur's  Confed 
erate  division,  which  still  retained  its  morale,  was  in 
position  to  delay  movements  in  this  direction  till  the 
Confederates  had  swept  by  the  point  of  danger  and 
darkness  had  put  an  end  to  hostile  operations. 

The  Union  loss  in  this  battle  of  the  Opequon  was 
from  4,500  to  5,000  men,  of  which  the  cavalry  lost  but 
441.  The  Confederate  loss  amounted  to  about  4,000, 
of  which  nearly  2,000  were  prisoners.  The  Army  of 
the  Shenandoah  also  captured  5  pieces  of  artillery  and 
9  battle-flags. 

The  victory  came  at  a  time  when  its  moral  effect 
was  most  needed,  and  crowned  with  success  a  long 
series  of  misfortunes  to  the  Federal  arms  in  the  Shen 
andoah  Valley.  It  restored  the  lower  valley  to  Federal 
control,  and  relieved  Maryland,  Pennsylvania,  and  the 
national  capital  from  further  fears  of  invasion,  and  it 
is  safe  to  say  could  not  have  been  gained  but  for  the 
part  taken  by  the  cavalry  both  in  securing  and  driving 
the  enemy  from  it. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  135 


XIX. 

"We  have  just  sent  them  whirling  through  Win 
chester,  and  we  are  after  them  to-morrow/'  wired  Sher 
idan,  and  his  words  sent  a  thrill  of  joy  through  the 
Northern  States. 

In  obedience  to  Sheridan's  orders,  the  cavalry  corps 
was  after  the  retreating  Confederates  at  daybreak, 
September  20th — Merritt  straight  down  the  Valley 
Road  towards  Strasburg;  Wilson  to  Front  Eoyal  by 
way  of  Stevensburg;  and  Averell  along  the  Back  Bond, 
skirting  the  edge  of  the  mountain  range  to  the  west, 
towards  Cedar  Creek.  The  infantry  followed,  the  Nine 
teenth  Corps  on  the  right  of  the  pike,  the  Sixth  on  the 
left,  and  the  Eighth  Corps  in  the  rear.  Early  had 
taken  his  stand  at  Fisher's  Hill,  two  miles  south  of 
Strasburg  and  beyond  a  little  stream  called  Tumbling 
Run.  No  effort  was  for  the  present  made  to  dislodge 
him,  for  his  position  -was  probably  the  strongest  that 
he  could  have  selected. 

At  Strasburg  the  valley  is  divided  longitudinally 
by  the  Massanutton  Range,  and  between  this  range 
and  the  Little  North  Mountains  to  the  west  is  barely 
four  miles.  With  his  right  resting  on  the  Massanutton 
spurs  and  the  north  fork  of  the  Shenandoah,  his  in 
fantry  line  of  battle  extended  across  the  valley,  and 


186  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

was  prolonged  on  the  left  by  Lomax's  cavalry,  dis 
mounted.  The  whole  Confederate  line  was  intrenched, 
and  so  sure  was  Early  of  the  strength  of  his  position 
that  the  ammunition  chests  wrere  lifted  from  the  cais 
sons  and  placed  behind  the  works. 

As  the  Union  troops  arrived  on  the  evening  of  the 
20th,  Wright  and  Emory  went  into  position  on  the 
heights  of  Strasburg,  Crook  north  of  Cedar  Creek,  and 
the  cavalry  to  the  right  and  rear  of  Wright  and  Emory, 
extending  to  the  Back  Road. 

A  reconnaissance  satisfied  Sheridan*  that  the  ene 
my's  right  was  impregnable,  and  he  determined  to  use 
the  same  turning  tactics  he  had  used  at  Opequon. 

On  the  21st  Sheridan  pushed  the  enemy's  skirmish 
ers  back  towards  Fisher's  Hill,  and  after  a  severe  en 
gagement  of  the  infantry,  secured  an  advantageous 
position  on  the  right.  The  night  of  the  21st  Crook  was 
concealed  in  the  timber  near  Strasburg.  The  same  day 
Torbert,  with  Wilson's  and  Merritt's  cavalry  divisions, 
was  dispatched  up  the  Luray  Valley  with  orders  to 
defeat  the  enemy's  cavalry,  cross  over  the  Massanutton 
Range  to  New  Market,  and  thus  gain  the  enemy's  rear, 
should  Sheridan  drive  him  south  from  Fisher's  Hill. 

On  the  22d  Crook  moved  secretly  to  a  position  in 
the  timber  near  Little  North  Mountain,  and  the  Sixth 
and  Nineteenth  Corps  were  massed  opposite  the  right 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  137 

center  of  the  enemy's  line,  Rickett's  division  opposite 
the  left  center,  and  Averell's  cavalry  on  Rickett's  right. 

The  maneuver  of  Crook  was  eminently  successful. 
Moving  out  from  the  timber  late  in  the  afternoon  of 
September  22d,  he  struck  the  enemy's  left  and  rear 
with  unexpected  and  irresistible  force;  the  infantry  in 
the  main  line  of  battle  swung  into  the  turning  move 
ment  at  the  proper  time,  and  the  rout  of  Early's  army 
was  complete. 

All  during  the  night  of  the  22d  the  Federal  infantry 
with  Devin's  brigade  of  cavalry  pushed  on  in  pursuit  of 
the  demoralized  enemy.  Devin  struck  the  enemy  north 
of  Mount  Jackson,  and  had  he  been  properly  supported 
by  Averell,  would  doubtless  have  taken  thousands  of 
prisoners.  But  for  some  unaccountable  reason  Averell 
had  gone  into  camp  immediately  after  the  battle  of 
Fisher's  Hill,  leaving  the  infantry  and  Devin's  small 
cavalry  brigade  to  make  the  all-night  pursuit.  He  re 
inforced  Devin  about  3  p.  m.  on  the  23d  at  Mount  Jack 
son,  but  his  attack  was  indiff erently  made,  and  he  soon 
afterwards  withdrew  into  camp  near  Hawkinsburg. 

Meanwhile  Torbert  with  his  cavalry  had  passed  up 
the  Luray  Valley  to  Milford,  and  finding  this  place  in 
possession  of  the  Confederate  cavalry  under  Wickham, 
the  bridges  destroyed  and  the  country  impracticable  for 
cavalry  off  the  turnpike,  it  was  impossible  to  dislodge 


138  History  of  the  Cavalry  < 

the  enemy  or  to  pass  beyond  the  defile  opposite  New 
Market.  "Not  knowing  these  facts,  I  was  astonished 
and  chagrined,"  writes  Sheridan,  "on  the  morning  of 
the  23d  at  Woodstock,  to  receive  the  intelligence  that 
he  [Torbert]  had  fallen  back  to  Front  Royal  and  Buck- 
ton  Ford." 

Had  Torbert  succeeded  in  forcing  the  pass  and  reach 
ing  New  Market,  as  Sheridan  contemplated,  Early's 
army  must  have  been  captured  bodily.  As  it  was,  Sher 
idan's  loss  was  only  about  400,  while  Early's  was  be 
tween  1,300  and  1,400.  Early  abandoned  most  of  his 
artillery,  and  such  property  as  was  within  his  field 
works. 

Excepting  Devin's  energetic  pursuit,  it  must  be  con 
fessed  that  the  cavalry  contributed  very  little  to  the 
success  of  the  battle  of  Fisher's  Hill;  but  candor  com 
pels  the  statement  that  the  valleys  were  too  narrow  for 
cavalry  operations.  Averell  was  immediately  relieved 
from  his  command,  Sheridan  attributing  his  apparent 
apathy  to  dissatisfaction  at  Torbert's  appointment  as 
chief-of-cavalry,  which  had  repeatedly  manifested  itself, 
except  when  Averell  was  conducting  independent  expe 
ditions.  Colonel  William  H.  Powell  succeeded  to  the 
command  of  Averell's  division. 

The  enemy  which  had  concentrated  south  of  Mount 
Jackson  was  driven  thirteen  miles  southward  on  the 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  139 

24th,  through  New  Market  and  Keezletown,  reaching 
Port  Republic  during  the  night,  and  moving  from 
thence  to  Brown's  Gap  in  the  Blue  Ridge.  Below  Port 
Republic,  Early  had  been  joined  by  Lomax's,  Wick- 
harn's,  and  Payne's  brigades  of  cavalry,  and  Kershaw's 
infantry  division,  while  Cutshaw's  artillery  was  en  route 
to  join  him. 

On  the  25th  the  Sixth  and  Nineteenth  Army  Corps 
reached  Harrisonburg,  where  they  were  ordered  for  the 
present  to  remain;  and  during  the  next  few  days  the 
cavalry,  all  of  which  had  rejoined  Sheridan  by  the  26th, 
was  employed  in  laying  waste  the  upper  valley,  and  in 
skirmishing  with  the  enemy  as  far  south  as  Stauntou 
and  Brown's  Gap,  the  general  line  of  the  Federal  army 
being  until  October  6th  from  Port  Republic  along  North 
River  by  Mount  Crawford  to  the  Back  Road  near  the 
mouth  of  Briery  Branch  Gap. 

During  this  time  Sheridan  advised  that  the  Valley 
campaign  be  here  terminated,  and  that  a  portion,  at 
least,  of  the  troops  be  withdrawn  for  other  purposes. 
Grant's  consent  to  Sheridan's  plans  reached  the  latter 
October  5th,  and  on  the  following  day  the  movement 
down  the  valley  was  begun,  the  infantry  preceding  the 
cavalry,  and  the  latter  in  a  line  stretching  completely 
across  the  valley,  destroying  or  taking  all  available 
supplies. 


140  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

The  enemy's  cavalry,  now  under  General  Rosser,* 
became  exceedingly  annoying  to  the  rear  guard  during 
the  next  few  days,  and,  on  October  8th,  Torbert  was 
directed  by  Sheridan  "to  give  Kosser  a  drubbing  next 
morning  or  get  whipped  himself."  At  this  time  Merritt 
was  in  camp  near  Bound  Top,  north  of  Tom's  Brook, 
and  Custer  some  six  miles  northwest,  near  Tumbling 
Kun. 

During  the  night  Custer  was  ordered  to  retrace 
his  steps  by  the  Back  Road,  joining  his  line  of  battle 
with  Merritt,  who  was  to  attack  along  the  Valley 
Pike,  only  about  three  miles  separating  these  parallel 
roads. 

About  7  a.  m.  October  9th  Ouster  encountered 
Rosser  with  three  brigades  near  Tom's  Brook  Cross 
ing,  and  soon  after  Merritt  struck  Lomax  and  John 
son  on  the  Valley  Pike,  the  Federal  line  of  battle  ex 
tending  across  the  valley. 

The  fighting  was  desperate  on  both  sides.  On  the 
Federal  side  there  was  a  determination  to  maintain 
the  prestige  of  the  cavalry  in  the  valley,  and  to  make 
up  for  Torbert's  failure  to  punish  these  same  Confed 
erate  divisions  at  Milford  a  fewr  weeks  before.  On 
the  Confederate  side  it  was  hoped  that  Rosser,  whose 


*Rosser  had  joined  Early  on  October  5th,  with  a  cavalry 
brigade  from  Richmond,  and  was  boastfully  proclaimed  "the 
.savior  of  the  valley." 


f  UNIVERSITT  ) 

p>£&UFOg^X   , 
Army  of  the  1  otomdc. 

previous  efforts  had  been  successful,  would  reestab 
lish  the  supremacy  of  the  Confederate  cavalry,  and 
the  sight  of  the  devastated  valley  by  men,  many  of 
whom  were  from  this  region,  spurred  them  to  stub 
born  resistance. 

The  fight  was  essentially  a  saber  contest.  Again 
and  again  were  charges  given  and  received  on  both 
sides,  and  for  two  hours  the  honors  wrere  almost 
equally  divided,  the  Confederates  holding  the  center 
with  success,  while  the  Federal  cavalry  pushed  back 
the  flanks.  This  finally  proved  too  much  for  the 
enemy,  and  as  both  Confederate  flanks  gave  way,  Mer- 
ritt  and  Custer  ordered  a  charge  along  the  whole  line. 
The  retreat  of  the  Confederates  which  immediately 
followed  degenerated  into  a  panic-stricken  rout,  wh'ch 
continued  for  twenty-six  miles  up  the  valley,  through 
Mount  Jackson  and  Columbia  Furnaces.  Eleven  pieces 
of  artillery,  330  prisoners,  ambulances,  caissons,  and 
even  the  headquarters  wagons  of  the  Confederate 
commanders,  were  captured. 

Torbert  has  stated  that  of  all  the  cavalry  victories, 
that  of  Tom's  Brook  "was  the  most  brilliant  one  of 
them  all,  and  the  most  decisive  the  country  has  ever 
witnessed." 

Of  this  reverse  to  the  Confederate  arms  Early 
wrote  to  Lee,  October  9jh;  "  *  *  *  GCK]  knows 


142  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  avert  the  disasters 
which  have  befallen  the  command ;  but  the  fact  is,  the 
enemy's  cavalry  is  so  much  superior  to  ours,  both  in 
numbers  and  equipment,  and  the  country  is  so  favor 
able  to  the  operations  of  cavalry  that  it  is  impossible 
for  ours  to  compete  with  his.  Lomax's  cavalry  are 
armed  entirely  with  rifles,  and  have  no  sabers,  and 
the  consequence  is  that  they  cannot  fight  on  horse 
back,  and  in  the  open  country  they  cannot  success 
fully  fight  on  foot  against  large  bodies  of  cavalry.  It 
would  be  better  if  they  could  all  be  put  in  the  in 
fantry;  but  if  that  were  tried,  T  am  afraid  they  would 
all  run  off."* 

Sheridan  had  specially  halted  the  Union  infantry 
one  day  in  order  to  have  the  battle  of  Tom's  Brook 
fought.  On  the  following  day  he  again  moved  for 
ward  across  Cedar  Creek  and  occupied  the  heights, 
the  cavalry  on  the  flanks,  and  the  Sixth  Corps  con 
tinuing  its  march  to  Front  Royal,  with  a  view  of  join 
ing  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  On  the  13th,  however, 
it  was  recalled  in  consequence  of  the  enemy's  arrival 
at  Fisher's  Hill.  It  was  Sheridan's  intention  at  the 
time  to  send  all  the  cavalry  on  a  raid  through  Chester 
Gap  to  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad  at  Charlottes- 
ville,  and  it  had  actually  proceeded  as  far  as  Front 


".Rebellion  Records,  page  558,  Vol.  XLIIL,  Part  L 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  148 

Royal,  but  in  consequence  of  unconfirmed  informa 
tion  that  Longstreet  was  about  to  join  Early,  the 
expedition  was  given  up.  The  cavalry  was  accord 
ingly  ordered  back  to  Cedar  Creek,  and  General 
Wright  was  directed  to  make  his  position  strong,  and 
be  well  prepared  for  any  advance  of  the  enemy.  This 
done,  Sheridan  proceeded  to  Washington  to  consult 
with  the  Secretary  of  War  in  regard  to  future 
operations. 

XX. 

Nothing  suspicious  was  seen  or  heard  by  the  Fed 
eral  army  at  Cedar  Creek  to  indicate  a  further  ad 
vance  by  Early.  In  fact,  a  reconnaissance  on  October 
18th  reported  the  enemy  as  having  retreated  up  the 
valley.  But  it  is  to  be  observed  that  no  cavalry  scouts 
or  pickets  were  kept  in  advance  to  observe  the  ene 
my's  movements. 

On  the  night  of  the  1.8th  the  Army  of  the  Shenan- 
doah  was  encamped  on  the  bluffs  along  the  north 
bank  of  Cedar  Creek,  as  follows:  Crook's  Army  of 
West  Virginia  was  on  the  extreme  left,  his  two  divis 
ions  on  each  side  of  the  pike;  on  his  right  was  th^ 
Nineteenth  Corps,  separated  from  the  Sixth  Corps 
farther  to  the  right  by  a  rivulet — Meadow  Brook; 
Merritt's  cavalry  division  was  on  the  right  of  the 


144  History  of  the  Cavalry  y 

Sixth  Corps  at  Middle  Marsh  Brook,  and  Ouster's  a 
mile  and  a  half  beyond  Merritt,  watching  the  fords  of 
the  Back  and  Mine  Bank  roads;  Powell's  First  Bri 
gade  was  out  on  the  Front  Eoyal  pike,  and  his  Sec 
ond  Brigade  was  guarding  Burton's  Ford  on  the 
Shenandoah. 

The  enemy  attacked  the  left  of  the  line,  in  a  heavy 
fog  before  daylight,  October  19th,  and,  with  a  turning 
movement  which  was  very  effective,  drove  the  infant 
ry  back  from  position  to  position. 

The  cavalry  was  in  the  saddle  at  the  first  alarm, 
and  was  put  in  position  on  the  right  of  the  infantry. 
The  First  Brigade,  Second  Division,  being  at  Burton's 
Ford,  was  cut  off  by  the  enemy's  attack,  but,  passing 
completely  about  the  Confederate  flank,  joined  the 
left  of  the  army  at  Middletown.  The  second  brigade 
of  this  division  moved  slowly  backward  on  the  Front 
Royal-Winchester  pike,  and  succeeded  admirably  in 
engaging  Lomax's  cavalry  and  in  preventing  him, 
throughout  the  day,  from  attacking  the  Federal  rear. 
The  value  of  this  stubborn  resistance  can  best  be  esti 
mated  by  thinking  of  the  consternation  that  would 
have  followed  an  attack  on  the  rear,  in  addition  to 
the  confusion  in  front. 

Of  Merritt's  division,  the  Reserve  Brigade,  having 
received  orders  for  a  reconnaissance  the  night  before, 
had  already  advanced  to  the  line  of  pickets,  when  the 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  145 

latter  were  attacked,  but  subsequently  fell  back,  and 
gave  way  to  the  First  Brigade.  Ouster's  division, 
which  had  at  daylight  been  feebly  attacked  by  Kosser 
at  Copp's  Ford,  was,  with  Merritt's  division,  deployed 
in  line  of  battle  on  the  right  of  the  infantry.  The 
infantry  lines  soon  after  gave  way  in  confusion,  and 
the  Fifth  U.  S.  Cavalry  was  deployed  across  tli ' 
fields  in  the  almost  useless  attempt  to  stop  strag 
glers  and  form  a  line.  Devin's  brigade  was  sent 
to  the  left  of  the  line,  with  orders  to  hold  the  pike, 
and  about  10  o'clock  the  First  and  Third  Divisions* 
were  transferred  to  the  left  of  the  line,  across  the  pike 
just  north  of  Middletown,  the  First  Division  being  so 
disposed  as  to  connect  with  the  line  of  the  infantry. 
The  First  Brigade,  Second  Division,  was  on  the  left 
of  the  Third  Division,  and  the  Third  Division  was  on 
the  left  of  the  First. 

The  cavalry  fought  gallantly.  Even  at  times  when, 
by  backward  movements  of  the  infantry  line  on  th<k 
right,  the  First  Cavalry  Division  was  subjected  to  a 
galling  cross-fire,  the  division  stood  firm,  and  both 
divisions  suffered  greatly  from  a  murderous  artillery 
fire. 


*Three  regiments  of  the  Third  Division  were  left  on  the 
right  of  the  line,   and  for  five  hours   gallantly  stemmed  the 
tide  of  thousands  of  stragglers  who  were  moving  to  the  rear. 
—17- 


146  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

» 

But  for  the  services  of  the  cavalry  at  this  time  on 
the  left  flank,  the  enemy  must  surely  have  penetrated 
to  the  rear  of  the  Federal  army.  The  cavalry  not  only 
held  its  own  on  the  left,  but  at  one  time  so  threat 
ened  to  envelop  Early's  right  that  he  was  forced  to 
crowd  his  troops  farther  east. 

Finding  his  efforts  of  little  avail  against  the  solid 
front  presented  by  the  Sixth  Army  Corps  and  the 
cavalry.  Early  determined  to  try  to  force  the  Union 
flank.  But,  to  his  surprise  and  consternation,  \\<> 
found  his  own  troops  in  no  condition  for  such  an 
attack.  Early  himself  states:  "So  many  of  our  men 
had  stopped  in  the  cam])  to  plunder  (in  which  I  •  am 
sorry  to  say  that  officers  participated),  the  country 
was  so  open,  and  the  enemy's  cavalry  so  strong,  that 
I  did  not  deem  it  prudent  to  press  further,  especially 
as  Lomax  had  not  come  up."* 

Affairs  were  at  this  stage  when  Sheridan,  having 
made  his  historic  ride,  arrived  on  the  field.  He  says: 
"On  arriving  at  the  front  I  found  Merritt's  and  Cus- 
ter's  divisions  of  cavalry  under  Torbert,  and  General 
Getty's  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps,  opposing  the 
enenry." 

Custer's  division  was  at  once  (11  a.  in.)  ordered  to 
the  right,  and  in  a  charge  drove  back  the  enemy's  cav- 

*Early  to  Lee,  the  day  after  the  battle. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  147 

airy  for  a  mile  behind  their  infantry  supports.  The 
Nineteenth  Corps  and  two  remaining  divisions  of  the 
Sixth  Corps  were  also  ordered  to  the  front,  and  Sher 
idan  personally  supervised  the  formation  of  the  line 
of  battle  in  prolongation  of  Getty's  line. 

At  4  p.  m.  a  general  advance  of  the  Federal  lines 
was  ordered,  and  as  the  enemy's  line  overlapped  a 
portion  of  the  Union  right,  McMillan's  brigade  cutoff 
the  Confederate  flanking  force.  This  done,  Glister's 
division  was  ordered  to  charge.  Leaving  but  three 
regiments  to  hold  the  Confederate  cavalry  in  his 
front,  Custer  moved  to  the  left,  dividing  the  enemy's 
cavalry  from  his  infantry,  and  charging  across  an 
open  plain  on  the  enemy's  exposed  flank.  The  effect 
was  apparent  before  the  charge  was  completed,  thou 
sands  of  the  enemy  throwing  away  their  arms  and 
crowding  across  Cedar  Creek,  a  demoralized  mob. 

Meanwhile  Merritt's  division,  on  the  extreme  right 
of  the  line,  had  also  gallantly  moved  forward  in  the 
general  advance  of  the  line.  "The  Eeserve  and  Sec 
ond  Brigades  charged  into  a  living  wall  of  the  enemy, 
which,  receiving  the  shock,  emitted  a  leaden  sheet  of 
fire  upon  their  devoted  ranks";  while  the  First  Bri 
gade,  in  column  of  regiments  in  line,  overwhelmed  a 
battery  and  its  supports,  amid  a  perfect  tempest  of 
fire  at  close  range.  In  this  charge  the  fearless  and 
chivalric  Lowell  received  a  mortal  wound. 


148  Ilislory  of  Hie  Cavalry, 

The  cavalry  on  both  flanks  continued  the  pursuit 
across  Cedar  Creek,  and  even  after  dark  charged  and 
broke  the  last  line  the  disorganized  Confederates 
attempted  to  form.  Darkness  alone  saved  the  greater 
part  of  Early's  army  from  capture. 

The  cavalry  alone  captured  45  pieces  of  artillery, 
32  caissons,  46  army  wagons,  672  prisoners — more 
than  half  the  total  number  captured — arid  a  great 
deal  of  other  property. 

The  services  of  the  cavalry  during  the  entire  day 
were  most  distinguished  and  valuable,  and  in  decided 
contrast  to  those  of  the  Confederate  cavalry.  Neither 
Kosser  nor  Lomax,  although  striking  for  the  Union 
lines  at  a  time  when  the  Federal  infantry  was  most 
demoralized,  were  able  to  reach  the  pike;  the  former 
being  easily  repulsed  by  Custer,  and  the  latter  held 
at  bay  during  the  entire  day  by  Powell.  The  fact 
that  two  of  the  cavalry  divisions  were  about  to  depart 
upon  a  raid  to  the  Virginia  Central  Kailroad,  and 
that  their  orders  were  countermanded  at  the  last 
moment  by  Sheridan  at  Front  Royal,  shows  how  the 
smallest  happenings  may  affect  the  fate  of  the  great 
est  battles.* 


*During  the  Shenandoah  campaign  the  cavalry  alone  cap 
tured  2,556  prisoners,  71  guns,  29  battle-flags,  52  caissons,  105 
army  wagons,  2,557  horses,  1,000  horse  equipments,  and  7,152 
beef  cattle.  It  destroyed,  among  other  things,  420,742  bushels 
of  wheat,  780  barns,  and  700,000  rounds  of  ammunition. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  149 

Early's  disorganized  army  reassembled  at  New 
Market,  while  Sheridan  proceeded  to  Kernstown. 
From  Stephenson's  Depot  to  Harper's  Ferry  the  rail 
road  was  reconstructed  and  arrangements  made  to 
detach  troops  to  General  Grant.  On  the  night  of 
November  llth  General  Early  made  a  reconnaissance 
north  of  Cedar  Creek,  but  hastily  retired  on  the  night 
of  the  following  day,  before  troops  could  be  sent 
against  him.  His  cavalry,  however,  were  not  so  for 
tunate.  On  the  day  following  this  reconnaissance 
General  Powell's  cavalry  division  attacked  Lomax's 
cavalry  at  Nineveh,  routing  them,  pursuing  them  two 
miles  south  of  Front  Royal,  and  capturing  all  their 
artillery  (2  guns),  their  ordnance  train,  and  180  pris 
oners.  On  the  same  day  General  Custer,  moving  on 
the  Middle  and  Back  roads,  engaged  Rosser's  cavalry 
division  north  of  Cedar  Creek,  routing  it,  driving  it 
across  Cedar  Creek  and  capturing  sixteen  prisoners. 
The  enemy's  infantry  was  also  successfully  engaged 
on  the  Valley  Pike  by  a  portion  of  the  First  Cavalry 
Division  under  General  Merritt. 

Late  in  November  (November  28th  to  December 
3d),  General  Merritt  was  sent  with  two  brigades  on 
an  expedition  into  the  Luray  Valley  for  the  purpose 
of  operating  against  Mosby,  and  of  rendering  the 
valley  useless  as  a  base  of  supplies  for  the  guerrillas 
in  the  future. 


150  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

The  division  passed  through  Ashby's  Gap  of  the 
Blue  Ridge,  and  raiding  columns  were  then  detached 
which  devastated  the  country  on  each  side  of  the 
general  line  of  march.  The  guerrillas  kept  safely  at 
a  distance  and  avoided  capture,  but  the  destruction  of 
property  was  enormous — that  destroyed  by  the  Re 
serve  Brigade  alone  aggregating  $411,620. 

In  spite  of  the  bitter  cold  weather,  the  cavalry  was 
kept  moving  during  December.  On  the  19th  Tor- 
bert,  with  Merritt's  and  Powell's  divisions,  marched 
through  Chester  Gap  for  the  purpose  of  striking 
the  Virginia  Central  Railroad  at  Gordonsville,  while 
Custer,  as  a  diversion,  proceeded  up  the  valley.  Tor- 
bert  drove  Jackson's  cavalry  division  out  of  Madison 
Court  House,  and  the  latter  formed  a  junction  with 
McCauseland's  division  at  Liberty  Mills;  but  the  com 
bined  force,  General  Lomax  commanding,  was  sig 
nally  defeated  by  Torbert  and  driven  across  the  Rap- 
idan.  The  bridge  had  been  mined,  and  was  blown  up 
while  the  Federal  cavalry  were  crossing  in  pursirt; 
but,  by  crossing  by  fords  above  and  below,  Torbert 
captured  two  pieces  of  artillery.  He  then  proceeded 
towards  Gordonsville,  but  found  the  enemy's  infantry 
in  such  force  that  he  returned.  Custer  had  meanwhile 
been  surprised  in  his  camp  at  Lacy's  Springs,  both 
Rosser's  and  Payne's  forces  attacking  him  at  daylight, 
and  ho  was  obliged  to  retire. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  151 

The  weather  was  so  intensely  cold  during  these 
operations  that  horses  and  men  suffered  severely,  and 
many  men  were  badly  frost-bitten.  The  expeditions 
practically  closed  the  operations  of  the  winter,  and 
Sheridan's  troops  went  into  cantonment  near  Win 
chester.  The  Sixth  Corps  had  been  sent  to  Petersburg 
early  in  December,  one  division  of  Crook's  corps  to 
West  Virginia,  and  the  remainder  to  City  Point,  leav 
ing  Sheridan  with  but  one  division  of  the  Nineteenth 
Army  Corps  and  the  cavalry. 


XXI. 

While  these  stirring  events  had  been  taking  place 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley,  Gregg's  cavalry  division 
(still  known  as  the  Second  Cavalry  Division),  on  duty 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  had  not  been  idle. 
Indeed,  in  consequence  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  other 
cavalry  divisions  to  the  'Shenandoah  Valley,  it  had 
rather  more  than  its  share  of  cavalry  duty  to  perform. 

When  Kershaw's  division  of  Lee's  army  was  with 
drawn  to  reinforce  Early,  the  Second  Cavalry  Divis 
ion,  with  the  Second  Army  Corps  (Hancock's),  crossed 
the  James  at  Deep  Bottom,  August  14th.  On  the  16th 
the  Federal  cavalry  met  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  the 
Charles  City  road,  and  drove  them  as  far  as  White's 


152  History  of  tlie  Cavalry, 

Tavern.  In  these  engagements  Generals  Ckainbliss 
and  Girardey,  of  the  Confederate  army,  were  killed. 

During  the  destruction  of  the  Weldon  Railroad 
which  followed,  the  cavalry  was  on  picket  duty,  but 
a  portion  of  it,  dismounted,  took  active  part  in  the 
engagement  at  Ream's  Station  on  August  25th,  which 
resulted  in  the  breaking  of  Hancock's  line  and  the  cap 
ture  of  five  pieces  of  his  artillery.* 

No  movements  of  consequence,  except  reconnais 
sances,  now  occurred  until  September  30th,  when  a 
demonstration  was  ordered  on  the  left  of  the  line,  to 
prevent  the  enemy  detaching  troops  to  the  north  side 
of  the  James.  In  this  movement  two  divisions  of 
the  Fifth  Army  Corps  under  General  Warren,  and 
two  of  the  Ninth  Army  Corps  under  General  Parke, 
moved  from  the  left  towards  Poplar  Spring  Church 
and  Peeble's  Farm;  the  cavalry  division  at  the  same 
time  moved  to  the  left  and  rear.  On  October  1st 
Gregg  was  attacked  by  a  large  force  of  the  enemy  on 
the  Duncan  road,  where  he  was  guarding  the  rear  and 
left  of  the  movement,  but  he  repulsed  the  attack  witli 
great  loss,  General  Dunovant  being  among  the  Con 
federates  killed.  For  some  weeks  the  troops  were  em 
ployed  in  holding  and  fortifying  the  position  thus 
gained. 


*For  the  organization  of  the  cavalry,  see  Appendix  13. 


Army  of  tlie  Potomac.  153 

On  October  27th  the  cavalry  division  was  placed 
under  the  orders  of  General  Hancock,  and,  together 
with  part  of  the  Ninth,  Fifth,  and  Second  Corps, 
moved  towards  the  left  in  reconnaissance.  The  Sec 
ond  Corps  and  the  cavalry  crossed  Hatcher's  Eun  on 
the  Vaughan  road,  with  slight  opposition  from  the 
enemy's  cavalry.  On  arriving  at  Gravelly  Run,  the 
enemy  was  found  posted  on  the  west  side  in  a  position 
of  great  natural  strength.  The  First  Maine  and  Sixth 
Ohio  were  dismounted,  and,  assisted  by  the  Twenty- 
first  Pennsylvania,  mounted,  drove  the  enemy's  line 
back  beyond  the  heights,  the  enemy  breaking  in  con 
fusion  at  the  advance  of  the  Second  Corps.  In  the 
subsequent  operations  on  the  Boydton  Plank  Road, 
the  cavalry  was  on  the  left  of  the  Second  Army  Corps, 
and,  with  almost  the  entire  division  dismounted,  re 
peatedly  held  the  line  against  superior  numbers  of  the 
enemy  until  he  retired.  On  October  28th  the  troops 
were  again  withdrawn  to  the  lines  of  intrenchments. 

During  November  the  division  was  employed  on 
picket  and  reconnaissance;  and  on  December  7th, 
numbering  4,200  effective  men,  it  was  sent,  under 
General  Warren,  with  three  divisions  of  the  Fiftli 
Corps,  Mott's  division  of  the  Second  Corps,  and  four 
batteries  of  artillery,  to  destroy  the  Weldon  Railroad 
and  interrupt  the  enemy's  communications. 


154  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

As  the  command  reached  the  vicinity  of  the  rail 
road  General  Gregg  detached  a  force  to  destroy  the 
railroad  bridge  over  the  Nottoway,  and  the  cavalry 
continued  the  partial  destruction  of  the  railroad  as  far 
as  Jarratt's  Station.  On  December  9th  the  work  of 
destruction  continued,  the  cavalry  clearing  the  enenry 
out  of  the  way  southward,  and  picketing  the  country 
north  and  east.  At  Three  Creeks  the  Confederates 
had  posted  on  the  south  bank  two  small  field-guns 
and  two  hundred  cavalry,  the  bridges  having  been 
destroyed  and  the  fords  obstructed;  but  dismounted 
men  crossed  and  drove  the  enemy  away.  The  railroad 
was  destroyed  for  seventeen  or  eighteen  miles,  when, 
the  command's  supplies  not  justifying  further  opera 
tions,  it  returned  to  camp  on  December  12th. 

Early  in  February  the  Second  Cavalry  Division 
proceeded  via  Beam's  Station  to  Dinwiddie  Court 
House  without  finding  the  enemy  in  any  considerable 
force.  On  the  following  day,  however,  the  division 
formed  a  junction  with  General  Warren  at  Gravelly 
Run,  and  covered  his  movements  to  Hatcher's  Kun, 
the  enemy  following.  With  the  First  and  Third  Bri 
gades  dismounted  and  the  Second  Brigade  mounted, 
the  enemy  wras  driven  across  the  run,  and  the  com 
mand  bivouacked  on  the  field  of  battle. 

On  February  9th  General  David  McM.  Gregg,  who 
had  for  so  long  a  time  been  so  prominently  and  illus- 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  155 

triously  identified  with  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  was  relieved  from  command,  through  the 
acceptance  of  his  resignation,  and  General  John  I. 
Gregg  assumed  temporary  command.  General  Davies, 
returning  from  leave  later  in  the  month,  assumed  com 
mand,  and  on  March  27th  he  in  turn  was  relieved  by 
General  Crook,  who  retained  permanent  command  of 
the  division.*  During  this  period  little  of  importance 
occurred,  the  division  reporting  on  the  27th  to  Gen 
eral  Sheridan  for  duty  with  the  First  and  Third  Cav 
alry  Divisions,  which  had  again  joined  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac. f 

The  latter  divisions  had  meanwhile,  on  February 
27th,  entered  upon  the  final  campaign,  which  was  to 
clear  the  valley,  once  for  all,  of  organized  Confederate 
troops. 

General  Merritt,  who  had  performed  such  distin 
guished  services  as  a  division  commander,  succeeded 
General  Torbert  as  chief-of-cavalry.  Torbert  had  dis 
appointed  Sheridan  during  the  battle  of  Fisher's  Hill 
and  in  the  later  expedition  to  Gordonsville.  He 
seemed  to  lack  self-reliance  at  critical  times,  and  one 
of  Sheridan's  traits  of  character  was  that  he  took  no 


*Wilson  meanwhile  having  been  ordered  west  to  reorganize 
and  command  Sherman's  caavlry. 

fFor  the  effective  force  of  the  First  and  Third  Divisions 
February  28th,  see  Appendix  14. 


156  History  of  the  Camlri/, 

chances.  Sheridan's  original  plans,  as  directed  by 
Grant,  contemplated  the  destruction  of  the  Virginia 
Central  Railroad,  the  capture  of  Lynchburg  if  practi 
cable,  and  a  junction  with  Sherman's  victorious  army 
in  North  Carolina. 

A  small  force  of  Rosser's  cavalry  was  encountered 
March  1st  at  Mount  Crawford,  but  was  easily  driven 
to  Kline's  Mills.  At  this  time  Early  was  at  Staunton, 
but  as  Sheridan's  command  approached  that  place  he 
retired  to  Waynesboro,  where  he  occupied  a  line  of 
breastworks  along  a  ridge  west  of  the  town.  Custer 
was  dispatched  towards  Waynesboro,  closely  followed 
by  Devin,  and  finding  the  Confederate  left  somewhat 
exposed,  he  sent  dismounted  regiments  around  this 
flank,  while  he,  with  two  brigades,  part  mounted  and 
part  dismounted,  assaulted  in  front. 

The  Hanking  movement  was  successful,  and  ena 
bled  Custer's  line  of  battle  to  carry  the  breastworks. 
The  Eighth  New  York  and  First  Connecticut  charged 
in  column  through  the  enemy's  line,  and  the  town  of 
Waynesboro,  and  held  the  east  bank  of  the  South 
River,  thus  cutting  off  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat. 
All  the  Confederates  surrendered  except  Rosser's  com 
mand  and  a  few  general  officers,  the  cavalry  captur 
ing  17  battle-flags,  1,600  prisoners,  and  11  pieces  of 
artillery. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  157 

Continuing  the  march,  Ouster's  division  reached 
Charlottesville  on  the  3d  instant,  but  the  muddy 
roads  delayed  the  wagon  train  until  the  5th.  On  the 
8th  Custer  destroyed  the  railroad  as  far  as  Amherst 
Court  House,  sixteen  miles  from  Lynchburg,  while 
Devin,  who  had  proceeded  along  the  James,  destroyed 
the  canal. 

The  Confederates  had  meanwhile  destroyed  the 
bridges  over  the  James,  and,  the  river  being  so  swol 
len  as  to  be  unfordable,  Sheridan  deemed  a  junction 
with  Sherman  impracticable.  He  therefore  decided 
to  still  further  destroy  the  Virginia  Central  Railroad 
and  James  River  Canal,  and  then  join  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  in  front  of  Petersburg. 

Columbia  was  reached  on  the  10th  of  March,  where 
a  halt  of  a  day  was  made  to  allow  the  trains  to  catch 
up.  From  this  point  Merritt,  with  Custer's  division, 
proceeded  to  Louisa  Court  House,  destroying  the  Vir 
ginia  Central  as  far  as  Frederick's  Hall,  while  Custer 
destroyed  it  from  the  latter  place  to  Beaver  Dam 
Station. 

Receiving  word  that  Pickett's  Confederate  division 
with  Fitzhugh  Lee's  cavalry  were  moving  east  from 
Lynchburg,  and  that  Longstreet  was  assembling  a 
force  at  Richmond  to  cut  off  Sheridan's  junction 
with  Orant,  the  raiding  force  now  pushed  on  to  Ash- 


158  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

land;  Merritt  having  marched  from  Frederick's  Hall 
through  Hanover  Court  House,  and  Custer  crossing 
the  South  Anna  on  the  Ground  Squirrel  Bridge. 

The  command  reached  White  House  via  King  Wil 
liam  Court  House  on  March  18th,  where  supplies  were 
found,  which  Sheridan  had  requested  to  have  ready. 

The  expedition  had  caused  an  immense  amount  of 
damage  to  the  Confederate  cause,  with  but  slight  loss 
to  Sheridan's  command.  But,  owing  to  the  incessant 
rains,  which  lasted  for  sixteen  days  and  nights,  the 
almost  impassable  roads  and  the  high  water  in  the 
streams,  the  march  was  one  of  the  greatest  hardship. 

At  White  House  the  command  rested  for  five  days 
and  shod  the  horses.  But  the  march  from  Winchester 
had  been  so  severe  upon  the  latter  that  there  was  not 
a  sufficient  number  of  remounts  at  White  House  to 
replace  those  disabled,  so  that  the  dismounted  men 
were  sent  into  camp  near  City  Point.* 

XXII. 

On  March  24th  General  Sheridan  moved  from 
White  House,  crossed  the  James  River  at  Jones'  Land 
ing,  and  joined  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  front  of 
Petersburg  on  the  27th  instant.  But  his  force  was 


*For  abstract  of  returns  of  the  cavalry  for  March,   1865, 
see  Appendix  15. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  159 

still  regarded  as  a  separate  army,  and  he  received  his 
orders  direct  from  General  Grant. 

The  effective  force  of  the  three  divisions  of  cavalry 
aggregated  9,000  men.*  Sheridan's  general  instruc 
tions  from  Grant  were  to  move  near  or  through  Din 
widdie,  reaching  the  right  and  rear  of  the  Confederate 
army  as  soon  as  possible,  but  with  no  intention  of  at 
tacking  the  enemy  in  his  intrenched  position.  Should 
he  remain^  intrenched,  Sheridan  was  to  cut  loose  and 
destroy  the  Danville  and  South  Side  railroads — the 
only  avenues  of  supply  to  Lee's  army,  and  then  either 
return  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  or  join  Sherman's 
army  in  North  Carolina. 

The  general  moA~ement  against  the  Confederate 
army  began  March  29th.  The  evening  of  that  day  the 
cavalry  had  reached  Dinwiddie  Court  House,  on  the 
extreme  left  of  the  line,  the  nearest  extremity  of  the 
infantry  line  beincj  near  the  intersection  of  the  Quak 
er  Road  with  the  TJoydton  Plank  Road.  The  First 
and  Second  Divisions  went  into  camp,  covering  the 
Yaughan,  Flatfoot,  Boydton  Plank,  and  Five  Fork 
roads,  all  intersecting  at  Dinwiddie,  Ouster's  diyision 
remaining  at  Malone's  Crossing  to  guard  the  trains. 

The  next  day  Devin's  division  was  sent  by  General 
Merritt  to  get  possession  of  Five  Forks,  Davies'  bri- 


*For  organization,  March  29th  to  April  9th,  see  Appendix  16. 


160  History  of  fJir  Cavalry, 

gade  of  Crook's  division  in  support.  The  reconnais 
sance  showed  the  enemy  to  be  in  force  at  Five  Forks 
on  the  White  Oak  road,  and  there  was  severe  skir 
mishing.  On  the  following  day,  March  31st,  Merritt, 
with  the  First  Division  and  Davies'  brigade  of  the 
Third  Division,  again  advanced  on  Five  Forks,  while 
Crook,  with  his  two  other  brigades,  moved  to  the  left 
and  encountered  the  enemy  at  Chamberlain's  Creek. 
But  in  the  meantime  Warren's  army  corps,  which  was 
next  on  the  right  of  the  cavalry,  was  driven  back,  leav 
ing  the  cavalry  at  Five  Forks  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the 
attack.  In  the  very  obstinate  battle  which  ensued, 
the  enemy  was  unable,  with  two  divisions  of  infantry 
and  all  his  cavalry,  to  push  back  the  five  cavalry  bri 
gades,  which  were  dismounted  on  the  open  plain  in 
front  of  Dinwiddie.  The  fighting  continued  until  after 
dark,  and  the  opposing  lines  of  bivouac  that  night 
were  not  separated  by  more  than  a  hundred  yards. 

Of  this  day's  battle  General  Grant  says:  "Here 
Sheridan  displayed  great  generalship.  Instead  of  re 
treating  with  his  whole  command  on  the  main  army, 
to  tell  the  story  of  superior  forces  encountered,  he 
deployed  his  cavalry  on  foot,  leaving  only  mounted 
men  enough  to  take  charge  of  the  horses.  This  com 
pelled  the  enemy  to  deploy  over  a  vast  extent  of 
wooded  and  broken  country,  and  made  his  progress 
slow." 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  161 

On  the  morning  of  the  1st  of  April,  Sheridan,  rein 
forced  by  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  later  by  Mackenzie's 
cavalry  division*  (1,000  effective  men)  from  the  Army 
of  the  James,  advanced  again  against  Five  Forks. 

His  plan  of  attack  was  to  make  a  feint  with  the 
cavalry,  to  turn  the  enemy's  right,  but  meantime  bring 
ing  up  the  entire  Fifth  Corps  to  strike  the  enemy's 
left  flank  and  crush  the  whole  force  if  possible.  The 
movement  wras  hastened  by  the  fact  that  two  divisions 
of  the  Fifth  Corps  were  at  the  time  in  rear  of  tho 
enemy.  The  enemy's  infantry  had,  in  the  hot  pursuit 
of  Sheridan  to  Dinwiddie,  isolated  itself,  and  was, 
moreover,  outside  the  Confederate  line  of  works. 

Warren's  corps  was  slow  getting  up,  but  neverthe 
less  Devin's  and  Custer's  divisions  were  all  the  morn 
ing,  under  Merritt's  direction,  pressing  the  enemy 
steadily  backward,  until  at  2  o'clock  the  Confederates 
were  driven  behind  the  works  on  the  White  Oak  road. 

In  furtherance  of  the  plan  of  attack  Merritt  closely 
engaged  the  enemy,  and  Warren's  corps  was  ordered 
up  on  the  Gravelly  Church  road,  oblique  to  the  White 
Oak  road,  and  about  one  mile  from  Five  Forks.  But 
Warren  was  again  slow  in  getting  into  position. 

*0n  March  20th  General  Kautz  was  relieved  from  command 
of  this  cavalry  division  and  was  succeeded  by  General  R.  S. 
Mackenzie,  a  young  officer  of  engineers,  not  long  out  of  West 
Point. 

-19- 


162  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

About  4  o'clock  Warren  began  the  infantry  attack, 
his  right  flank  covered  by  Mackenzie's  cavalry,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  General  Merritt  made  a  lively  demon 
stration  against  the  enemy's  right.  Although  the  two 
leading  infantry  divisions  barely  escaped  disaster 
through  getting  separated,  the  error  was  rectified  in 
time,  and  as  the  infantry  swarmed  over  the  left  and 
rear  of  the  enemy's  works,  doubling  up  the  Confeder 
ate  line  in  confusion,  Devin's  cavalry  division  went 
over  the  works  in  front.*  The  hostile  artillery  was 
captured  and  was  quickly  turned  on  the  demoralized 
enemy.  At  the  same  time  Custer  was  having  an  ob 
stinate  battle  on  the  left  with  Corse's  and  Terry's 
infantry  and  W.  H.  F.  Lee's  cavalry. 

After  the  first  line  was  carried,  the  enemy  made  no 
serious  stand,  and  the  spoils  of  the  battle  were  6  guns, 
1%  battle-flags,  and  nearly  6,000  prisoners. 

Fearing  Lee  would  escape,  Grant  ordered  a  general 
assault  on  the  enemy's  works  the  next  day,  and  the 
intrenchments  were  carried  at  several  points.  Mer 
ritt  on  the  same  day  was  moving  westward,  and  drove 


*"The  dismounted  cavalry  had  assaulted  as  soon  as  they 
heard  the  infantry  fire  open.  The  natty  cavalrymen,  with  their 
tight-fitting  jackets  and  short  carbines,  swarmed  through  the 
pine  thickets  and  dense  undergrowth,  looking  as  if  they  had 
been  especially  built  for  crawling  through  knot-holes."  (Gen 
eral  Horace  Porter's  "Campaigning  with  Grant,"  in  the  Century 
Magazine.) 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  163 

a  considerable  force  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  from  a 
point  north  of  Hatcher's  Kun  to  Scott's  Corners. 

During  the  night  of  the  2d,  General  Lee  evacu 
ated  Richmond  and  Petersburg  and  moved  towards 
Danville. 

On  the  3d  the  cavalry  resumed  their  pursuit,  the 
Fifth  Corps  in  support,  and  five  pieces  of  artillery 
and  hundreds  of  prisoners  were  taken.  The  enemy's 
infantry  rear  guard  was  overtaken  at  Deep  Creek, 
where  a  severe  fight  took  place,  and  Merritt  was  di 
rected  to  await  Crook's  arrival  and  that  of  a  division 
of  the  Fifth  Corps. 

As  Lee  seemed  to  be  heading  for  Amelia  Court 
House,  Crook  was  ordered  on  the  4th  to  push  ahead 
and  strike  the  Danville  Kailroad,  which  he  did  near 
Jetersville;  and  the  Fifth  Corps,  following  close  be 
hind,  intrenched  itself  at  that  point. 

While  at  Jetersville,  a  telegram  from  Lee's  com- 
rrtissary-general  to  the  supply  departments  at  Danville 
antl  Lynchburg  was  intercepted,  ordering  3,000,000 
rations  sent  to  Burkeville.  The  telegram  was  re-trans 
mitted  by  Sheridan,  who  determined  forthwith  to 
secure  the  rations  for  his  own  army. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th  General  Davies  made  a 
reconnaissance  towards  Payne's  Cross-Koads  and  dis 
covered  that  Lee's  army  was  attempting  to  escape  in 


164  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

that  direction.  Da  vies  succeeded  in  burning  nearly 
200  of  the  enemy's  wagons,  and  rejoined  the  support 
ing  brigades  of  Smith  and  Gregg  near  Flat  Creek, 
eluding  a  strong  force  of  Confederate  infantry,  which 
had  been  sent  out  to  cut  off  his  retreat. 

It  became  apparent  to  Sheridan  on  the  following 
day  that  the  entire  mass  of  Lee's  army  was  attempt 
ing  to  escape.  His  trains,  heavily  escorted,  were 
found  moving  towards  Burkeville,  and  there  were 
other  evidences  of  a  general  retreat.  At  this  time. 
Meade's  plan  of  attack  was  to  advance  his  right  flank 
to  Amelia  Court  House,  but,  after  carrying  out  this 
maneuver,  he  found  Lee  gone,  just  as  Sheridan  had 
predicted,  when,  on  April  4th  and  5th,  the  cavalry 
leader  wished  to  attack  Lee  with  his  cavalry  and  the 
Second  Army  Corps. 

Crook  was  sent  against  Lee's  train  on  the  Deatons 
ville  road,  but  found  them  strongly  guarded.  So  Sher 
idan  shifted  the  cavalry  across  country,  parallel  to 
Lee's  line  of  march,  hoping  to  find  a  weak  point  in  Ifis 
column.  To  prevent  the  detaching  of  any  of  the  ene 
my's  forces,  the  Michigan  brigade  (Stagg's)  of  the 
First  Division,  with  Miller's  battery,  remained  a  few 
miles  south  of  Deatonsville  and  made  a  strong  demon 
stration.  This  gained  time  for  the  arrival  of  the  Sixth 
Army  Corps,  then  marching  to  join  Sheridan. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  165 

A  favorable  opportunity  for  the  attack  of  the  long 
Confederate  column  occurred  at  Sailor's  Creek,  where 
Custer,  with  the  Third  Cavalry  Division,  charged  tlu* 
force  guarding  the  trains,  routed  it,  and  captured  over 
300  wagons.  While  Ouster  was  thus  engaged,  the 
Confederates  were  reinforced  by  Kershaw's  and  Custis 
Lee's  infantry  divisions  under  Ewell.  The  First  Cav 
alry  Division  was  pushed  forward  by  Merritt  to  Cus- 
ter's  assistance,  and  as  Stagg's  brigade  of  this  divis 
ion  moved  up  on  the  left  of  the  Third  Division  it 
made  a  brilliant  charge,  which  resulted  in  the  cap 
ture  of  300  prisoners,  and  with  the  arrival  of  the  other 
brigades  the  enemy's  line  was  broken.  This  success, 
supported  by  the  position  of  Crook's  cavalry  division, 
which  had  been  planted  squarely  across  the  enemy's 
line  of  march,  had  the  effect  of  cutting  off  three  of  the 
enemy's  infantry  divisions;  and  as  the  Sixth  Corps 
moved  up  in  the  enemy's  rear,  nearly  the  entire  force 
was  captured.  This  included  General  Ewell  and  6  of 
his  generals,  15  guns,  31  battle-flags,  and  from  9,000 
to  10,000  prisoners.  The  battle  had  also  the  effect 
of  deflecting  Longstreet's  corps  from  its  march  to 
wards  Danville,  and  it  moved  to  Farmville,  north  of 
Appomattox. 

Sheridan  at  this  time  wrote  to  Grant,  "If  the  thing 
is  pressed,   I   think  that  Lee  -will   surrender."     And 

—19- 


166  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

President  Lincoln  telegraphed  Grant  the  laconic  mes 
sage,  "Let  the  thing  be  pressed." 

It  was  pressed.  On  the  7th  Crook's  division  was 
pushed  on  to  Farmville;  and  Merritt  and  Mackenzie  to 
Prince  Edward's  Court  House  to  prevent  any  m  ce 
ment  of  the  enemy  towards  Danville. 

Crook  overtook  the  rear  guard  of  the  enemy's  train 
just  across  the  river  at  Farmville,  and  in  a  sharp  fight, 
by  Gregg's  brigade,  was  repulsed.* 

This  action  indicated  clearly  that  Lee's  objective 
was  Lynchburg.  This  being  the  case,  Sheridan  deter 
mined  to  throw  all  his  cavalry  across  the  enemy's  path, 
and  hold  him,  if  possible,  until  the  infantry  could 
arrive. 

Accordingly  Merritt  and  Mackenzie  were  recalled, 
joining  Crook  at  daylight,  April  8th,  at  Prospect  Sta 
tion,  and  all  the  cavalry  were  hurried  on  towards  Ap- 
pomattox  Depot,  twenty-eight  miles  away.  Custer, 
having  the  advance,  detached  two  regiments  to  cut  off 
fourf  trains  of  stores  destined  for  Lee's  army,  which 
were  found  a  short  distance  out  of  Appomattox,  and 
then,  turning  his  attention  to  the  depot,  charged  the 
enemy's  advance  guard  just  approaching. 


*General  Gregg  was  captured,  and  the  command  of  his 
brigade  devolved  upon  Colonel  S.  B.  M.  Young,  Fourth  Penn 
sylvania  Cavalry. 

tSheridan  says  four  trains;  Merritt  and  Custer  report  three. 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  167 

The  First  Division  was  soon  brought  up  by  Merritt, 
and,  being  deployed,  dismounted,  on  the  right  of  the 
Third,  it  crossed  the  road  along  which  the  enemy  was 
attempting  to  move,  and  effectually  blocked  his  retreat. 

The  enemy  was  driven  in  this  fight,  which  con 
tinued  until  after  dark,  towards^  Appomattox  Court 
House,  and  24  pieces  of  artillery,  an  immense  train, 
and  many  prisoners  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  cavalry. 

The  day's  work  of  the  cavalry  was  most  important. 
As  General  Merritt  has  said:  "The  enemy's  supplies 
were  taken,  as  it  were,  out  of  their  mouths.  A  strong 
force — they  knew  not  how  strong — was  posted  along 
their  line  of  retreat  at  a  point  where  they  did  not 
expect  opposition.  Night  was  upon  them.  Tired,  des 
perate,  and  starving,  they  lay  at  our  feet.  Their 
bravest  soldiers,  their  hardiest  men  gave  way  when 
they  heard  the  noise  of  battle  far  in  the  rear,  and  the 
night  of  despair  fell  with  the  night  of  the  8th  of 
April,  darkly  and  terribly,  on  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia."* 

During  the  night  of  the  8th,  urgent  efforts  were 
made  to  hurry  up  the  infantry  reinforcements  under 
Ord,  and  about  daylight  on  the  9th  the  Twenty-fourth 
and  Fifth  Corps  and  one  division  of  the  Twenty-fifth 
Corps  arrived  at  Appomattox  Depot.  Soon  after,  the 

*Report  of  April  20,  1865. 


168  History  of  tlie  Cavalry, 

movement  which  General  Lee  had  agreed  upon  during 
the  night — namely,  that  Gordon  should  break  through 
the  Federal  cavalry — was  begun  under  stress  of  over 
whelming  numbers.  Merritt's  cavalry  division  was 
directed  to  fall  back  to  the  right  and  rear,  resisting; 
and  Crook  and  Mackenzie  on  the  left  of  the  line  were 
instructed  to  hold  their  ground  as  long  as  possible, 
without  sacrificing  their  men. 

As  the  enemy  caught  sight  of  the  long  lines  of 
Ord's  infantry,  he  realized  that  further  resistance  was 
useless,  and  discontinued  the  attack.  About  this  time 
Merritt  was  ordered  to  move  against  the  enemy's  lett, 
and,  in  spite  of  a  heavy  artillery  fire,  the  First  and 
Third  Cavalry  Divisions  secured  possession  of  high 
ground  within  half  a  mile  of  the  Court  House. 

Preparations  were  being  made  to  attack  the  ex 
posed  Confederate  flank  with  Custer's  and  Devin's 
divisions,  when  a  flag  of  truce  called  for  a  suspension 
of  hostilities,  and,  so  far  as  the  cavalry  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  was  concerned,  the  War  of  the  Rebel 
lion  was  practically  over. 

The  cavalr}'  was  marched  to  Petersburg,  and  on 
April  24th  was  moved  southward  with  a  view  to 
aiding  General  Sherman's  army.  But  upon  reaching 
South  Boston,  on  the  Dan  River,  Sheridan  received 
word  of  General  Johnston's  surrender,  and  the  cavalry 
retraced  its  steps  to  Petersburg,  from  whence,  by 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  169 

easy  stages,  it  marched  to  Washington.  On  May  23d, 
inid  the  cheers  of  thousands,  it  took  part  in  "The 
Grand  Review,"  as  fine  a  body  of  cavalry  as  the  world 
has  ever  seen. 

XXIII. 

The  development  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  perhaps  the  most  wonderful  object 
lesson  of  the  entire  war. 

Given  a  mass  of  citizen-soldiers,  undisciplined,  un- 
drilled,  many  of  them  ignorant  of  arms  and  of  horses, 
men  from  the  factory  and  men  from  the  counting- 
house,  engineers  off  the  railroad  and  professors  from 
colleges;  to  take  these  and  in  four  years  to  mould 
them  into  that  magnificent  body  of  horsemen  which 
constituted  Sheridan's  command  at  Appomattox  is 
something  that  is  distinctively  a  production  of  the 
active,  physical,  and  mental  energy,  the  intelligence, 
the  resources,  and,  above  all,  the  patriotism,  of  the 
American  nation. 

It  would  be  absurd  to  draw  comparisons  between 
the  courage  of  the  soldiers  of  Stuart  and  those  of 
Pleasanton;  between  those  of  Fitzhugh  Lee  and 
those  of  Sheridan.  They  were  all  Americans,  and, 
whether  born  beneath  Southern  suns  or  Northern 
—20- 


170  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

stars,  possessed  equally  American  pluck,  endurance, 
and  bravery. 

But  the  Southern  soldiers  were  natural  horsemen, 
and,  under  the  wise  patronage  of  General  Lee  and  the 
dashing  leadership  of  Stuart,  the  Confederate  cavalry 
from  the  beginning  exhibited  that  independence  of 
action,  whether  mounted  or  dismounted,  which  made 
them  so  formidable  to  the  Federal  Army.  At  the  be 
ginning  of  the  Gettysburg  campaign,  no  finer  type  of 
cavalry  could  be  found  anywhere  than  the  cavalry  of 
Stuart;  and  the  stimulus  of  such  a  standard  of  excel 
lence  contributed  not  a  little  towards  producing  a 
Federal  cavalry  which  could  successfully  cope  with 
their  adversaries.  But  the  greatest  influence  in  mak 
ing  the  National  Cavalry  was  its  concentration  under 
one  competent  commander. 

That  it  did  so  is  a  matter  of  history,  and  the  supe 
riority  arose  from  a  number  of  causes.  The  first  two 
years  of  the  war,  though  years  of  inferiority  for  the 
Federal  cavalry,  were  filled  with  valuable  lessons,  far- 
reaching  in  their  effects.  The  use  of  arms  and  the 
care  of  horses — natural  from  birth  to  the  Southerner 
—was  hammered  into  the  daily  life  of  the  Northerner 
with  a  persistent  thoroughness  which  was  a  remarka 
ble  characteristic  of  his  nature;  and  this  constant  at 
tention  to  the  minutiae  of  a  cavalryman's  life  had  its 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  171 

ultimate  effect  in  producing  men  equally  skillful  with 
saber,  pistol,  and  carbine.  The  saber  was  considered 
the  first  weapon  of  the  Union  cavalry,  but  in  the  use 
of  the  repeating  carbine  it  showed  that  its  effective 
fire-action  was  not  lessened  by  its  effective  shock- 
action.  The  fact,  too,  that  in  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  each  trooper  was  required  to  furnish  his 
horse,  undoubtedly  had  its  effect  upon  the  degeneracy 
of  the  Confederate  cavalry.  Other  causes — the  loss  of 
Stuart  and  the  rise  of  Sheridan,  as  well  as  the  gradual 
draining  of  the  resources  of  the  Confederacy,  men  and 
materials,  all  these  contributed  to  the  final  result. 

It  is  best  now  to  think  of  the  cavalry  of  both  great 
armies  as  exemplifying  to  the  entire  world  all  that 
was  greatest  and  best  in  the  organization,  equipment, 
and  use  of  the  mounted  arm.  To  be  sure,  a  certain 
class  of  European  critics  continue,  with  almost  willful 
persistence,  to  misrepresent  the  true  character  of  our 
cavalry  and  its  use  during  the  greatest  of  modern 
wars.  That  our  cavalry  cast  aside  the  moss-grown 
traditions  of  European  tacticians,  rejecting  all  that 
was  obsolete,  retaining  all  that  was  best,  and  devel 
oping  that  which  their  sound  common  sense  indicated 
would  add  to  their  fighting  efficiency,  is  to  their  lasting 
credit.  They  created  a  new  r61e  for  the  mounted  army 
and  proved  to  their  own  satisfaction,  as  Kilpatrick 


172  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

has  said,  that  "cavalry  can  fight  anywhere,  except  at 
sea." 

Laying  aside  the  question  of  cavalry  raids,  those 
independent,  self-sustaining  operations  which  were  a 
distinct  product  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  exam 
ples  are  not  wanting  of  the  most  glorious  use  of  the 
cavalry,  both  mounted  and  dismounted,  throughout 
the  war. 

Side  by  side  with  the  charge  of  the  German  cav 
alry  at  Mars-la-Tour,  we  can  place  the  effective  charge 
of  the  Eighth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  under  Huey,  at 
Chancellorsville.  For  the  charge  of  the  English  Light 
Brigade  at  Balaclava,  we  can  name  that  of  the  lam 
ented  Farnswrorth  upon  the  Confederate  right  flank  at 
Gettysburg.  With  the  charge  of  the  French  cuiras 
siers  at  Sedan,  wre  can  class  the  devoted  charge  of 
the  First  and  Fifth  United  States  Cavalry  at  Games' 
Mill,  or  that  of  the  Sixth  United  States  and  Sixth 
Pennsylvania  upon  the  Confederate  artillery  at  Bran 
dy  Station. 

Was  there  ever  a  finer  or  more  effective  cavalry 
charge  against  infantry  than  that  of  Merritt's  division 
upon  the  Confederate  left  flank  at  Opequon?  Was 
there  ever  a  grander  cavalry  battle  than  that  of  Bev 
erly  Ford,  or  the  desperate  fight  of  Gregg's  division 
upon  the  right  flank  at  Gettysburg? 


Army  of  the  Potomac.  ITS 

And  was  ever  before  seen  the  spectacle  of  these 
same  cavalry  troops,  dismounted,  holding  in  check 
long  lines  of  the  enemy's  infantry,  as  did  the  troop 
ers  of  the  gallant  Buford  at  Gettysburg,  or  the  cav 
alry  under  the  peerless  Sheridan  at  Dinwiddie  Court 
House?  Does  the  world  believe  that  cavalry  was  none 
the  less  true  cavalry  when,  like  Gamble's  brigade  at 
Upperville,  it  dismounted  behind  stone  walls,  in  order 
to  check  a  cavalry  charge  with  a  withering  fire  from 
their  carbines;  or,  as  did  Devin's  division  at  Five 
Forks,  carrying  the  enemy's  works,  side  by  side  with 
their  comrades  of  the  infantry? 

No;  it  will  be  the  proud  boast  of  the  cavalry  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  that  it  created  where  others  had 
been  content  to  follow;  that  it  shattered  the  tradi 
tions  of  the  Old  World  and  builded  them  anew.  Its 
deeds  are  too  indelibly  written  upon  the  pages  of  his 
tory  to  ever  be  effaced;  and,  though  for  a  time  mis 
understood,  misused,  and  misrepresented,  it  at  last 
vindicated  itself  in  a  way  which  the  cavalry  of  the 
future  will  do  well  to  emulate. 


174  History  of  the  Cavalry, 

The  writer  has  depended  for  his  statements  almost  entirely 
upon  that  best  of  all  authorities— the  official  records  of  the 
Union  and  Confederate  armies— but  a  list  of  the  principal  sup 
plementary  works  consulted  is  appended. 

Official  Records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion. 

History  of  the  United  States  Cavalry  (Brackett). 

The  Second  Dragoons  (Rodenbough). 

History  of  the  First  Maine  Cavalry  (Tobie). 

History  of  the  First  New  York  (Lincoln)  Cavalry  (Stevenson). 

Annals  of  the  Sixth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  (Gracey). 

Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War  (The  Century  Co.). 

The  Shenandoah  Valley  in  1864  (Post). 

Cavalry  in  the  Gettysburg  Campaign  (Davis). 

Sheridan's  Memoirs. 

The  Civil  War  (Abbott). 

History  of  the  Civil  War  (Comte  de  Paris). 

History  of  the  United  States  (Eliot). 

Organization  and  Tactics  (Wagner). 

Operations  of  War  (Ham ley). 

Journal  of  the  U.  8.  Cavalry  Association. 


Appendix.  175 

The  following  pages  of  the  Appendix  are  almost 
entirely  statistical,  and  are  merely  added  for  reference 
in  order  to  make  the  entire  history  of  the  cavalry  as 
complete  as  possible  in  itself : 

APPENDIX  1. 

Copy  of  the  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War, 
authorizing  the  raising  of  the  First  Regiment  of  volun 
teer  cavalry:* 

War  Department,  Washington,  May  1,  1861. 
To  the  Governors  of  the  Several  States,  and  All  Whom  It  may 
Concern: 

I  have  authorized  Colonel  Carl  Schurz  to  raise  and  organ 
ize  a  volunteer  regiment  of  cavalry.  For  the  purpose  of  ren 
dering  it  as  efficient  as  possible,  he  is  instructed  to  enlist  prin 
cipally  such  men  as  have  served  in  the  same  arm  before.  The 
Government  will  provide  the  regiment  with  arms,  but  cannot 
provide  the  horses  and  equipments.  For  these  necessaries  we 
rely  upon  the  patriotism  of  the  States  and  the  citizens,  and  for 
this  purpose  I  take  the  liberty  of  requesting  you  to  afford 
Colonel  Schurz  your  aid  in  the  execution  of  this  plan. 

(Signed)      SIMON  CAMERON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

APPENDIX  2. 

Organization  of  the  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
October  15,  1861: 


*By  authority  of  this  letter,   the  First  Regiment  of  New 
York  (Lincoln)  Cavalry  was  organized. 


176  Appendix. 


Brigadier-General  Stoneman's  cavalry  command:  — 
Fifth  United  States  Cavalry. 
Fourth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
Oneida  Cavalry  (one  company). 
Eleventh  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  (Harlan's). 
Barker's  Illinois  Cavalry  (one  company). 
Attached  to  City  Guard— 4th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Cos.  A  and  E. 
Attached  to  Banks'  Division — 3d  Regiment,  New  York  Cavalry 

(four  companies). 

Attached  to  McDowell's  Division — 2d  New  York  Cavalry  (Har 
ris  Light). 

Attached  to  Heintzelman's  Division — 1st  'New  Jersey  Cavalry. 
Attached  to  Porter's  Division — 3d  Pennsylvania   Cavalry,   8th 

Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Attached  to  Franklin's  Division — 1st  New  York  Cavalry. 
Attached  to  Stone's  Division — 3d  New  York  Cavalry  (six  com 
panies). 

Attached  to  McCall's  Division — 1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
Attached  to  Hooker's  Division— 3d  Indiana  Cavalry  (eight  com 
panies). 

Attached  to  Blenker's  Brigade — 4th  New  York  Cavalry  (Mount 
ed  Rifles). 

Attached  to  Dix's  Division — (Baltimore)  one  company  of  Penn 
sylvania  Cavalry. 


APPENDIX  3. 

Organization  of  the  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
•during  the  operations  before  Richmond,  June  25  to 
July  2,  1862: 

Attached  to  Second  Army  Corps — 6th  New  York  Cavalry,  Cos. 
D,  F,  H,  and  K. 

Attached  to  Third  Army  Corps — 3d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Attached  to  Fourth  Army  Corps — 8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Attached  to  Fifth  Army  Corps — 8th  Illinois  Cavalry. 

Attached  to  Third  Division,  Fifth  Army  Corps — 4th  Pennsyl 
vania  Cavalry. 

Attached  to  Second  Division,  Sixth  Army  Corps — 5th  Pennsyl 
vania  Cavalry,  Cos.  I  and  K. 


Appendix.  1 77 

Attached  to  Sixth  Army  Corps— 1st  New  York  Cavalry   (un 
attached). 

Cavalry  Reserve. 
Brigadier-General  Philip  St.  George  Cooke. 

6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  6th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

1st  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Cos.  A,  C,        5th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Cos.  A,  D, 

F,  and  H.  F,  H,  and  I. 

Cavalry  Troops  at  General  Headquarters — McClellan  Dragoons, 

Oneida  (New  York)  Cavalry,  2d  U.   S.   Cavalry,   4th  U.  S. 

Cavalry,  Cos.  A  and  E. 


APPENDIX  4. 

Organization  of  the  Union  cavalry  at  the  battle  of 
Cedar  Mountain,  Va.,  August  9,  1862: 

Escort    at    General    Headquarters— 1st    Ohio    Cavalry,    Cos.    A 

and  C. 
Escort    at    Headquarters,    Second    Army    Corps— 1st    Michigan 

Cavalry  (detachment),  5th  New  York  Cavalry  (detachment), 

1st  West  Virginia  Cavalry  (detachment). 

Cavalry  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  George  D.  Bayard. 

1st  Maine  Cavalry.  1st  New  Jersey  Cavalry. 

1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  1st  Rhode  Island  Cavalry. 


APPENDIX  5. 

Organization  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  Vir 
ginia  (Pope's)  during  the  operations  August  16  to  Sep 
tember  2,  1862,  inclusive: 

Headquarters  escort — 1st  Ohio  Cavalry,  Cos.  A  and  C. 
Escort  at  Headquarters  First  Army  Corps — 1st  Indiana  Caval 
ry,  Cos.  I  and  K. 


178  Appendix. 


Attached    to    First   Army    Corps— 3d    West    Virginia    Cavalry, 

Co.  C. 
Attached  to  Independent  Brigade — 1st  West  Virginia  Cavalry, 

Cos.  C,  E,  and  L. 

Cavalry  Brigade  of  the  First  Army  Corps. 
Colonel  John  Beardsley. 

1st  Connecticut  Battalion.  9th  New  York  Cavalry. 

1st  Maryland  Cavalry.  6th  Ohio  Cavalry. 

4th  New  York  Cavalry. 

Cavalry  Brigade  of  the  Second  Army  Corps. 
Brigadier-General  John   Buford. 

1st  Michigan  Cavalry.  1st  Vermont  Cavalry. 

5th  New  York  Cavalry.  1st  West  Virginia  Cavalry. 

Cavalry  Brigade   of  the   Third   Army  Corps. 
Brigadier-General  George  D.  Bayard. 

1st  Maine  Cavalry.  1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

2d  New  York  Cavalry.  1st  Rhode  Island  Cavalry. 
1st  New  Jersey. 

Unattached — 3d  Indiana  Cavalry   (detachment). 


APPENDIX  6. 

Organization  of  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Sep 
tember  14,  17,  1862  (South  Mountain  and  Antietam): 

Escort  at  General  Headquarters — Independent  Company,  Onei- 

da  (New  York)  Cavalry;   4th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Cos.  A  and  E. 
Attached  to  Provost  Guard— 2d  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Cos.  E,  F,  H,  K. 
Quartermaster's  Guard— 1st  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Cos.  B,  C,  H,  I. 
Escort  Headquarters  First  Army  Corps— 2d  New  York  Cavalry, 

Cos.  A,  B,  I,  K. 
Escort  to   Second  Army  Corps — 6th   New  York  Cavalry,  Cos. 

D  and  K. 
Escort  to  Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps— 1st  Maine  Cavalry 

(detachment). 


Appendix. 


179 


Escort  to  Headquarters  Sixth  Army  Corps — 6th  Pennsylvania 

Cavalry,  Ccs.  B  and  G. 
Escort  to  Headquarters  Ninth  Army  Corps' — 1st  Maine  Cavalry, 

Co.  G. 
Escort   to    Headquarters    Twelfth    Army    Corps— 1st    Michigan 

Cavalry,  Co.  L. 


Cavalry 
Brigadier-General  Alfred 

1st  Brigade— Major  Charles 

Whiting. 

5th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 
6th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

2d  Brigade — Colonel  John   F. 

Farnsworth. 
8th  Illinois  Cavalry. 
3d  Indiana  Cavalry. 
1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 
8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

3d  Brigade— Col.  Richard   H. 

Rush. 

4th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 


Division. 
Pleasanton,  U.  S.  Army. 

4th  Brigade— Col.  Andrew  T. 

McReynolds. 
1st  New  York  Cavalry. 
12th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

5th  Brigade— Colonel  Benj.  F. 

Davis. 

8th  New  York  Cavalry. 
3d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Unattached. 
1st  Maine  Cavalry. 
15th     Pennsylvania     Cavalry 
(detachment). 

Artillery  (attached  to  2d  and 

3d  Brigades). 
2d   U.   S.   Artillery,    Batteries 

A,  B,  L,  M. 
3d  U.    S.   Artillery,    Batteries 

C,  G. 


APPENDIX  7. 

Report  of  officers,  enlisted  men,  and  horses  in  the 
cavalry  and  light  artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
November  1,  1862; 


180 


Appendix. 


TRANSPORTATION. 

HORSES. 

No.  of 

. 

cc 

. 

£ 

Public 

Officers 

Men. 

ffi 

e 

I 

go 

| 

S 

Ani- 

0 

H 

a 
& 

^£ 

n5 
0 

2 

mals. 

Cavalry  and  Light 
Artillery  

396 

7,995 

752 

541 

276 

7,063 

6:50 

8,986 

APPENDIX  8. 


Organization  of  the  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  Va.,  December  11-15, 
1862: 

Escort  at  General  Headquarters — Oneida  (New  York)  Cavalry. 

1st  U.  S.  Cavalry  (detachment),  4th  U.  S.  Cavalry,  Cos.  A 

and  E. 
Attached  to  Provost  Guard — McClellan  (Illinois)  Dragoons,  Cos. 

A  and  B;  2d  U.  S.  Cavalry. 
Escort   at   Headquarters    Ninth    Army    Corps — 6th    New    York 

Cavalry,  Ccs.  B  and  C. 
Escort  at  Headquarters  First  Army  Corps— 1st  Maine  Cavalry, 

Co.  L. 
Escort   at  Headquarters   Sixth   Army   Corps — 10th   New   York 

Cavalry,  Co.  L;  6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Cos.  I  and  K. 

Cavalry  Division  Attached  to  Rifjlit  Grand  Division. 
Brigadier-General  Alfred   Pleasanton. 


1st  Brigade— Brig. -Gen.  John 

F.  Farnsworth. 
8th  Illinois  Cavalry. 
3d  Indiana  Cavalry. 
8th  New  York  Cavalry. 
Artillery— 2d  U.  S.  Battery  M. 


2d  Brigade — (1)  Colonel  David 
McM.  Gregg;    (2)  Colonel 

Thomas  C.  Devin. 
6th  New  York  Cavalry. 
8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
6th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 


Appendix.  181 

Cavalry  Brigade  Attached  to  Center  Grand  Division. 
Brigadier-General  William  W.  Averell. 

1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry.  4th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry 

3d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  5th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

Artillery— 2d  U.  S.,  Batteries  B  and  L. 

Cavalry  Brigade  Attached  to  Left  Grand  Division. 

(1)   Brigadier-General   George   D.    Bayard;    (2)    Colonel    David 

McM.   Gregg. 

1st  Maine  Cavalry.  District    of    Columbia     Inde- 

2d  New  York  Cavalry.  pendent  Co. 

1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  1st  New  Jersey  Cavalry. 

10th  New  York  Cavalry. 
Artillery— 3d  U.  S.,  Battery  C. 


APPENDIX  9. 

Organization  of  the  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
May  1-6,  1863  (Chancellorsville  Campaign): 

Attached    to    the    command    of    Provost-Marshal-General — 6th 
Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Detachment  of  Regular  Cavalry. 

Guards  and  Orderlies— Oneida  (New  York)  Cavalry. 

Escort    Headquarters   First    Army   Corps— 1st    Maine    Cavalry, 
Co.  L. 

Escort  Second  Army  Corps— 6th  New  York,  Cos.  D  and  K. 

Escort  Headquarters  Sixth  Army  Corps— 1st  New  Jersey  Cav 
alry,  1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Escort  Headquarters  Eleventh  Army  Corps— 1st  Indiana,  Cos 
I  and  K. 


—21- 


182  Appendix. 

CAVALRY  CORPS.* 

Brigadier-General  George  Stoneman. 

First  Division. 

Brigadier-General  Alfred  Pleasanton. 
1st  Brigade— Colonel  Benj.  F.        2d  Brigade — Colonel  Thos.  C. 

Davis.  Devin. 

8th  Illinois  Cavalry.  1st  Michigan  Cavalry. 

3d  Indiana  Cavalry.  6th  New  York  Cavalry. 

8th  New  York  Cavalry.  8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

9th  New  York  Cavalry.  17th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Artillery — New  York  Light,  6th  Battery. 

Second  Division. 

Brigadier-General  William  W.  Averell. 
1st   Brigade — Col.    Horace   B.        2d  Brigade— Colonel  John   B. 

Sargent.  Mclntosh. 

1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry.  3d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

4th  New  York  Cavalry.  4th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

6th  Ohio  Cavalry.  16th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

1st  Rhode  Island  Cavalry. 

Artillery— 2d  United  States,  Battery  A. 

Third  Division. 

Brigadier-General  David  McM.  Gregg. 
1st   Brigade— Colonel    Judson          2d  Brigade— Colonel  Percy 

Kilpatrick.  Wyndham. 

1st  Maine  Cavalry.  12th  Illinois  Cavalry. 

2d  New  York  Cavalry.  1st  Maryland  Cavalry. 

10th  New  York  Cavalry.  1st  New  Jersey  Cavalry. 

1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Regular  Reserve  Cavalry  Brigade. 

Brigadier-General  John  Buford. 
6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  5th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

1st  U.  S.  Cavalry.  6th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

2d  U.  S.  Cavalry. 


*The  Second  and  Third  Divisions,  First  Brigade,  First  Di 
vision,  and  the  Reserve  Brigade,  with  Robertson's  and  Tid- 
ball's  batteries  were  on  the  "Stoneman  Raid,"  April  29th  to 
May  2d. 


Appendix.  183 

Artillery. 

Captain  Jas.  M.  Robertson. 

Second  United  States,  Batter-        Fourth    United    States,    Bat- 
ies  B  and  M.  tery  E. 


APPENDIX  10. 

Organization  of  the  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
n\  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  July  1-3,  1863: 

Attached  to  the  command  of  the  Provost-Marshal-General — 2d 
Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Regular 
Cavalry  (detachments  from  1st,  2d,  5th, and  6th Regiments). 

Guards  and  Orderlies — Oneida  (New  York)  Cavalry. 

Escort  Headquarters  First  Army  Corps— 1st  Maine  Cavalry, 
Co.  L. 

Escort  Headquarters  Second  Army  Corps — 6th  New  York  Cav 
alry,  Cos.  D  and  K. 

Escort  Headquarters  Fifth  Army  Corps — 17th  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry,  Cos.  D  and  K. 

Escort  Headquarters  Sixth  Army  Corps — 1st  New  Jersey  Cav 
alry,  Co.  L;  1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry,  Co.  H. 

Escort  Headquarters  Eleventh  Army  Corps— 1st  Indiana  Cav 
alry,  Cos.  I  and  K. 

CAVALRY   CORPS. 
Major-General  Alfred  Pleasanton. 

First  Division. 

Brigadier-General  John  Buford. 

1st  Brigade— Colonel  William        2d  Brigade— Colonel  Thos.  C. 
Gamble.  Devin. 

8th  Illinois  Cavalry.  6th  New  York  Cavalry.. 

12th  Illinois  Cavalry  (4  Cos.).        9th  New  York  Cavalry. 
3d  Indiana  Cavalry  (6  Cos.).  17th  Pennsylvania  Cr, .  al  y. 

8th  New  York  Cavalry.  3d  West  Virginia  Cavaliy  (2 

Cos.). 


184 


Appendix. 


Reserve  Brigade— Brig.-Gen.  Wesley  Merritt. 
6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
1st  U.  S.  Cavalry. 
2d  U.  S.  Cavalry. 
5th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 
6th  U.  S.  Cavalry.       , 

Second  Division. 

Brigadier-General  David  McM.   Gregg. 
Headquarters  Guard — 1st  Ohio  Cavalry,  Co.   A. 


1st  Brigade— Colonel  John  B. 
Mclntosh. 

1st  Maryland  Cavalry  (11 
Cos.). 

Purnell  (Md.)  Legion. 

1st  Massachusetts  Cavaltry.* 

1st  New  Jersey  Cavalry. 

1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

3d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

3d  Pennsylvania  Heavy  Artil 
lery  (section  Bat.  H).t 


2d  Brigade! — Colonel  Pennock 

Huey. 

2d  New  York  Cavalry. 
4th  New  York  Cavalry. 
6th  Ohio  Cavalry  (10  Cos.). 
8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

3d  Brigade — Colonel  J.  Irvin 

Gregg. 

1st  Maine  Cavalry  (10  Cos.). 
10th  New  York  Cavalry. 
4th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
16th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 


Third  Division. 

Brigadier-General  Judson   Kilpatrick. 
Headquarters  Guard — 1st  Ohio  Cavalry.  Co.  C. 


1st  Brigade— (1)  Brig.-Gen.  E. 

J.    Farnsworth;    (2)    Col. 

Nath'l  P.  Richmond. 
5th  New  York  Cavalry. 
18th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
1st  Vermont  Cavalry. 
1st  W>est  Virginia  Cavalry  (10 

Cos.). 


2d    Brigade— Brig.-Gen. 

A.  Custer. 

1st  Michigan  Cavalry. 
5th  Michigan  Cavalry. 
6th  Michigan  Cavalry. 
7th  Michigan  Cavalry. 


Geo. 


*Served  with  Sixth  Army  Corps  and  on  the  right  flank. 

tServing  as  light  artillery. 

$At  Westminster,  and  not  engaged  in  battle. 


Appendix. 


185 


Horse  Artillery. 


1st   Brigade— Capt.   James   C. 

Robertson. 

9th  Michigan  Battery. 
6th  New  York  Battery. 
2d  U.  S.,  Batteries  B,  L,  M. 
4th  U.  S.,  Battery  E. 


2d   Brigade— Captain  John  C. 

Tidball. 

1st  U.  S.,  Batteries  E,  G,  K. 
2d  U.  S.,  Battery  A. 
3d  U.  S..  Battery  C.* 


APPENDIX  11. 

Field  report  of  the  Cavalry  Corps,  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  June  28,  1863  (preceding  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg) : 


d 

5 

«3 

0 

• 

i 

iS 

. 

T3 

'o-S 

*o^S 

0! 

'OCC 

8 

>  cS 

£ 

-2 

'S3 

E 

-2    (H 

33  'S 

oa  o>  o 

§ 

.2 

ft" 

g| 

S 

.2  ® 

W   h 

<»  fl 

*~ 

^ 

o 

QrH 

'c  ?*"< 

Of» 

Q|_I 

o 

H 

B 

W 

0 

E^J 

W 

W 

Corps  Headquarters  
1st  Division  
2d  Division  
Stahel's  Division  

20 
179 
266 
231 

300 
4,019 
4,347 
3  291 

60 

275 

3 

7 

'  iis' 

156 
331 

355 

4,570 
4,534 

'590' 

834 

Brigade  Horse  Artillery 

7 

484 

2 

20 

736 

""!. 

Total  

703 

12,441 

60 

275 

20 

620 

10,195 

1,424 

fNot  reported. 


APPENDIX  12. 


Organization  of  the  cavalry  operating  against  Rich 
mond,  May  5,  1864  (Army  of  the  Potomac): 

Attached   to  Provost  Guard— 1st  Massachusetts   Cavalry,   Cos. 

C  and  D. 

Guards    and    Orderlies— Independent    Company,    Oneida    (New 
York)  Cavalry. 

*With  Huey's  cavalry  brigade,  and  not  engaged  in  battle. 


186  Appendix. 

Escort  to  Headquarters  Second  Army  Corps— 1st  Vermont  Cav 
alry,  Co.  M. 

Escort  to  Headquarters  Sixth  Army  Corps— 8th  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry,  Co  A. 

Attached  to  Ninth  Army  Corps— 3d  New  Jersey  Cavalry,  22d 
New  York  Cavalry,  2d  Ohio  Cavalry,  13th  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry. 

Attached  to  Provisional  Brigade— 24th  New  York  Cavalry 
(dismounted). 

CAVALRY  CORPS. 
General  Philip  H.  Sheridan. 

First  Division. 
Drig.-General  Alfred  T.  A.  Torbert,  Escort  6th  U.  S.  Cavalry. 

1st    Brigade— Brig.-Gen.  Geo.        2d  Brigade— Colonel  Thos.  C. 

A.  Custer.  Devin. 

1st  Michigan  Cavalry.  4th  New  York  Cavalry. 

5th  Michigan  Cavalry.  6th  New  York  Cavalry. 

6th  Michigan  Cavalry.  9th  New  York  Cavalry. 

7th  Michigan  Cavalry.  17th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Reserve  Brigade— Brig.-Gen.  Wesley  Merritt. 

19th  New  York  Cavalry  (1st  Dragoons). 
6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
1st  United  States  Cavalry. 
2d  United  States  Cavalry. 
5th  United  States  Cavalry. 

Second  Division. 
Brigadier-General  David  McM.  Gregg. 

1st  Brigade— Brig.-Gen.  H.  E.        2d  Brigade— Colonel  J.   Irvin 

Davies,  Jr.  Gregg. 

1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry.  1st  Maine  Cavalry. 

1st  New  Jersey  Cavalry.  10th  New  York  Cavalry. 

6th  Ohio  Cavalry.  2d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  4th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

16th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 


Appendix.  187 

Third  Division. 

Brigadier-General  James  H.  Wilson. 
Escort — 8th  Illinois  Cavalry  (detachment). 

1st  Brigade — Colonel  Timothy  2d    Brigade — Col.    George    H. 
M.  Bryan,  Jr.;  Col.  J.  B.  Chapman. 

Mclntosh   (assigned  3a  Indiana  Cavalry. 

May  5th).  8th  New  York  Cavalry. 

1st  Connecticut  Cavalry.  1st  Vermont  Cavalry. 
2d  New  York- Cavalry. 
5th  New  York  Cavalry. 
18th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  James. 
Unattached — 1st  Battalion,  4th  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 
Cavalry  Division — Brigadier-General  August  V.  Kautz. 

1st     Brigade — Colonel    Simon  2d    Brigade — Colonel    Samuel 

H.  Mix.  P.  Spear. 

1st  District  Columbia  Cavalry.  5th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

3d  New  York  Cavalry.  llth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Unattached. 

1st  New  York  Mounted   Rifles. 
1st  U.  S.  Colored  Cavalry. 
2d.  U.  S.  Cavalry. 


APPENDIX  13. 

Organization  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  in  the  operations  against  Richmond,  August 
31,  1864: 

Attached  to  Provost  Guard — 1st  Indiana  Cavalry,  Co.  K;  1st 
Massachusetts  Cavalry,  Cos.  C  and  D;  3d  Pennsylvania 
Cavalry,  Cos.  A,  B,  and  M. 

Guards  and  Orderlies — Independent  Company,  Oneida  (New 
York)  Cavalry. 


188 


A  npendix. 


Escort   at  Headquarters   Ninth   Army  Corps— 3d  New  Jersey 
Cavalry  (detachment). 


CAVALRY. 
Second  Division. 


Brigadier-General 

1st  Brigade — Colonel  William 

Stedman. 

1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry. 
1st  New  Jersey  Cavalry. 
10th  New  York  Cavalry. 
6th  Ohio  Cavalry. 
1st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 


David  McM.  Gregg. 

2d    Brigade— Colonel    Charles 

H.  Smith. 
1st  Maine  Cavalry. 
2d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
4th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
13th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
16th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 


Recapitulation. 

Abstract   from    tri-monthly   returns  showing    present    foil 

duty  equipment  or  effective  strength  of  the  armies  operating 

against  Richmond,  under  General  U.   S.  Grant,  August   31  to 
December  31,  1864. 


ARM. 

Aug.  31st. 

Sept.  30th. 

Oct.  31st. 

Nov.  30th. 

Dec  31st. 

Infantry  

45,963 
6  358 

66,818 
7  122 

76,637 
6  295 

77,387 
8  698 

92,141 
10  059 

Artillery  

7,846 

10,182 

8,011 

10!294 

9,719 

Agpregate  

60,167 

84,122 

90,943 

96,379 

111,919 

APPENDIX  14. 

Effective  force  of  the  First  and  Third  Cavalry  Di 
visions,  Army  of  the  ^henandoah,  February  28,  1865, 
Major-General  Wesley  Merritt,  chief-of -cavalry: 


Appendix. 


189 


Officers. 

Men. 

Total. 

First  Cavalry  Division  (Devin's)  
One  Section,  Companies  C  and  E,  4th  U.  S.  Artillery 
Third  Cavalry  Division  (Cluster's)  

260 
2 

240 

4,787 
52 
4  600 

5,047 
54 
4  840 

One  Section,  Company  M,  2d  U.  S.  Artillery  

1 

45 

46 

Total  

503 

9,484 

9,987 

APPENDIX  15. 

Abstract  from  the  returns  of  the  cavalry  com 
manded  by  Major-General  Philip  H.  Sheridan,  U.  S.  A., 
for  the  month  of  March,  1865 : 


COMMAND. 

Present  for 
Duty. 

Aggre 
gate 
Pres'nt 

Aggre 
gate 
Pres'ni 
and 
Absent. 

Piec 
Arti 

>> 
1 

es  of 
llery. 

2 
'3 

£ 

Officers 

Men. 

1st  Division  (Devin). 
General  Headquarters  
1st  Brigade  (Stagg)  
2d  Brigade  (Fitzhugh)  

5 
48 
82 
20 
2 
166 

5 

1,344 
1,495 

825 
50 

5 
4,801 
5,417 
3,365 
157 

956 
1,168 
659 

47 

'"2" 

2 

Reserve  Brigade  (Gibbs)  
Artillery  (Miller)  
Total  

2,830 

3,719 

13,745 

3d  Division  (Custer). 
General  Headquarters  
1st  Brigade  (Pennington)  
2d  Brigade  (Wells)  
3d  Brigade  (Capehart)  

3 

81 
70 
55 

3 
1,570 
1,959 
1,725 

3 
4,747 

3,884 
3,196 

'.','.'.'. 

1,294 

1,725 
1,336 

Total  

209 

4,355 

5,257 

11,830 

Grand  Total  Army  of  Shenandoah 

375 

7,185 

8,976 

25,575 

2 

-22- 


190 


Appendix. 


COMMAND. 

Present  for 
Duty. 

Aggre 
gate 
Present 

Aggre 
gate 
Pres'nt 
and 
Absent. 

Pieces  of 
Artillery. 

£ 

1 
W 

H3 

2 

£ 

Officers 

Men. 

ARMY  OF  POTOMAC. 
2d  Division  (Crook). 
General  Headquarters  

5 
91 
66 

48 
6 

2,14?' 
1,752 
1,516 
235 

5 

2,776 
3,366 
2,270 
265 

5 
3.950 
4,651 
4,104 
338 

2d  Brigade  (Gregg).  
3d  Brigade  (Smith)  
Artillery  

..£.. 

Total  

216 

5.656 

8,682 

13,048 

8 

Qrand  Total          

591       12,835 

17,658 

38,623 



10 

APPENDIX  16. 

Organization  of  the  Union  Cavalry  in  the  Appo- 
mattox  campaign,  March  29  to  April  9,  1865: 

Escort   to    General   Grant's   Headquarters — 5th   U.    S.    Cavalry, 

Cos.  B,   F,  and  K. 
Attached  to  Provost  Guard  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac — 1st 

Indiana  Cavalry,   Co.  K;    1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry,   Cos. 

C  and  D;   3d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
Quartermaster's    Guard — Independent    Company,    Oneida  (New 

York)  Cavalry. 
Escort    Headquarters    Fifth    Army    Corps — 4th    Pennsylvania 

Cavalry,  Co.  C. 
Escort    Headquarters    Sixth    Army    Corps — 21st    Pennsylvania 

Cavalry,  Co.  E. 

Attached  to  Ninth   Army  Corps — 2d  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
Attached  to  Independent   Brigade — 1st  Massachusetts  Cavalry 

(8  companies). 


Appendix.  191 

CAVALRY. 

Major-General  Philip  H.   Sheridan. 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah — Brevet  Brig.-General  Wesley  Merritt. 

First  Division. 
Brigadier-General  Thomas  C.  Devin. 

1st     Brigade— Colonel  Petier       2d  Brigade— Colonel  Chas.  L. 

Stagg.  Fitzhugh. 

1st  Michigan  Cavalry.  6th  New  York  Cavalry. 

5th  Michigan  Cavalry.  9th  New  York  Cavalry. 

6th  Michigan  Cavalry.  19th  New  York  Cavalry. 

7th  Michigan  Cavalry.  17th  Pennsylvania  Cavi.l.y. 

20th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

Reserve  Brigade— Brig.-Gen.  Alfred  Gibbs. 

2d  Massachusetts  Cavahy. 

1st  United  States  Cavalry. 

6th  United  States  Cavalry. 

6th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry  (6  companies). 

5th  United  States  Cavalry. 

Third  Division. 
Brigadier-General  George  A.  Custer. 

1st  Brigade— Colonel  A.  C.  M.  2d  Brigade— Colonel  William 

Pennington.  Wells. 

1st  Connecticut  Cavalry.  8th  New  York  Cavalry. 

3d  New  Jersey  Cavalry.  15th  New  York  Cavalry. 

2d  New  York  Cavalry.  1st  Vermont  Cavalry. 
2d  Ohio  Cavalry. 

3d  Brigade— Col.   Henry  Capehart. 

1st  New  York  (Lincoln)  Cavalry. 
1st  West  Virginia  Cavalry. 
2d  West  Virginia  Cavalry. 
3d  West  Virginia  Cavalry. 


192  Appendix. 

Second  Division. 

(Army  of  the  Potomac) — Major-General  George  Crook. 
1st  Brigade— Brig.-Gen.  Henry        2d   Brigade— Brvt.   Brig.-Gen. 

B.  Davies,  Jr.  J.  Irvin  Gregg;    Colonel 

1st  New  Jersey  Cavalry.  Samuel  B.  M.  Young. 

10th  New  York  Cavalry.  4th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

24th  New  York  Cavalry.  <8th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

1st   Pennsylvania   Cavalry    (5        16th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 
Cos.).  21st  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 

2d  U.  S.  Artillery,  Battery  A.        1st  U.  S.   Artillery,  Batteries 

H  and  I. 

3d  Brigade— Brevet  Brig.-Gen.  Chas.  B.  Smith. 

1st  Maine  Cavalry. 

2d  New  York  Mounted  Rifles. 

6th  Ohio  Cavalry. 

13th  Ohio  Cavalry. 

Cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  James. 

Unattached — 4th  Massachusetts  Cavalry,  Cos.  I,  L,  and  M;  5th 
Massachusetts  Cavalry  (colored);  7th  New  York  Cavalry 
(1st  Mounted  Rifles). 

Attached  to  Separate  Brigade — 20th  New  York  Cavalry,  Cos. 
D  and  P;  1st  United  States  Colored  Cavalry,  Cos.  B  and  T. 

Headquarters  Guard  Twenty-fourth  Army  Corps — 4th  Massia- 
chusetts  Cavalry,  Cos.  F  and  K. 

Provost  Guard  of  the  Twenty-fifth  Army  Corps — 4th  Massa 
chusetts  Cavalry,  Cos.  E  and  H. 

Attached— 2d  United  States  Colored  Cavalry. 

Cavalry  Division. 

Brigadier-General  Ranald  S.  Mackenzie. 
1st   Brigade — Col.    Robert    M.        2d    Brigade— Colonel    Samuel 

West.  P.  Spear. 

20th  New  York  Cavalry.  1st  District  of  Columbia  (bat- 

5th  Pennsylvania  Cavalry.  talion). 

1st  Maryland  Cavalry, 
llth  Pennsylvania  Cavalry. 


CONTENTS. 


Page 
Introduction .  .  3 


I. 

Cavalry  force  at  the  opening  of  the  Rebellion. 5 

Cavalry  at  Bull  Run   .      .6 

McClellan  assumes  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 6 

Drill  regulations  of  the  cavalry  at  the  opening  of  the  war.    ...    7 

Armament  of  the  volunteer  regiments   .    ...      7 

Peninsular  Army  and  siege  of  Yorktown 9 

Fort  Magruder .     10 

Battle  of  Williamsburg 10 

Hanover  Court  House 11 

Battle  of  Fair  Oaks  12 

Passage  of  the  Chickahominy 13 

Battle  of  Games'  Mill 13 

General  Stoneman  in  command  of  cavalry 15 

II. 

General  Pope  in  command  of  the  Army  of  Virginia 17 

Fremont  in  command  of  the  Mountain  Department 17 

Battle  of  Kernstown 18 

Cavalry  in  the  Army  of  Virginia 18 

Battle  of  Cedar  Mountain 20 

Cavalry  in  the  battle  of  Bull  Run 21 

III. 

Consolidation  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  the  Army  of 

Virginia 23 

Lee's  invasion  of  Maryland 23 

Battle  of  Antietam   .  .    .'.... 24 

Stuart's  raid  into  Pennsylvania 25 

Buford  as  chief  of  cavalry   26 


194  Contents. 

Page 

Bayard  in  command 26 

McClellan  superseded  by  Burnside 28 

Operations  on  the  Rappahannock ....  ....         28 

Averell's  proposed  cavalry  expedition 30 

IV. 

Burnside  succeeded  by  Hooker 31 

Consolidation  of  the  cavalry 31 

Operations  on  the  Rappahannock 32 

Kelly's  Ford 32 

Cavalry  in  West  Virginia    35 

The  Chancellorsville  campaign 37 

Stoneman's  operations 37 

Kilpatrick  on  the  Chickahominy . .  38 

Stoneman's  raid 39 

Pleasanton's  operations 41 

VI. 

Mosby's  raids 43 

Lee's  plan  of  invasion  of  the  Northern  States 44 

"The  Surprise" 45 

Brandy  Station    46 

Effects  of  experience  on  cavalry 47 

VII. 

Lee's  second  objective 48 

Stuart's  operations   ...  48 

Pleasanton's  operations 49 

Increased  confidence  of  the  Federal  cavalry 51 

Army  of  the  Potomac  moves  northward   52 

Kilpatrick  in  command  of  the  Third  Division 52 

VIII. 

Stuart's  cavalry  raid 53 

Lee's  letters  to  Stuart 53 

Stuart  crosses  the  Potomac 54 

Disposition  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 54 

Attack  at  Hanover         ...   55 

Stuart  moves  toward  Gettysburg 56 

Buford's  operations   .  56 

Bu  ford  impressed  with  the  strategic  importance  of  Gettysburg.  .58 


Contents.  195 

IX. 

Page 

Cavalry  operations  around  Gettysburg 59 

Combat  at  Rummel's  Farm 63 

Stuart's  plan  of  attack , 64 

X. 

The  Federal  left  at  Gettysburg 65 

Kilpatrick's  operations     .          66 

Farns worth  at  "Round  Tops" 68 

Merritt's  operations 68 

Farnsworth  and  Kilpatrick 68 

Farnsworth's  charge 69 


XI. 

Cavalry  at  Gettysburg 71 

Cavalry  operations  after  the  battle   72 

Casualties 74 


XII. 

Cavalry  during  the  first  two  years  of  the  war 74 

Furnishing  remounts   75 

Cavalry  much  depleted 78 

Reorganization  under  Hooker 79 

Stoneman's  raid 79 

"Scratches" 80 

"Foot-rot" 80 

The  Cavalry  Bureau  established 81 

The  "dismounted  camp". ..    . ....    81 

XIII. 

Buford's  operations  on  the  Rapidan 83 

Kilpatrick's  operations  on  the  Rappahannock 83 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac 84 

The  Bristoe  campaign 89 

Operations  on  the  Rappahannock 90 


196  Contents. 

XIV. 

Page 

Army  of  the  Potomac  advances  south. 91 

Gregg's  division 91 

Custer's  division 93 

The  campaign  a  failure         .94 

Troops  go  into  winter  quarters ....   94 

Operations  in  December 95 

Fitzhugh  Lee  invades  West  Virginia   96 

Operations  in  January   . 96 

Custer's  raid  into  Virginia 98 

Kilpatrick's  expedition 99 

The  expedition  a  failure 101 

Butler's  expedition 102 


XV. 

Changes  affecting  the  cavalry 102 

Grant  placed  in  command  of  the  armies 102 

Sheridan  given  command  of  the  cavalry 103 

Condition  of  the  cavalry 103 

Meade's  views         ....  103 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  moves  on  the  Army  of  Northern 

Virginia 104 

Sheridan  against  Stuart   107 

The  raid  accomplishes  important  results 110 


XVI. 

Operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 110 

Grant  uncertain  as  to  Lee's  position 112 

Cavalry  at  Cold  Harbor 113 

Cavalry  at  Trevilian  Station   114 

Sheridan's  return 115 

Operations  of  the  Army  of  the  James     116 

Wilson's  raid 118 

Sheridan  recuperates 119 

Raid  of  the  First  and  Second  Cavalry  Divisions 119 

Lee  deceived  by  the  movements  of  the  troops 120 

Results  of  the  cavalry  under  Sheridan 121 


Contents.  197 

XVII. 

Page 

Operations  in  West  Virginia 122 

Campaign  of  the  Kanawha 123 

Operations  begun  in  the  Shenandoah  Valley   124 

Hunter's  Campaign  against  Lynchburg 125 

Early's  operations 126 

Early  engages  Crook 127 

XVIII. 

Early's  second  raid       128 

Grant  determines  to  devastate  the  Shenandoah  Valley 128 

Sheridan's  Valley  campaign 129 

Battle  of  the  Opequon 131 

Losses  at  the  battle  of  the  Opequon 134 

XIX. 

Cavalry  pursues  the  Confederates 135 

Early  makes  a  stand  at  Fisher's  Hill   135 

Early's  army  routed     137 

Losses  at  Fisher's  Hill 138 

The  Valley  campaign  terminated   .139 

Battle  of  Tom's  Brook    140 

Early's  letter  to  Lee 141 

Further  operations .    . .    . 143 

XX. 

Army  of  the  Shenandoah  at  Cedar  Creek 143 

Early  attempts  to  force  the  Union  flank   146 

Sheridan's  ride . .          . 146 

Custer's  charge   .          146 

Losses  at  Cedar  Creek 148 

Federal  and  Confederate  cavalry  contrasted   148 

Early's  army  reassembles  at  New  Market 149 

Merritt's  expedition  into  the  Luray  Valley 149 

Troops  go  into  cantonment  151 


198  Contents. 

XXI. 

Page 

Operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 151 

The  cavalry  division  under  Hancock's  orders 153 

The  division  destroys  the  Weldon  Railroad   153 

The  Second  Cavalry  Division 154 

Merritt  succeeds  Torbert  as  chief-of-cavalry   ....    155 

Custer's  operations .  .    156 

Sheridan  decides  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 157 

Results  of  the  expedition 158 

XXII. 

Sheridan  joins  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  front  of  Peters 
burg 158 

Sheridan's  instructions  from  Grant 159 

Battle  of  Five  Forks   159 

Spoils  of  the  battle 162 

Fight  at  Deep  Creek 163 

Sheridan  determines  to  capture  Lee's  rations 163 

The  attack  at  Sailor's  Creek 165 

Sheridan,  Grant,  and  Lincoln 165 

Lee's  movements 166 

Lee  at  Appomattox 167 

Cavalry  moves  on  to  Washington   168 

XXIII. 

Development  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 169 

American  and  European  cavalry  compared   172 

Bibliography 174 

APPENDIX  1. 
Letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War 175 

APPENDIX  2. 

Organization   of   cavalry,  Army   of   the   Potomac,    October 

15,  1861 175 


Contents.  199 

APPENDIX  3. 

Page 

Organization  of  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  before  Rich 
mond,  June  25  to  July  2,  1862 176 

APPENDIX  4. 

Organization  of  Union  cavalry,   battle  of  Cedar  Mountain, 

August  9,  1862 177 

APPENDIX  5. 

Organization  of  cavalry,    Army  of  Virginia,    August  16  to 

September  2,  1862 177 

APPENDIX  6. 

Organization  of  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac  (South  Mount 
ain  and  Antietam) ,  September  14,  17,  1862 178 

APPENDIX  7. 

Report  of  officers,  enlisted  men,  and  horses  in  the  cavalry  and 

light  artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  November  1,  1862.  .179 

APPENDIX  8. 

Organization   of   cavalry,    Army  of   the  Potomac,  battle   of 

Fredericksburg,  December  11-15,  1862 180 

APPENDIX  9. 

Organization  of  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Chancellors- 
ville  campaign,  May  1-6,  1863   181 

APPENDIX  10. 

Organization  of  cavalry,   Army  of  the  Potomac,    battle  of 

Gettysburg,  July  1-3,  1863 183 

APPENDIX  11. 

Field  report  of  the  Cavalry  Corps,   Army  of  the  Potomac, 

June  28,  1863 ... 185 

APPENDIX  12. 

Organization  of  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac,    operating 

against  Richmond,  May  5,  1864 185 


200  Contents. 

APPENDIX  13. 

Page 
Organization  of  cavalry,  Army  of  the  Potomac,   operating 

against  Richmond,  August  31,  1864 187 

APPENDIX  14. 

Effective  force  of  First  and  Third  Cavalry  Divisions,  Army 

of  the  Shenandoah,  February  28,  1865 188 

APPENDIX  15. 

Abstract  from  the  returns  of  cavalry  commanded  by  Sheridan 

for  March,  1865   189 

APPENDIX  16. 

Organization  of  Union  cavalry,  Appomattox  campaign,  March 

29  to  April  9,  1865 190 


I 


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